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Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential
Damages: Default Theory and Cognitive Reality
LARRY T. GARVIN*
Hadley v. Baxendale's limits on a plaintiff's ability to recover
consequential damages resulting from a breach of contract by now are quite
familiar. Less familiar, but increasingly important, is an additional limit which
focuses on the disproportionality between the contract price charged and the
consequential damages which that breach induced. This limit, which has a long
history, may be found in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and has been
adopted by a good many states; moreover, the current draft of revised Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code contains it.
Disproportionality is largely, if not entirely, unjustifiable when looked at
with the standard economic tools of default ride analysis, in particular problem-
solving default analysis and information-forcing default rule analysis. Under
either, Hadley by itself is more efficient than Hadley with disproportionality, at
least under the great majority of plausible scenarios-those with a high-
magnitude, low-probability risk.
Standard default theory, however, assumes that economic actors will
behave rationally. Recent work in cognitive psychology and experimental
economics suggests otherwise. Even seasoned businesspeople will frequently
underestimate remote risk, which would cause them to charge too low a
premium for bearing the risk. The types of risk that are most prone to
underestimation-those that the promisor finds infrequent, remote, obscure,
and unfamiliar-are the ones that are hence most appropriate for a
disproportionality test, though one that focuses on the disparity between the size
of the risk and the size of the premium charged to bear it.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hadley v. Baxendale1 is probably the one case that every common-law
lawyer may be assumed to have read.2 Its facts-a miller sent his broken
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State University; M.S., University of Michigan; J.D., Yale Law School. My thanks to Mark
Seidenfeld for his helpful comments, Susan Bloodworth and Kasandra Derry for their doughty
research assistance, and Patricia Simonds, Mary McCormick, and the rest of the library staff
for their aid and forbearance.
1 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
2 Cf CHRLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CotrRmcr LAw 917
OHIO STATE IAW JOURNAL
millshaft for repair, and the carrier's delay cost him lost profits from the mill's
closure-may be all too familiar, evoking Kingsfieldian memories of a first-
year contracts class. More importantly, we still look to Hadley as the key to the
law of consequential damages, with every law student at some point learning
the two tests from Hadley: that a party seeking consequential damages must
show either (1) that the damages flowed naturally from the breach of contract,
or (2) that the damages, though not flowing naturally, were nevertheless
foreseeable by the contracting parties at the time of contracting.3 And, as usual
in contract law, we can look to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for clear statements of familiar black-
letter law.
Or can we? Consider first the Restatement (Second). True, the pertinent
section-number 351-starts with something like the test we know and love. 4
Its first subsection starts with an oddly negative version of a foreseeability test:
"Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have
reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was
made." 5 Of course, foreseeability is an elusive term, with its meaning
dependent upon the legal context in which it is used.6 So.the next subsection
defines a foreseeable loss as one that "follows from the breach (a) in the
ordinary course of events, or (b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond
the ordinary course of events, that the party in breach had reason to know." 7
Put together, these subsections amount to little more than Hadley, somewhat
(3d ed. 1993) (" [Hadley is] one of the few cases that probably all students of contract law in
this century have learned to remember by name, even if (as may be likely) they eventually
forget what it stands for."). The only real rivals for this status are Rylands v. Fletcher, 3
L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868), and, at least in the United States, Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.). Unaccountably, United States ex rel.
Mayo v. Satan and His Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971), is not in this number.
3 See Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 145.
4 Or loathe. See, e.g., Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, ConsequentialDamages
for Commercial Loss: An Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 665
(1994) (criticizing the Hadley test and proposing an alternative); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Principle ofHadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REv. 563 (1992) (same).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONTRACrs § 351(1) (1979).
6 Consider, for example, the substantial difference between foreseeability in contract-
the Hadley test-and foreseeability in tort-more or less proximate cause. See, e.g., Koufos
v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. [The Heron HI], [1969] 1 App. Cas. 350, 385-87 (1967) (appeal taken
from Eng.) (opinion of Lord Reid) (distinguishing tort foreseeability from contract); LEON
GREEN, RATONAm OF PROXIMATE CAUsE 44-55 (1927) (same); H.L.A. HART & TONY
HONoR1 , CAUSATION IN THE LAW 308-24 (2d ed. 1985) (same).
7 RESrATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNTCrs § 351(2) (1979).
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loosened, with the two familiar tests in the familiar order. But then we come to
the third subsection, which may surprise even those who remember clearly
their contracts class. There we get a limit on the two familiar tests: that even
foreseeable consequential damages may not be recoverable if the court
"concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid
disproportionate compensation." 8 What is this? Surely nothing from Hadley.
Nor does the comment orient us any better, with its references to the
informality of dealing and the commercial nature of the parties as factors in
determining whether liability should be placed on the promisor.9
Perplexed, we flip quickly to Article 2 of the U.C.C. There we breathe a
sigh of relief, seeing something like the traditional Hadley rule firmly in
place.' 0 But, aware that Article 2 is being revised, and now wary of over-
reliance on our recollections, we look up the current draft of Article 2.11 What
do we find when we see the revised text? The disproportionality language from
the Restatement (Second).12
Now, wait just a moment. For a case so well known as Hadley, and a
doctrine so firmly established, this review has tuned up more surprises than
one would have thought. After all, contracts classes usually do not reach this
disproportionality analysis, 13 and the assiduous reader of law reviews-if any
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 351(3) (1979). Somewhat similar
provisions exist in many state civil codes, typically based on the early Field Code. See CAL.
Civ. CODE § 3359 (West 1970) (only reasonable damages are recoverable when an obligation
"appears to create a right to unconscionable and grossly oppressive damages, contrary to
substantial justice"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-302 (1995) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
03-37 (1996) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 97 (West 1987) (same); S.D. CODmmD
LAWS § 21-1-3 (Michie 1987) (same); see also N.Y. Civ. CODE § 1878 (1865) (substantially
similar).
9 See R SrATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 351 cmt. f (1979).
10 See U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1995).
11 See U.C.C. § 2-806(b) (Tentative Draft, Mar. 1, 1998).
12 See id.
13 Of the roughly two dozen contracts casebooks on the market, only nine contain a case
or comment that discusses disproportionality at all, and only two of these discuss it at any
length. See JAMES F. HOGG & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRAcTs: CASES, PROBLEMS AND
MATmUALS 476-87 (1997) (containing a case directly addressing disproportionality); DAVID
H. VERNON, CONTRACTS: THEORY AND PRAcICE 320-32 (2d ed. 1991) (same); see also
JOHN P. DAwsoN Er AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTs 68-69 (6th ed. 1993)
(containing a case indirectly addressing disproportionality); ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL.,
CONTRAcTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 59-62 (2d ed. 1992) (same); FRIEDRICH KESSLER Er
AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1152-57 (3d ed. 1986) (same); KNAPP &
CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 936 (noting the disproportionality limitation on consequential
damages); EDWARD J. MURPHY Er AL., STUmis IN CONTRAcr LAw 919 (5th ed. 1997)
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such person exists-would have little to recall on the issue. 14 So is
disproportionality a weird academic fancy, of little interest to practical lawyers?
Actually, no. Bear in mind that revised Article 2 of the U.C.C. is likely to
contain disproportionality as a part of its rules on consequential damages. 15 The
U.C.C. is not merely precatory; it is the law of all our common-law states.
16
Should the revision enjoy the popularity of the original, then virtually all
domestic sellers of goods will have to face this rule. 17 And we find
(same); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CoNnrAcrs: CAsEs AND MATERIus 669 (4th ed.
1991) (same); ARTHUR RosErr, CONTRACt LAW AND ITS APPIUCATON 326 (4th ed. 1988)
(same); ROBERT S. SUMMERs & ROBERT A. HILmAN, CONTRACr AND REiATED
OBIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACrlCE 257 (3d ed. 1997) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 351(3)).
14 Since the Restatement (Second) came forth in 1979, only three articles have focused
on disproportionality (though a number of others have mentioned it in passing). See William
Burnett Harvey, Discretionary Justice Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 666 (1982); M.N. Kniffin, A Newly Discovered Contract
Unconscionability: Unconscionability of Remedy, 63 NOTREDAME L. REV. 247 (1988); W.F.
Young, Half Measures, 81 COLuM. L. REv. 19 (1981).
15 As noted earlier, the current draft contains a disproportionality provision. This
provision has been in the draft for over three years. See U.C.C. § 2-715(c) (Tentative Draft,
July 29-Aug. 5, 1994). The provision has been discussed from time to time, but there have
been no proposals to limit its scope. Indeed, the one recent proposal that focuses on
disproportionality would extend it to non-economic losses. See Letter from Charles R.
Keeton, Counsel for General Electric Company, to Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
13 (Feb. 5, 1998) (on file with author).
16 Louisiana, our bastion of civil law, has a more conventional rle in its Civil Code,
though one that abandons foreseeability in cases of bad-faith breach. See LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. arts. 1996 & 1997 (West 1987).
17 Though generally not abroad. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, which the United States has ratified, contains a standard
consequential damages provision. See CISG art. 74. The UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts-a sort of restatement of contracts for international
transactions-also uses a rule much like Hadley. See INTERNATIONAL INSTIUTE FOR THE
UNIRCATION OF PRiVATE LAW, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CoMMERCIAL CorNRAcrs
art. 7.4.4 (1994). Indeed, in its comments UNIDROIT specifically rejects the option of
allowing a court to reduce damages with regard to the circumstances of the contract breached.
SeeMi. at art. 7.4.2 cmt. 1.
Looking to the domestic law of a few other nations, French law also does not provide for
disproportionality as an overlay to consequential damages. See C. civ. arts. 1150 & 1151
(1994). In contrast, German law makes specific performance the usual breach remedy, but
allows the payment of monetary damages where specific performance would prove
disproportionate. See §§ 249 & 251(2) BGB (1992). See generally G.H. TREr, REMEDIES
FOR BREACH OF CONTRACr: A COMPARATIvE ACCOUNT 127-29, 137-38 (1988) (discussing
civil law approaches). Scandinavian countries seem more inclined to limit disproportionate
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disproportionality used more and more at home. Cases of this sort appear as far
back as Roman times, and over two dozen times in the last two decades.
So perhaps it is time to pay some attention to disproportionality.
Consequential damages for breach of contract are so important an element of
contract remedies that if defendants can invoke disproportionality to have these
damages reduced or effaced, they can significantly limit this major source of
liability. It thus becomes important to know just when disproportionality
analysis may properly be invoked. Unfortunately, there seems to be no
consensus here. The writers on disproportionality tend to view it as more or
less an equitable limitation on consequential damages, with all the flexibility and
vagueness that this invocation of equity suggests, and the Restatement (Second)
and the case law provide scarcely more guidance.
Hence this Article. Part II briefly traces the history of disproportionality
analysis in contract remedies and describes the current state of the law and
literature. Part III looks at disproportionality from the vantage of default rule
theory; because the law of consequential damages is almost entirely composed
of default rules, disproportionality is sensible to the extent that it makes a
sensible default rule. As we shall see, though, the case for disproportionality
under classic default rule theory is slight at best. An unconstrained rule would
probably prove highly inefficient in practice, and it is hard, if not impossible, to
define a class of cases for which disproportionality would prove efficient.
This rather gloomy scenario does not, however, end our analysis. Part IV
employs modem cognitive psychology to provide and define a role for
disproportionality as an adjunct to Hadley. Standard default rule theory tends to
assume, as does the bulk of microeconomic analysis, that economic agents are
basically rational-that they employ a coherent set of preferences for risk, and
that they use these preferences consistently and efficiently, maximizing their
gains to the extent possible. But, as a good many empirical studies have shown,
these assumptions are often, perhaps usually, ill-founded. In fact, we carry
around a good many departures from rational choice theory. For example, most
people tend to undervalue remote risks; overvalue vivid data and undervalue
drab data; take risks to avoid loss, but avoid them to protect gains; and many
others.
These cognitive biases greatly affect our response to risk, which is at the
center of much of law. Hence the recent efflorescence of legal literature
damages. See JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY, CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGEs IN COMPARTIVE
ComNT= 187-94 (1989). Finally, English law contains no such doctrine, though
disproportionality has been held relevant to determine whether a limitation of liability clause is
enforceable. See George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd., [1983] 2
App. Cas. 803, 816-17 (H.L.); see also infra note 74 (American cases).
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employing cognitive analysis. 18 Oddly, though, relatively little of it has dealt
with its implications for contract and commercial law19-oddly, because much
of the purpose of contracts in practice is to diminish and allocate risks of market
shifts, product and labor scarcity, and the like. If, contrary to the assumptions
of standard law-and-economics analysts, those who enter into contracts cannot
be assumed to act rationally, in the sense of making coherent decisions to
maximize wealth, perhaps the law's expectations should be adjusted. More
particularly, what if parties to a contract systematically tend to undervalue
remote risk-the sort of risk at the core of disproportionality analysis? Then the
law of consequential damages might properly take into account the possibility
that these remote risks might not have been allocated to the breaching party,
even though they were foreseeable. If the parties undervalue the risk, they will
not assign it a large enough risk premium. The party bearing the risk would
thus not be sufficiently compensated if it had to bear the full risk. This
undervaluation is the focus of Part IV, which surveys the data supporting its
presence and its varying strength and endurance.
Part V considers just where disproportionality analysis might sensibly be
used. It ought not be ubiquitous; its presence adds greatly to commercial
uncertainty and hence commercial cost, and in any case there are a good many
types of contracting parties that should be assumed to have dealt satisfactorily
with remote risk. Rather, its use should largely be confined to those breachers
who deal but infrequently with the risk in question, who lack substantial
experience with the risk, and for whom the risk is insufficiently salient to
overcome the natural tendency to underestimate remote risk. Interestingly, this
result does in fact explain most modem disproportionality decisions, but runs
flatly against many of the earliest such cases-including a Cardozo opinion that
18 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 1027 (1990) (administrative law); Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public
Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1 (1995) (mnsts and
estates); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement:
An Experimental Approach, 93 MIcI. L. REv. 107 (1994) (civil procedure); Donald C.
Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics
About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996) (securities
regulation); Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tar, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1861
(1994) (tax).
19 For the few exceptions, see, for example, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211 (1995); Larry T. Garvin,
Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. CoLO. L. Ray.
71 (1998); Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term
Contracts, 69 MuNN. L. REv. 521 (1985); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect
Infomation in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security
Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1983).
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helped trigger, with some delay, the modem explosion in disproportionality. 20
11. DISPROPORTIONAITY-PAST AND PRESENT
A. The Origins of Disproportionality
Disproportionality in contract remedies goes back much further than the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, or, indeed, than the common law. Even in
Roman law one sees antecedents of the modem approach. To be sure, the
Roman law of consequential damages is itself not clear, perhaps including a
foreseeability test.21 Beyond this limit, though, is some modest evidence of
early disproportionality. One comment in the Digest of Justinian concerns
damages claimed by a buyer with respect to the manumission of a slave that he
had purchased and trained. The buyer sought damages both for the price of the
slave-direct damages-and for the cost of training-consequential damages.
The commentator thought that the normal rule, which allowed an action for the
full value of the slave, was reasonable, but that the rule would be unfair if the
price was greatly exceeded by the slave's worth (if, for instance, the slave had
been trained as a charioteer or a dancer). 22 Then, said another commentator,
the better rule would be limiting damages to twice the contract price,23 a rule
which seems to have been in effect in later Roman law. 24 Roman law thus
seems to have recognized the risk that consequential damages might be
disproportionate, and seems as well to have had a means, however crude, of
limiting these damages.
20 See Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 157 N.E. 140 (N.Y. 1927) (Cardozo,
C.J.).
21 See, e.g., REwHARD ZImM mANN, THE LAw op OBUGATONS 826-33 (1995);
FRANCIS DE ZULUErA, THE RoMAN LAW OF SALE 41 (1945). Compare DIG. 19.1.13.pr.
(Jlpian, Edict 32) (full consequential damages), DIG. 19.1.13.13 (Ulpian, Edict 32) (same),
DIG. 21.2.8 (Julian, Digest 15) (same), DIG. 21.2.60 (Javolenus, Plautius 2) (same), and DIG.
21.2.70 (Paul, Questions 5) (same), with DIG. 19.1.21.3 (Paul, Edict 33) (lost profits not
included). See also, e.g., W.W. BucKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF RoMAN LAw 494 (Peter Stein
ed., 3d ed. 1966) (canvassing authority; Roman law probably had some limits on
consequential damages, but unclear just what); cf DIG. 19.1.1.pr. (Ulpian, Sabenius 28)
(measure of damages for breach of sales contract sometimes exceeds price).
22 See DIG. 19.1.43 (Paul, Questions 5).
23 See DIG. 19.1.44 (Africanus, Questions 8).
24 See CODE JUSr. 7.47.1 (Justinian 530); see also, e.g., DE ZuLuErA, supra note 21, at
45; J.A.C. THOMAs, TEXTOOK OF RoMAN LAw 285-86 (1976). Note that this rule applied
to breach of contract actions, but not to less certain actions, presumably including actions in
tort. So much for early attempts at tort reform.
1998]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The common law was slow to recognize disproportionality as a limit on
consequential damages-but then, it was also slow to recognize foreseeability
as a limit on consequential damages. 25 In this area, as in others pertaining to
contract, Roman law had little direct effect.26 Rather, common-law decisions
before Hadley put few structural limits on consequential damages. Instead, they
left the general question of damages for breach of contract to the jury, largely
without constraints.27 Any existing limits tended to look more like those in the
modem law of tort than the modem law of contract. Some courts, for example,
required a showing of proximate cause for a potential item of damage to be
recoverable. 28 Others required a significant degree of certainty, which tended to
eliminate the more speculative sort of consequential damages.29 Still others used
25 For that matter, it was slow to award damages for breach, not fully developing this
right until the thirteenth century. See, e.g., 3 W.S. HOLDsWORTH, A HIsTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 417-28 (3d ed. 1927); George T. Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law
(pt. 1), 47 L.Q. REv. 345, 345 (1931). Once it did, it was slow to recognize the existence of
consequential damages at all. As one early damages treatise put it, "the law does not aim at
complete compensation for the injury sustained... [i]n other words, the law refuses to take
into consideration any damages remotely or consequentially resulting from the act complained
of." THEODORE SED-WICK, A TREAmE ON THE MEASUmE OF DAMAGEs 63-64 (photo.
reprint 1972) (1847).
2 6 See, e.g., 3 HoLDSwORTH, supra note 25, at 412. Roman law did, however,
influence the common law of contract damages indirectly, through the intermediary of civil
law (primarily French). See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
2 7 Thus, for example, leading treatises of the time on contracts paid little attention to
damages, typically saying only, as did one, that "it is, in general, entirely the province of the
jury to assess the amount, with reference to all the circumstances of the case." JOSEPH
CHIrY, A PRACICAL TREATSE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs 343 (3d Am. ed., Philadelphia,
Grigg & Elliot 1834); see also, e.g., George T. Washington, Damages in Contract at
Common Law (pt. 2), 48 L.Q. REv. 90, 90 (1932) ("When one looks back over the older law
of damages, the word 'discretion' seems to provide the key to its philosophy."). Professor
Horwitz similarly found that juries awarded damages with minimal constraint until the early
nineteenth century saw the advent of the expectation measure. See MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860 at 166-67, 174-77 (1977). But see
A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 533,
547-61 (1979) (criticizing Horwitz and arguing that expectation damages had long since
arisen).
28 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Percy, 5 Wend. 535, 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); see also,
e.g., SEDOwiCK, supra note 25, at 74-75 (proximate cause as requirement).
29 To some extent, this fear of speculation has survived in modem law. At the lowest
level, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, so wholly speculative claims for damages wil
fail. Beyond that, though, a few jurisdictions retain the old rule that new businesses may not
claim lost profits as consequential damages in actions for breach, because they have no record
of past profits that would support such an award. See, e.g., Molly Pitcher Canning Co. v.
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language vaguely redolent of foreseeability, though never quite arising to the
level of Had/ey.30 As Richard Danzig has observed, though, the general
approach taken by common-law courts on the eve of Hadley gave quite
substantial leeway to the jury.31
And then, of course, came Hadley. Others have related its history at
considerable and entertaining length, so we need not recount it here.32 For our
purposes, it is sufficient to note that the opinion marked a change in the
common law from relatively unconstrained jury awards of consequential
damages to awards constrained by foreseeability. The idea of foreseeability was
not entirely foreign to common lawyers, of course, though it was at least
unusual. But the court did not refer to any common-law cases when setting
forth this principle. Rather, it relied upon civilian authority-in particular, the
French Civil Code, which carried forward the Roman use of foreseeability. 33
Central of Ga. Ry., 253 S.E.2d 392, 396-97 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979). This rule was once
standard, but has since become very much a minority position; instead, most modem courts
now allow a new firm to seek lost profits, using the best evidence it can (for instance, the
profits of similar businesses or expert projections). See, e.g., Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 242
N.W.2d 372, 376 (Mich. 1976). See generally 1 ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES
FOR LOsT PRoFrrs § 4.2 (4th ed. 1992 & Supp. 1997) (collecting cases).
30 See, e.g., McAlpin v. Lee, 12 Conn. 129, 132-33 (1837) (holding no recovery for
consequential damages unless the loss naturaly resulted from the breach); Masterton & Smith
v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 7 Hill 61, 68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); see also, e.g., SEDWCK, supra
note 25, at 69-72, 76, 79-88.
31 See Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 255 (1975); see also, e.g., Waters v. Towers, 155 Eng. Rep.
1404, 1405 (Ex. 1853) (placing determination of damages due to breach of contract with
jury); Black v. Baxendale, 154 Eng. Rep. 174, 175 (Ex. 1847) ("It is not a question for the
Judge, but for the jury, to decide what are reasonable expenses.").
32 See, e.g., Danzig, supra note 31, at 255. One of the most interesting facts about
Hadley is its close tie to Black, a case it quickly and decisively reversed. The defendant, of
course, was the same. In addition, Baron Alderson, the author of the opinion in Hadley, was
one of the judges in Black, as was Baron Parke, another of the Hadley judges. The third
Hadley judge, Baron Martin, was also present, though not yet a judge; he was counsel for
Baxendale. See id. at 256. I suppose it is obvious that the Canons of Judicial Ethics had not
yet been issued.
33 See Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 147-48 (quoting C. Civ. liv. iii, tit. iii, § 1150 (1994))
("The debtor is liable only for the damages foreseen, or which might have been foreseen.");
1 ROBERT JOSEPH PoTHiER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 81-86 (William David
Evans ed., Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1826) (leading French treatise on contracts; lays out
consequential damages rule based on contemplation of the parties); ZIMMERMANN, supra note
21, at 829-30. This civilian influence on the common law was hardly uncommon, as others
have observed. See, e.g., A.W.B. Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law,
91 L.Q. REv. 247, 255-57 (1975).
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The Hadley rule was adopted rapidly in the United States, with courts
flocking to it within a decade or two of its arrival. 34 Importantly, one reason
advanced for adopting Hadley was its effect on disproportionate damages. A
good illustration is Fleming v. Beck,35 in which the plaintiff claimed lost profits
as damages for breach of a contract to dress millstones.36 The court rebuffed
the plaintiff, in large part because it feared the effect of holding the supplier of a
small part of a mill liable for the losses if the mill were idle. 37 It thought the
Hadey test well adapted to keeping damages within reasonable bounds,
imposing on the breaching party "the proportion of [the loss] that a proper view
of his acts and the attending circumstances would dictate."' 38 In much the same
vein, another court, in applying the Hadley rule, observed that the effect of
allowing unlimited consequential damages "would often be to impose a liability
wholly disproportionate to the nature of the act or service which a party had
bound himself to perform and to the compensation paid and received
therefor." 39
Not long after Hadley's advent, though, some courts sought to restrict
further the scope of consequential damages. A particularly notorious approach
was the so-called tacit agreement test, most famously put forth by Justice
Holmes in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co.40 There Holmes held
that "mere notice to a seller of some interest or probable action of the buyer is
not enough necessarily and as a matter of law to charge the seller with special
damage on that account if he fails to deliver the goods." 41 This contradicts what
34 See, e.g., United States Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232, 249 (1868) ("This is
the rule furnished by the case of Hadley v. Baxenae... which has been recognized... as
being in all respects the most correct and precise."); Squire v. Western Union Tel. Co., 98
Mass. 232, 237-38 (1867) ("[A] party can be held liable for a breach of contract only for
such damages as are the natural or necessary, and the immediate and direct results of the
breach."); Messmore v. New York Shot & Lead Co., 40 N.Y. 422, 427 (1869) ("[T]he party
injured by a breach of a contract, is entitled to recover all his damages ... as might naturally
be expected to follow the breach.").
35 48 Pa. 309 (1864).
3 6 See id. at 312.
37 See id. at 313.
38 Id. F7eming thus stands for Hadley as a means of combatting disproportionality, rather
than for disproportionality as a limit on Hadley, as has been argued. See Knifin, supra note
14, at 261-62.
39 Squire, 98 Mass. at 237; see also, e.g., Rochester Lantern Co. v. Stiles & Parker
Press Co., 31 N.E. 1018, 1021-22 (N.Y. 1892) (applying the second part of Hadley; pointing
to disproportionality as a justification).
40 190 U.S. 540 (1903).
4 1 Id. at 545.
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we have come to think of as the second part of Hadley analysis, for which
notice-even mere notice-would be sufficient. Rather, held Holmes, the
plaintiff needs to establish that the extent of a promisor's liability "should be
worked out on terms which it fairly may be presumed he would have assented
to if they had been presented to his mind." 42 Holmes drew this test from a
series of English cases that followed swiftly upon Hadley,43 and it soon
became, for a time, a popular American rule. 44
More directly to our point, a number of courts toyed with considering
disproportionality when determining whether to award consequential damages.
The cases are few enough, and scattered enough, that they are less a line than a
series of collinear points (with one segment); still, they bear some attention, as
the clearest predecessors to modem disproportionality doctrine. First, we
examine the disconnected cases. They share a worry that the promisor might
not have assumed all the potential for loss that was realized, and use
disproportionality as a means of determining whether the promisor should be
charged with having taken on the risk. Thus, for example, in a dispute over a
breached contract to lay railroad tracks, one court denied consequential
damages for a lost rebate of interest on bonds, saying that "[t]he damages
insisted upon, under this rule, exceed $44,000-a sum enormously out of all
proportion to the amount to be paid for the entire work." 45
Another such case, this time involving a delay in installing boilers needed
42 Id. at 543. Indeed, this test was adopted by some courts in part for fear of
disproportionate liability. See, e.g., Haight v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 277 P. 525, 527-28
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929).
4 3 See, e.g., Home v. Midland Ry., 7 L.R.-C.P. 583, 591 (1872); British Columbia &
Vancouver's Island Spar, Lumber, & Saw-Mill Co. v. Nettleship, 2 L.R.-C.P. 499, 509
(1868). This line was not without criticism in England-from, among others, a future Lord
Chancellor. See, e.g., F.E. Smith, The Rue in Hadley v. Baxendale, 16 L.Q. Rav. 275,
284-85 (1900) (author later created Lord Birkenhead). Ultimately, English courts adhered to
Hadley as it is now understood. See, e.g., Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman
Indus. Ltd., [1949] 2K.B. 528, 540.
44 See Charles T. McCormick, The Contemplation Rue as a Limitation Upon Damages
for Breach of Contract, 19 MINN. L. REV. 497, 511-15 (1935) (referencing cases). The rule
has since been abandoned in every state save Arkansas. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 2
(1995) ("The 'tacit agreement' test for the recovery of consequential damages is rejected."); 3
E. AuLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CoNTRAcrs § 12.14 (1990). But see Morrow v.
First Nat'l Bank, 550 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ark. 1977) (reaffirming adherence to tacit agreement
test). Since Globe Refining has not yet been overturned by the Supreme Court, it remains the
law for federal contracts. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 233,
242-43 n.8 (1995).
45 Snell v. Cottingham, 72111. 161, 170 (1874).
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to operate a mil,46 presented a plaintiff that sought damages for lost profits
resulting from the delay. The court there, worried that "the breach of a very
simple contract... might bring ruin upon the parties failing, when no such loss
was contemplated," found that "[w]here the damages claimed, as in this case,
largely exceed the contract price... we may well question the justice of such a
conclusion in the absence of a clear showing that such a result was anticipated
by the parties." 47 So here disproportionality impelled the court to impose a very
strict level of proof of intent, not unlike the tacit agreement test in effect.
Perhaps the most prominent of these cases is Sullivan v. O'Connor,48 in
which an entertainer underwent some remarkably unsuccessful rhinoplasty-
unsuccessful despite the surgeon's promise that she would be more attractive. 49
The court reluctantly acknowledged the presence of a claim in contract, but
elected to limit the plaintiff to her reliance damages. It reasoned that "the fee
paid by the patient to the doctor for the alleged promise would usually be quite
disproportionate to the putative expectancy recovery." 50 Furthermore,
enforcing contracts in this context could be troublesome; while failing to do so
might encourage quackery, doing so too promiscuously might encourage
defensive medicine and perhaps would dissuade physicians from uttering
reassuring words.51
Other cases could be summed up, though probably with no analytical
gain.52 It should be added, though, that disproportionality arguments did not
46 What is it with these mills? First Hadley, then Fleming, and now this. The mills of the
Gods grind slowly ....
47 McEwen v. McKinnon, 11 N.W. 828, 830 (Mich. 1882).
48 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973).
49 Instead, her nose "now had a concave line to about the midpoint, at which it became
bulbous; viewed frontally, the nose from bridge to midpoint was flattened and broadened, and
the two sides of the tip had lost symmetry." Id. at 185. Not a desirable result, unless her star
tam was impersonating Ernest Borgnine. Perhaps if Doctor McGee of Hawkins v. McGee
fame had performed Ms. Sullivan's operation, she would have had a hairy nose as well.
5 0 Id. at 188.
5 1 See id. at 186.
52 See, e.g., Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Griffith, 43 F.2d 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1930); Great
Am. Music Mach., Inc. v. Mid-South Record Pressing Co., 393 F. Supp. 877, 885 (M.D.
Tenn. 1975); Moulthrop v. Hyett, 17 So. 32, 33-34 (Ala. 1895); University Hills Beauty
Acad., Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 554 P.2d 723, 726 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976);
Flug v. Craft Mfg. Co., 120 N.E.2d 666, 671 (IlI. App. Ct. 1954); Romberg v. Hughes, 26
N.W. 351, 353 (Neb. 1886); Armstrong & Latta v. City of Philadelphia, 94 A. 455, 458 (Pa.
1915); cf. Majors v. Kalo Labs., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20, 22-23 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (finding




always overwhelm courts. At times, disproportionality, though considered
relevant to whether damages were within the reasonable contemplation of the
parties, was not thought conclusive.53 One court rejected it out of hand.54
Advocates for disproportionality thus could draw only modest strength from
this part of the case law.
The closest thing to a line of cases before the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts arose from contracts to send telegrams.55 Not infrequently, the result
of an errant missive was substantial loss, perhaps because of missed business
opportunities or wasted expenditures. The problem was often litigated in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 56 In general, the results were
predictable, given orthodox HadLey analysis: consequential damages would not
be recoverable unless they either flowed naturally from the breach or should
have been expected to fall within the contemplation of the parties. 57 For the
second part of Hadley to be satisfied, the telegraph company would ordinarily
need notice, though this requirement was often slight. A message couched in
the language of business would give sufficient notice to trigger liability for
consequential damages, even if the full import of the message was not thereby
disclosed, as long as the probable consequences of faulty delivery were
apparent. 58
53 See, e.g., Campfield v. Sauer, 189 F. 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1911).
54 See Edward de V. Tompkins, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 110 A. 183, 192-93 (Conn.
1920).
55 There is another line of sorts, though it is rather specialized. Gdvernment contractors
generally are held not to be liable to members of the public for failure to provide the services
contracted for, barring a contractual term that states otherwise. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CONTRACrs § 313(2) (1979); see also, e.g., Zigas v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 806,
811 (Ct. App. 1981); Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (N.Y. 1928)
(Cardozo, C.J.). The rationale is in part that the liability might prove "disproportionately
burdensome in relation to the value of the promised performance." Zigas, 174 Cal. Rptr. at
811 n.3.
56 Indeed, the whole area of telegraph company regulation inspired treatises which now
make singularly dry reading. See, e.g., S. WALTER JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TEmGRAPH AND TEEPHONE COMPANms (2d ed. 1916).
57 See, e.g., Squire v. Western Union Tel. Co., 98 Mass. 232, 238 (1867); Leonard v.
New York, Albany & Buffalo Electro-Magnetic Tel. Co., 41 N.Y. 544, 566 (1870) (opinion
of Earl, C.J.); United States Tel. Co. v. Wenger, 55 Pa. 262, 267 (1867).
58 See, e.g., Fererro v. Western Union Tel. Co., 9 App. D.C. 455, 470-71 (1896);
McNeil v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 134 N.W. 611, 613-14 (Iowa 1912); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Sheffield, 10 S.W. 752, 754-55 (Tex. 1888). Indeed, some courts held that the mere
fact of sending a coded telegram was notice of its importance, laying the carrier open to
liability for consequential damages if it miscarried, though this was a minority position.
Compare Wheelock v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 83 N.E. 313, 316 (Mass. 1908) (finding no
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By their nature, however, the telegram cases were especially prone to
disproportionality reasoning. The cost of a telegram was small, but the
consequential damages that could result from failure to deliver were potentially
very large. It is thus unsurprising to see a number of disproportionality cases
among the telegraphic array. Some addressed the issue indirectly, by stressing
the low cost of the telegram and the high and often speculative damages. 59
Others were more direct. Perhaps the most important was Kerr Steamship Co.
v. Radio Corp. of America,60 Judge (later Justice) Cardozo's contribution to the
field.
In Kerr Steamship, a ciphered telegram went undelivered, resulting in
unladen and ultimately uncarried cargo.61 The carriage was worth $6675.29
and the telegram cost $26.78. Cardozo, for a unanimous court, began with
relatively orthodox analysis, pointing out the obscurity of the message and its
consequent failure to give the telegraph company any real aid to detecting its
significance.62 In justifying the traditional rule, though, Cardozo launched into
something like disproportionality. He worried about the potentially "crushing"
liabilities to which the carriers could be put; as a result of these large and
uncertain liabilities, they would have to raise their rates to all, even though only
a few would gain. 63 The potential range of liabilities would be large: "to one
the loss of freight, to another an idle factory, to another a frustrated bargain for
the sale or leasing of the cargo. " 64 The sender, in contrast, could easily insure
against loss accurately, knowing as it did the magnitude of the potential harm.65
Kerr Steamship is not, perhaps, as explicit a disproportionality case as some,
but it was one of the few cases referred to in the Restatement (Second) on this
issue, and the basis of one of the illustrations. 66
By the eve of the Restatement (Second), then, disproportionality arguments
liability), and Candee v. Western Union Tel. Co., 34 Wis. 471, 480-81 (1874) (same), with
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Way, 4 So. 844, 849-50 (Ala. 1887) (finding liability), and
Bailey v. Western Union Tel. Co., 76 A. 736, 740 (Pa. 1910) (same). See also JONEs, supra
note 56, at 536-38.
59 See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. R.J. Jones & Sons, 211 F.2d 479, 485 (5th Cir.
1954).
60 157 N.E. 140 (N.Y. 1927).
61 See id. at 140-41. The ciphered message began with the sonorous "akjedudaht
akfreictoj kinghorn urgpoopgwo." DAWSON Er AL., supra note 13, at 68.
62 See Kerr S.S., 157 N.E. at 140-42.
63 See id. at 142.
64Id. at 141.
65 See id. at 142.
66 See RETAT (SECOND) OF CoNrAMTS § 351 illus. 17 & reporter's note (1979).
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had made rather modest headway. The reporters contained a handful of
decisions that gave it weight, whether as a reason to adopt Hadley or as a
limitation on Hadley itself, and concerns about excessive damages had
otherwise encouraged some courts to restrict consequential damages further
than did even Had/ey.67 Commentators seldom held forth on disproportionality,
though those who did tended to give it at least tepid support. 68 Perhaps the
leading supporter was Professor Farnsworth, who suggested that foreseeability
might properly be limited where disproportion indicated that the risk had not
been assumed by the promisor.69 Professor Farnsworth was in rather a good
position to ensure that his proposal might take wing: he was the reporter for the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. A convenient marriage of will and
authority.
Little need be said about the origin of Restatement (Second) section 351(3).
Its original draft did not mention disproportionality in the text, referring instead
to a court's ability to limit damages "if it concludes that justice so requires. "70
Only in the comments did disproportionality arise, as the first-mentioned
circumstance under which justice might require reducing or eliminating the
consequential damages. 71 The provision was changed as a result of discussion
at an American Law Institute meeting, during which some members expressed
concern at the open-endedness of the black-letter text and suggested that
disproportionality be brought up from the comments for the sake of clarity. 72
B. Modem Disproporionality
The law of disproportionality since the Restatement (Second), though not
overwhelmingly large, 73 nevertheless contains much fodder for analysis. For
67 A somewhat exaggerated view may be found in the American Law Institute's
discussion leading up to section 351(3); in the words of the reporter, this is "a rule that you
can find only a couple of cases to support explicitly and then some statements by scholars and
interpretations of other cases to support implicitly." 56 A.L.I. PRocEmDNGs 338-39 (1979).
68 See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 44, at 511. Fuller and Perdue mention
disproportionality in their classic article, but only as a matter of description. See L.L. Fuller
& William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 88, 373, 374 (1936-1937).
69 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L.
REv. 1145, 1208-10 (1970).
70 RESrATEMNT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 365(3) (Tentative Draft No. 14, 1979).
71 See id. at cmt. f.
72 See 56 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 340-49 (1979).
73 As Professor Farnsworth, perhaps somewhat disappointedly, puts it, "this frank
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the most part, the courts that have discussed the issue have chosen to follow the
Restatement (Second), or have installed home-grown common-law
equivalents. 74 In addition, a few states have statutes that do much of the work
of section 351(3). 75 Indeed, only one court-a diversity court, loath to extend
state law-has declined to apply disproportionality analysis. 76
Courts that consider disproportionality do so in a wide range of contexts,
Many of the cases arise from ordinary goods or services contracts. 77 Some
involve contracts between governments and private parties, typically over
contracting out government services or developing public lands.78 An unusual
recognition of the judicial reluctance [to impose disproportionate liability] has little explicit
support in the courts." 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, § 12.17 at 272-73.
74 C., e.g., Husman Constr. Co. v. Purolator Courier Corp., 832 F.2d 459, 462 (8th
Cir. 1987) (validity of limitation on carrier's liability in bill of lading; otherwise would have
disproportionate liability); Bemstein v. GTE Directories Corp., 631 F. Supp. 1551, 1553 (D.
Nev. 1986) (validity of limitation of liability clause in contract for telephone directory listing;
would have disproportionate harm if clause invalidated); Pinnacle Computer Sys., Inc. v.
Ameritech Pub., Inc., 642 N.E.2d 1011, 1014-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Wassenaar v.
Panos, 331 N.W.2d 357, 364 (Wis. 1983) (validity of liquidated damages clause; invalid if
actual damages grossly disproportionate to liquidated amount).
7 5 As noted earlier, a number of state civil codes contain provisions that bar
unreasonable damages. See supra note 8. The cases following these codes have tended to limit
general damages, rather than consequential damages, though they have done so with
disproportion in mind. See, e.g., Kimmel v. Keefe, 88 Cal. Rptr. 47, 51-52 (Ct. App. 1970);
Schmidt v. Beckelman, 9 Cal. Rptr. 736, 742 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Avery v. Fredericksen
& Westbrook, 154 P.2d 41, 42 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944); Schneberger v. Apache Corp.,
890 P.2d 847, 854 (Okla. 1994). A few cases have, however, used the provisions to limit
consequential damages. See, e.g., Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365,
372-75 (Ct. App. 1996); Breznikar v. T.J. Topper Co., 72 P.2d 895, 898-99 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1937); DTS Tank Serv., Inc. v. Vanderveen, 683 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Okla. 1984).
7 6 See Sovereign Chem. & Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Ameropan Oil Corp., 148 F.R.D.
208, 213 (N.D. 111. 1992). But see Snell v. Cottingham, 72 Il. 161, 170 (1874) (applying
disproportionality); Flug v. Craft Mfg. Co., 120 N.E.2d 666, 671 (1M. App. Ct. 1954)
(same). C. EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 956 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner,
J.) (referring to disproportion as a means of addressing foreseeability; citing to Snell and
FYug).
77 See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Martine, 567 A.2d 808, 811 (Conn. 1989) (sale
of automobile); Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 379-82
(N.J. 1992) (construction contract); Seaman v. United States Steel Corp., 400 A.2d 90, 93
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (sale of heel plate for floating crane); Manouchehri v.
Heim, 941 P.2d 978 (N.M. 1997) (sale of used X-ray machine); Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613-14 (App. Div. 1983) (sale of harvesting
machine).
78 See All Points Towing, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 735 P.2d 145 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
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number deal with shipping inspections.79 Others allege breaches of lending
agreements,80 franchise agreements, 81 proposed asset purchases,82 and other
types of contracts. 83 This range is not too dissimilar from any other random
collection of contracts opinions, though obviously all share the potential for
very large consequential damages. Perhaps for that reason, they are almost all
mercantile contracts; it is unlikely that an individual would be able to pile up
huge consequential damages, and almost as unlikely that one would supply
something to a firm that could. 84
More important is how the courts apply disproportionality. Some, as noted,
use it in related, but distinct, contexts-generally determining the validity of a
limitation of liability clause or a liquidated damages clause. 85 Of those that face
our basic fact pattern-very large consequential damages and a relatively small
contract price-we see two basic categories. A number of courts seem to use
disproportion as a means of determining what risks the parties to the agreement
(contract to provide towing services to municipality); Zigas v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr.
806 (Ct. App. 1981) (financing agreement for low-income housing); Goodstein Constr. Corp.
v. City of New York, 604 N.E.2d 1356 (N.Y. 1992) (negotiation agreement for development
rights); Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 489 N.Y.S.2d 939, 951-57 (App. Div. 1985)
(Hancock, P.J., dissenting), rev'd, 537 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1989) (constution of stadium).
79 See Vitol Trading S.A. v. SGS Control Servs., Inc., 874 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1989);
Sundance Cruises Corp. v. American Bureau of Shipping, 799 F. Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), aft'd, 7 F.3d 1077 (2d Cir. 1993); International Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS
Control Servs., Inc., 743 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), a'd, 38 F.3d 1279 (2d Cir. 1994).
80 See Markowitz & Co. v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 608 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1979);
Native Alaskan Reclamation & Pest Control, Inc. v. United Bank Alaska, 685 P.2d 1211
(Alaska 1984); Glatt v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 383 N.W.2d 473 (N.D. 1986).
81 See Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365 (Ct. App. 1996).
82 See Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 578 N.E.2d 789 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
83 See, e.g., Husman Constr. Co. v. Purolator Courier Corp., 832 F.2d 459 (8th Cir.
1987) (courier services); Dixon Venture v. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co., 584 A.2d 797 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (transfer of contaminated property); Paris of Wayne, Inc. v.
Richard A. Hajiar Agency, 416 A.2d 436 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (real estate
brokerage agreement); General Star Indem. Co. v. Bankruptcy Estate of Lake Geneva Sugar
Shack, Inc., 572 N.W.2d 881 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (commercial insurance policy).
84 The comment to the Restatement (Second) observes, however, that section 351(3) is
"more likely to be imposed in connection with contracts that do not arise in a commercial
setting." RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 351 cmt. f (1979). Very nearly the only
non-commercial contracts that have been the subject of disproportionality disputes are
governmental contracts-and, if the point of this comment was to bring out the relative
sophistication of commercial parties, the governmental cases are only dubiously non-
commercial.
85 See supra note 74.
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contemplated shifting, whether because they had not entirely shedded the tacit
agreement test or because they used an older formulation of the second part of
Hadley.86 One can certainly imagine that disproportion might be a useful index
to intent, and even to the more pertinent foreseeability, but this inquiry
somewhat misses the point of Restatement (Second) section 351(3). This section
assumes that consequential damages are recoverable, and determines whether
these otherwise recoverable damages should be limited or eliminated. 87
Concentrating, then, on the cases that use disproportionality to limit
foreseeable consequential damages, we find, unsurprisingly, that the extent of
the disproportion is the most important element addressed. It is, after all, the
only restriction addressed in the Restatement (Second) section itself, and it
draws attention in the comment as well. 88 The disproportion in the successful
cases tends to be very great indeed. In Sundance Cruises Corp. v. American
Bureau of Shipping, one of the ship inspection cases, the fee charged by the
defendant was $85,000, while the damages sought were $264,000,000-a ratio
of roughly three thousand to one.89 Though often the courts do not use specific
numbers, particularly when they are ordering remands, the degree of
disproportion generally seems substantial, if not always of that order. For
instance, in Glatt v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, the trial court awarded damages
of about three and one-half million dollars for breach of an agreement to lend
less than two million. 90 Likewise, in Seaman v. United States Steel Corp.,
judgment was entered for $85,000, while the cost of the steel furnished by the
defendants was only $410.45. 91 Most of the discussion of disproportion is,
86 See, e.g., Goodstein Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 604 N.E.2d 1356, 1361-62
(N.Y. 1992); Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 537 N.E.2d 176, 178-79 (N.Y. 1989).
Interestingly, the tacit agreement test was considered briefly as a possible substitute for
disproportionality. See 56 A.L.I. PROCEEDiNGs 340-43 (1979).
87 See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 14, at 667.
88 See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 351(3) & cmt. f (1979).
89 See Sundance Cruises Corp. v. American Bureau of Shipping, 7 F.3d 1077, 1084 (2d
Cir. 1993); see also Vitol Trading S.A. v. SGS Control Servs., Inc., 874 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.
1989) (fee of $220 versus claimed damages of $547,688-ratio of roughly two thousand to
one).
90 See Glatt v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 383 N.W.2d 473, 474-75 (N.D. 1986); see
also Native Alaskan Reclamation & Pest Control, Inc. v. United Bank Alaska, 685 P.2d 1211
(Alaska 1984) (damages of over two million dollars from failure to honor one hundred
thousand dollar credit commitment).
91 See Seaman v. United States Steel Corp., 400 A.2d 90, 91-92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1979); see also Whitmier & Ferris Co. v. Buffalo Structural Steel Corp., 482 N.Y.S.2d
927, 928-29 (App. Div. 1985) (breach of option contract for rental of billboards at $600 per
year induced damages of $227,000 per year).
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however, more qualitative, stressing the possible oppression or surprise that
could come from large liability rather than the actual extent of the disproportion
in the case at hand.92
Perhaps more interesting are the disproportionality analyses where
disproportion was not found. Some of these had no real measure of the degree
of disproportion, merely noting that there was sufficient gain by the promisor to
eliminate the defense. 93 Others show fairly modest ratios-as, for example,
Apex Towing Co. v. Trading Corp. of Pakistan, with a contract price of almost
two million dollars and damages of about six hundred thousand. 94 Worth more
attention are the decisions in Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc.
and International Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control Services, Inc., which
from the numbers look like relatively promising disproportionality cases. In
Perini, the defendant, a general contractor, was held liable for over
$14,500,000 when it received a management fee of only $600,000. 95 Even
more strikingly, the defendant in International Ore had to pay damages of
$713,666.27 for breach of a contract priced at $150, a ratio of 4758 to one.96
Yet both judgments were affirmed. 97 Why?
In each, the other factors referred to in the Restatement (Second) comment
supported affirmance. As the International Ore court pointed out, the parties
were "sophisticated repeat players in a competitive market," with a long-
92 See, e.g., Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373-75 (Ct. App.
1996); Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 578 N.E.2d 789, 804-05 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991); Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613-14 (App.
Div. 1983).
93 See, e.g., All Points Towing, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 735 P.2d 145, 148 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987).
94 See Apex Towing Co. v. Trading Corp. of Pakistan, No. 82 Civ. 8324 (RWS), 1984
WL 805 at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1984).
95 See Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 380 (N.J.
1992).
96 See International Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control Servs., Inc., 38 F.3d 1279,
1289 (2d Cir. 1994) (Mishler, J., concurring inpart and dissenting in part).
97 Paris of Wayne, Inc. v. Richard A. Hajar Agency, 416 A.2d 436, 442-43 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980), showed a similar degree of disproportion-a brokerage fee of
$300 and a judgment of $58,900-but the award was upheld because of the fiduciary
relationship of the parties, against the suggestion of the court that it might have been reduced
in an ordinary commercial transaction. The peculiar facts thus warrant little discussion on
their own merits, though they may suggest a role for fault-based analysis as an element of
section 351(3). See also, e.g., George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80
VA. L. REv. 1225 (1994); Harvey, supra note 14, at 677 (fault is relevant for section 351(3)).
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standing business relationship.98 Furthermore, SGS, the defendant, was a
frequent actor in a highly professional area; it could easily have insured against
its potential liability for inadequate inspections. 99 In light of these facts, the
relative informality of this particular arrangement-by telephone and telex-
was immaterial, for the defendant was amply familiar with the seriousness of
the job to be performed. 10 Similarly, in Perini, the court pointed out that the
defendant, an experienced general contractor, knew of the types of risk
involved in building casinos.101 It could thus have bargained for a clause
absolving it from liability for delay. 102 Nor was the contract informal; rather, it
was quite detailed, addressing other sorts of damages in several provisions. 10 3
In contrast, where the court had suggested the value of disproportionality
analysis in a case with a much lower ratio of damage to contract price, it was
not at all clear that the parties had taken the risk into account. 104
When courts have found disproportionality, their remedial responses have
generally been unadventurous. The Restatement (Second) invites them to
reduce or limit consequential damages or grant only reliance damages, and the
reporter, during a discussion of the provision, added that a court could also
limit reliance damages by excluding incidental reliance, although he was
reluctant to place that in the comments. 105 In the main, though, the courts have
simply refused to give consequential damages, rather than reduce them or
otherwise limit the remedy.'0 6 The exceptions are cases that deny expectation,
98 Internaional Ore, 38 F.3d at 1284; see also RESrATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNT Acrs
§ 351 crnt. f (1979) (commercial setting should rarely invoke section 351(3)).
99 See International Ore, 38 F.3d at 1284-85.
100 See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CoRA~crs § 351 cat. f (1979)
(informal dealing supports use of section 351(3), as parties may not have attempted carefully
to allocate risks).
101 See Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 382 (N.J.
1992).
102 See id.
103 See id. at 381.
104 See id. at 380; see also Dixon Venture v. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co., 584 A.2d 797,
799 (N.J. 1991) (damages of $6850 plus posting a letter of credit for $500,000, with contract
price of $3,000,000).
105 See RFsrATEmENT (SEcoND) oF CoNrTCrs § 351 cat. f (1979); 56 A.L.I.
PROCEEDINGS 337-40 (1979); see also Harvey, supra note 14, at 667-73.
106 See, e.g., Vitol Trading S.A. v. SGS Control Servs., Inc., 874 F.2d 76, 80-82 (2d
Cir. 1989); Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 371-76 (Ct. App. 1996);
Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 537 N.E.2d 176, 178-80 (N.Y. 1989).
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instead giving reliance,107 and cases that give no remedy at all. 108 The trickier
risk-splitting for consequential damages suggested by section 351(3) has no
takers so far.
In short, then, the cases have not clearly laid out the bounds of
disproportionality analysis. The factors contained in the Restatement (Second)
comment seem germane, as might such things as whether the defendant is not
merely commercial but also experienced in the particular type of transaction, or
whether the defendant would have excessive leverage over the plaintiff were it
to be able to invoke disproportionality, or whether the defendant should be able
to insure against the risk of non-performance. These factors are helpful enough
as far as they go, but one may fairly ask how far that is.
Nor, indeed, have the commentators provided this guidance, though asking
that of them may be unfair. Some, after all, wrote mainly to attack the idea.
Professor Harvey, for example, sharply criticized the uncertain range of section
351(3), extending, as it may, to the flil range of contract remedies.109 Beyond
the scope, though, Harvey questioned the justice-based test; although the black-
letter mentions disproportion as a necessary condition, and some other factors
appear in the comments, it is not clear just what is sufficient.110 Thus, in his
view, the law of contract damages was left indeterminate, perhaps a very costly
result as one seeks to deal with a modest array of problems." 1 Somewhat in
contrast, Professor Young found the section, not insufficient, but "simply
overwritten," for, as it stands, it seems to support crude difference-splitting.11 2
Better to put in place a plain tacit agreement test for disproportionate
consequential damages, thus narrowing the scope and complexity of the
analysis. 113
Professor Kniffin is the most ardent scholarly defender of disproportionality
107 See, e.g., Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 578 N.E.2d 789, 804-05 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1991).
108 See, e.g., Sundance Cruises Corp. v. American Bureau of Shipping, 7 F.3d 1077,
1084-85 (2d Cir. 1993).
109 See Harvey, supra note 14, at 668-73. So far, as we have seen, the section appears
to have been confined to expectation, and there almost entirely to consequential damages. One
of the illustrations to the section deals with general damages, though, and Professor
Farnsworth, the reporter, showed no reluctance during a colloquy to extend the section's
coverage to reliance expenditures. See RESrATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 351 cmt. f,
illus. 19 (1979); 56 A.L.I. PROCEaInNGs 337-40 (1979).
110 See Harvey, supra note 14, at 678-79.
111 See id.
112 Young, supra note 14, at 30.
113 See id.
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analysis, as a sort of unconscionability clause for remedies. 114 In contrast to
Professor Harvey, she finds the remedy "carefully and admirably crafted,"
showing efficient "clarity and precision." 115 Thus, for example, the factors
contained in the comment to section 351(3) would sufficiently constrain
courts. 116 In any event, fairness, she contends, has long been a part of the law
of contract remedies, so all that section 351(3) has done is make it overt, rather
than covert.117 Perhaps it is clearer and more direct than, for example, the tacit
agreement test, which she holds out as an alternative. 118 As we have seen,
though, there is still a considerable degree of vagueness in the field, and the
wide range of ratios that may or may not qualify as disproportionate may
provide less comfort than one might hope.119 And with no more guidance than
the Restatement (Second) and the erratic case law provide, there may still be
room, if disproportionality is a sensible overlay to consequential damages
analysis, for further guidance from the academic peanut gallery. First, though,
we must determine whether disproportionality analysis could be appropriate;
then, if so, we can focus on its range.
II. DEFAULT THEORY AND DISPROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
So much for the current state of disproportionality. The real question,
which will occupy the balance of this Article, is whether disproportionality
should be added to orthodox Had/ey analysis and, if so, when. The bulk of this
Part will use modem default rule analysis to show that disproportionality has at
best an extremely modest claim to virtue. Using the major types of default rules
as our structure, then, we shall look for some group of situations in which
defendants might sensibly invoke disproportionality analysis. This search shall,
I think, be in vain, at least using this set of lenses, so perhaps it warrants
justification. Why not simply follow some commentators on disproportionality
and leave it to the discretion of the court, doing justice as the court sees fit?120
114 See Kniffin, supra note 14, at 247; see also Comment, Lost Profits as Contract
Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 1022-24
(1956). Professor Harvey pointed out the analogy to unconscionability as well, but was more
inclined to question the equivalent breadth of delegation to the judiciary. See Harvey, supra
note 14, at 678-79.
115 Kniffin, supra note 14, at 276.
116 See id. at 254-55 & n.64.
117 See id. at 259-63.
118 See "d. at 269-71.
119 See infra notes 123-139 and accompanying text (discussing the value of certainty).
120 See, e.g., Kniffin, supra note 14, at 247.
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One need not share Holmes's oft-expressed distaste for justice to doubt that this
enterprise will prove worthwhile.12 1 Unconfined, equity becomes what Max
Weber referred to as "kadi justice"-unsystematic, often unpredictable results
lacking a governing principle.' 22 At best, notions like "reasonable" or
"equitable" or "unconscionable" may develop set ways over time, thanks to
precedent, but they never quite lose their loose structure.
Why might this be a problem? To answer this, we must examine briefly the
classic distinction between rules and standards. These terms are variously
defined, but most definitions focus either on precision or the source of content.
Rules are relatively formal, specific guides to conduct, designed to carry out
some normative goal with a minimum of interpretation or discretion. In
contrast, standards are more general, giving goals or criteria which afford the
decisionmaker a good deal of discretion in their application.123 Thus, for
instance, a fifty-five-miles-per-hour speed limit is a rule, while a law stating that
one must always drive at a reasonable speed is a standard. To be sure, the
distinction can become perilously fine. Further, rules can become standards,
and vice versa.124 But the distinction nevertheless has a good deal of analytical
121 Holmes's views on abstract justice come to us in various forms. One especially nice
version is Learned Hand's:
When we got down to the Capitol, I wanted to provoke a response, so as he walked off,
I said to him: "Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!" He turned quite sharply and he said:
"Come here. Come here." I answered: "Oh, I know, I know." He replied: "That is not
my job. My job is to play the game according to the rules."
Learned Hand, A Personal Confession, in THE SPmrr OF LIErY 302, 307 (Irving Dillard
ed., 3d ed. 1960). See generally Michael Herz, "Do Justice!": Variations of a Thrice-Told
Tale, 82 VA. L. REv. 111 (1996) (collecting and discussing different versions).
122 See 3 MAx WEBER, ECONOMY AND Sociery: AN OuTLINE OF INTERPREIvE
SoCIoLOGY 976-78 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968).
123 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of
the Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. Rnv. 1217, 1227-28 (1982); Isaac Ehrlich
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257,
258 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 559-60 (1992).
124 A selectively enforced rule will have much the effect of a standard. The speed limit
mentioned above is a good example; though most drivers are nominal miscreants, the
gendarmerie enforces the law only against egregious scofflaws, or those who are otherwise
behaving oddly-thus converting a bright-line rule into a de facto standard. On the other
hand, a flexible standard can become a rule in a precedential system, as its general language
acquires more and more concrete meaning. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Preliminay Thoughts on
Optimal Tailoring of ContractualRul, 3 S. CAL. INmnDIsc. L.J. 1, 15-16 (1993); Kaplow,
supra note 123, at 577-84.
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force.
One can debate endlessly about the relative merits of rules and
standards.1 25 A useful place to begin is with Louis Kaplow's observation that
rules impose costs ex ante, while standards impose costs ex post.126 Rules are
relatively costly to set forth, because they must provide relatively precise guides
to conduct. Once they exist, though, they should be more or less easy to
apply.' 27 In contrast, standards are not as difficult to promulgate, for they
consist mostly of general statements-that one should drive safely, act
reasonably, contract in good faith-without much formal content. For that
reason, they are harder to apply than rules, as their content must be developed
with expert aid and in our realm of contract, often through judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings. Thus, a rule should be cheaper when the situation it
governs comes about often enough to warrant the costs of promulgating it,
while a standard should be cheaper when its infrequent use justifies only a
relatively flexible, cheap means of deciding. 128
The law of contract damages, put generally, should fall much closer to the
rule side of this cost divide than the standard side. Though it is true that
relatively few contracts are breached, all contracts are made and performed
against a remedial background. The Holmesian bad man, sneering at
commercial ethics, places the law of remedies foremost when he decides
125 Indeed, this debate has been pointed to by advocates of Critical Legal Studies as a
sign of the fundamental incoherence and manipulability of a rule-based system. See, e.g.,
MAK KELmAN, A GUiDE TO CnmcAL LEGAL S'rixs 15-63 (1987); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HAv. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
126 See Kaplow, supra note 123, at 585-86.
127 Of course, some rules are quite complex-for example, the Sentencing Guidelines or
the grids for Social Security disability payments. The question is not so much whether they
can be applied without technical skill as whether they can be applied without judgment or
nuance-Llewellyn's situation-sense, perhaps-and thus whether they can be applied
ministerially.
128 More precisely, there are two elements to this analysis: the cost as such and the
indirect effect of the cost. If an individual can more cheaply become informed under a rule
than under a standard, then the difference in cost, taking into account the number of people
seeking information, will help decide whether a rule or a standard is preferable. But if the
costs of rules and standards differ, then some people will decide that the costs of becoming
informed under one, but not the other, are not worth the benefit. They will thus choose
ignorance as a sort of bounded rationality. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 123, at 571-77,
596-99. This sort of ignorance has its own costs, stemming from the potential for behavior
that violates the rule or standard. First, obviously, is the direct loss if one falls afoul of the
rule or standard. In addition, the uncertainty can yield excessive precaution for the risk-
averse. See, e.g., Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 299 (1986).
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whether to perform or breach. 12 9 Of course, the bad man would logically look
elsewhere as well; his reputation may have value, for example, and so he may
not choose to breach efficiently where the breach would work too great a harm
to his standing in the relevant business community. 130 These sorts of
contracts-relational contracts-are somewhat less driven by the law of
remedies than are more monistic contracts. 13 1 Even for the relational
contractor, though, remedies are not irrelevant, if only because relations can
break down, and the remedies available may dictate how one responds to a
failing relationship. Given this all but ubiquitous presence of the law of contract
remedies, then, the ex post costs of uncertainty are quite weighty.
Furthermore, consequential damages figure prominently in contract
remedies problems, not merely in the minds of law professors sadistically
wringing the last little bit out of Hadley. The prospect of an ill-defined
exception to classic Hadley analysis might well drive up transaction costs
greatly and, as Craswell and Calfee have suggested, lead to overcompliance by
contracting parties. 132 If a firm is uncertain whether it will be liable for
damages, and is somewhat averse to risk, it will tend to value the risk more
highly than it ought. The excessive valuation may cause the firm not to enter
into contracts that would be more profitable than their replacements, thus
lowering its wealth, or set a lower price on performance than is appropriate,
thus reducing the net gains from contracting. Moreover, the party potentially in
breach will look to the consequences of breach to help set its degree of
precaution.' 33 Here uncertainty may lead to errant estimation, whether the
129 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459
(1897).
130 On the value of trust and reputation, see, for example, Larry T. Garvin, Credit,
Information, and Trust in the Law of Sales: The Credit Seller's Right of Reclaation, 44
UCLA L. REv. 247, 341-44 (1996).
131 See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Melvin Amon Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of
Contract, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1432, 1462 n.36 (1985); Garvin, supra note 130, at 339-40.
132 See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 128, at 298-99; c.f., e.g., Ehrlich & Posner,
supra note 123, at 262-63 (discussing the "chilling" of socially valuable behavior by a vague
criminal law).
133 The problem of variant risk cannot be solved simply through insurance. The classic
comprehensive general liability policy that provides the bulk of a business's insurance
coverage covers only limited consequential damages. If the damages arise from damage to
property or person, then they may well be covered, but not otherwise. Thus, most lost profits
for missed business opportunities would be uncovered, and a business would have to self-
insure for any such potential liability. There are specialized insurance riders that cover certain
types of risks-for example, products liability riders-but these typically provide limited
coverage with rather substantial premiums. They seem not to be in common use. In any
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excessive, and hence wasteful, valuation of the risk-averse, or the inadequate,
and hence overly hazardous, valuation of the risk-taking.134 In neither case is
the errant valuation efficient; with no reason to think this result morally
beneficent, it should be discouraged. 135
We must, however, go beyond this initial, unfavorable view of
disproportionality. Standards are not necessarily the bogeymen of the legal
world. For instance, parties to a contract may not need to know exactly what
liabilities they face. If approximate knowledge suffices, then a standard may do
quite as well as a rule, and more cheaply. 136 Indeed, a detailed rule could drive
up the costs of approximation, and thus prove less desirable than a simpler
event, greater risk would yield higher premiums, which would have to be taken into account
when setting a course of action.
134 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 123, at 605; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The
Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. Ray. 595, 605 (1995). Nor are the
extra resources put into determining damages socially worthwhile. See Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191, 201-03
(1996).
135 Perhaps the last comment should be unpacked. To say that this result is inefficient is
not to say that it is inappropriate. Though some have sought to make efficiency, or its cousin,
wealth-maximization, into a positive good, we might more moderately look at it as ceteris
paribus worthwhile, creating a presumption of merit that can be rebutted by, say,
distributional arguments or ethical precepts. See, e.g., RicHARD A. PosNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSiS OF LAW 27, 264-66 (4th ed. 1992); Richard A. Epstein, Are Values
Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Ruler of the World?, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 683. Here,
however, it is hard to see any such ethical defense. Virtually every disproportionality case pits
business against business, which undercuts any sentiments one might have in favor of the
downtrodden. More particularly, the battle is over how the parties should be held to have
allocated the risk of non-performance. Disproportionality arguments thus are made by those
who have breached contracts, which rather diminishes their moral force. To the extent, then,
thatpacta sunt servanda remains a bedrock principle of contracts, disproportionality should be
discouraged. Hence the dismissive comment in the text.
Indeed, as Jules Coleman and colleagues have suggested, default rules probably should
not be used to rectify perceived injustices between the contracting parties; because the parties
can contract around the default rules, attempts to provide variant outcomes will lead to higher
transaction costs as the better-positioned party seeks to protect its advantages by negotiating
terms, thus depleting the assets of both parties. Furthermore, the unfairness is exogenous to
the transaction itself; accordingly, the appropriate response is to forbid express agreements
that capitalize on inequities, rather than to change an otherwise unobjectionable default rule.
See Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and
Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HAv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 639, 708 n.75 (1989); see
also, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Theory of Promising, 88
MICH. L. REv. 489 (1989).
136 See Ayres, supra note 124, at 8-9.
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standard. 137 This is particularly so if the standard is clear-more rule-like-to
some part of the community. If, for instance, the standard is framed using terms
of art for some part of the contracting world, the standard should behave more
like a rule. Indeed, the U.C.C.'s reliance upon trade usage has some of this
effect, as trade usage, readily admissible as parol evidence, is used to give
meaning to performance standards otherwise left general.' 38 And, as noted
earlier, precedent can make a standard more certain, greatly reducing the costs
of uncertain effect and application. 139
But so what? Do any of these support disproportionality? Not really, and
not enough. We are not faced here with the choice of an unduly detailed rule or
a simple standard; rather, we have a fairly straightforward rule-orthodox
Hadley analysis-to which we may or may not add a standard. Nor can we take
refuge in approximation. Proof of consequential damages is generally itself an
exercise in approximation; consider, for example, the vast uncertainties that
attend proof of lost profits, quite an important category of consequential
damages. 140 With disproportionality added on, we may cross from risk to
uncertainty, in Frank Knight's formulation, rendering it impossible to frame a
useful probability distribution and thus to predict an outcome accurately.' 41
Finally, precedent and trade usage, though undoubtedly aids to certainty, do
little here. True, disproportionality might, over time, develop some relatively
firm meaning. But modem disproportionality case law is modest and somewhat
scattered, providing little aid for the most assiduous parser of judicial dictum. In
another generation or two, enough cases might have piled up to admit
generalization, but the interim costs would be substantial. And consider the
similar instance of punitive damages awards, which are subject to some
constraints, constitutional or statutory. It is hard to say that the plethora of these
cases has yielded a great deal of commercial certainty, and hard to say that the
relative dearth of disproportionality cases will do any better.
For our sort of facts, then, rules should generally prove superior to
standards, in that they should promote commercial certainty and yield more just
137 See id.
138 See U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-202, 2-208 (1995); see also, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Social
Stnture, Legal Structure, and Default Rdes: A Comment, 3 S. CAL. ITmswisc. L.J. 19,
25-27 (1993).
139 See supra note 124.
140 See generally DuNN, supra note 29.
141 As Knight makes the distinction, risk consists of future states in which the outcomes,
though unknown, follow a known distribution, while uncertainty consists of those future states
for which the distributions are also unknown. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RIsK, UNCERTAINTY
AND PRoFrr 233-34 (1921).
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results. The unadorned disproportionality test is a quintessential standard,
lacking even a laundry list of factors to provide modest guidance. This is not to
say that disproportionality is necessarily wicked-only that, unadorned, it
carries substantial vices with its virtues (if any, of course). But further inquiry
may yield some groups of contracting parties for which the rule is sensible,
whether because it maximizes wealth directly, evens out informational
asymmetry, or the like. 142 By finding areas where it should be used, we can
make this loose standard more like a rule and thus, to carry the theological
metaphor further, allow it to repent and be saved. Hence the discussion that
follows.
A. Problem-Solving Default Rules
The principal category of default rule is the problem-solving rule. 143 This
rule seeks to mimic what most contracting parties would do if they could
bargain without cost. In a world without transaction costs, as Coase famously
observed, those entering into an agreement will, whatever their legal starting
points, negotiate their way to an efficient result.144 In such a world, then, the
default rule is irrelevant, as, indeed, would be the better part of this Article. But
this world is wholly imaginary, as Coase himself pointed out.145 We are awash
in transaction costs. Our own time has value, as does the time of anyone we
hire-and then there are the incidental costs of doing business and the
opportunities forgone, among others. 146
142 Thus allowing disproportionality to serve the most common purpose asserted for it:
to correct for the errors in risk allocation that even a good default rule can make. See, e.g.,
RESrATEmEmT (SECOND) OF CONTRACts § 351 cmt. f (1979); Richard E. Speidel & James J.
White, The Emerging Article 2: Remedies for Breach of the Contract for Sale, in THE
EmRGED AND EMERGING NEw UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 33, 41 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study No. C965, 1994); Farnsworth, supra note 69, at 1208-10.
143 This has also been called a majoritarian default rule. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YAME L.J. 87, 93 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner I].
144 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 391 (1937);
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960) ("But the ultimate
result... is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work
without cost.").
145 See RONALD H. COASE, THE FroM, Tim MARKEr, AND THE LAW 15 (1988); see
also George J. Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1972) ("The world of zero transaction costs turns out to be as strange as
the physical world would be with zero friction.").
146 More generally, one can define transaction costs to include search and information
[Vol. 59:339
DISPROPORTIONAL1TY
The friction-full world in which we negotiate contracts thus requires that
we choose default rules carefully. If the default rule departs from the rule that
would be chosen by most contracting parties, then most contracting parties will
have to contract around the rule. These contracting costs should, so the theory
goes, dissuade us from choosing a rule other than that which would be chosen
by a majority. Moreover, if the bargaining costs exceed the gain in wealth from
bargaining, a rational party would choose not to bargain. The party might
therefore accept a default rule that would prove inefficient because still greater
inefficiency would result from bargaining around the rule. 147 If, in contrast, the
default rule gives the most efficient outcome, then we need not worry about
bargaining costs. If we assume, not unreasonably, that contracting parties
generally want to maximize their gains from trade, then it follows that a default
rule should seek to provide the most efficient result.
This analysis undergirds problem-solving default theory. As far as it goes,
it seems right enough. Certainly it is very popular: legal economists have used
it, or at least have asserted it, as they write about a wide range of situations. 148
Problem-solving theory is far from flawless; as we shall see, it overlooks a
good deal. Its popularity, though, makes it a logical starting point. We should
begin by looking at the garden-variety Hadley test, shorn of disproportionality,
to see how it might be justified. If it can be justified, then we will see whether
disproportionality aids or impedes these justifications.
1. Hadley as a Problem-Solving Rule
How might we explain Hadley using problem-solving theory? One
approach looks directly at transaction costs. Using the basic facts of Hadley, we
may assume, for the sake of simplicity, that there are two types of millers. One
type, prudently keeping a spare millshaft around in case of shipping delays,
may be termed a low-damage miller. The other, perhaps less prudent, lacks a
costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing and enforcement costs. See, e.g., Douglas
W. Allen, What are Transaction Costs?, 14 REs. L. & ECON. 1, 3-4 (1991); Carl J.
Dahlman, The Problem of Eternality, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 141, 148 (1979) (defining transaction
costs as search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing and
enforcement costs).
147 See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 124, at 12.
148 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161, 1182 (1981)
(corporate law); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971 (1983) (contracts); Alan
Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Refonn: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YAME L.J.
353, 361 (1988) (torts).
1998]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
spare millshaft and thus would be a high-damage miller. If we have a default
rule that allows full consequential damages only where the damages are
contemplated by the carrier, then the shipping company would ordinarily take
the amount of care consistent with the lower measure of damages. This is lower
than the amount that it would take if it knew that a shipment were high-damage.
The high-damage miller would thus have an incentive to bargain around the
default rule in order to get the higher level of care that its potential damages
merit. 149
In contrast, consider a rule that gives full consequential damages to all,
such as the tort test of proximate cause. The shipping company could set its
price based on the average risk it bears. 150 Low-damage millers would pay too
much, and high-damage millers would pay too little. Again leaving aside for the
moment the effects that the rule might have on whether millers choose to be
high-risk or low-risk, the effect would be the reverse of that above: low-risk
millers would have an incentive to bargain around the default rule. 151 The two
rules thus set up different incentives to bargain, and lead different types of
millers to seek different deals.
If we begin by looking purely at the transaction costs, we need to know
whether there are more high-damage millers or low-damage millers. Initially,
we can assume that the cost of bargaining around the rule is the same for each
type of miller; accordingly, the better problem-solving default rule from the
vantage of lowering transaction costs is the rule that fits more closely the
preferences of most millers. Suppose first that there are more high-damage
millers. Then the carrier would lower transaction costs by charging the high-
damage price, thus giving the low-damage millers an incentive to disclose their
relative safety (perhaps by accepting a limitation on the carrier's liability) in
order to get a lower price.152 The reverse is true if there are more low-damage
149 The result is a separating equilibrium-a world in which the market segregates
participants by one or more salient characteristics, each with a different price. This is distinct
from a pooling equilibrium, in which the market lumps together all participants at one price.
See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner I, supra note 143, at 111-12. See generally BERNARD SALANtlE,
T"H ECONoMIcs OF CONTRACrs 90-94 (1997) (pooling and separating equilibria); Michael
Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the
Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 634-37 (1976) (same).
150 This creates a pooling equilibrium, as long as the low-damage millers cannot signal
their type.
15 1 See DOUGLAS G. BAmD Er AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 148-50 (1994).
152 The carrier could also use a single price for all, setting the price by examining its
balance of low-damage and high-damage customers. Such a system might be prone to adverse
selection and moral hazard, though, and thus might prove undesirable in practice.
Furthermore, if there are many more high-damage millers than low-damage millers, then the
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millers. Then most millers would prefer a low-cost, low-damage default rule.1 53
The carrier would start with a low-damage rate combined with a limitation on
liability, allowing high-damage millers to buy insurance for an additional fee. 154
This last scenario, in fact, is what modem carriers generally do, suggesting that
there is some basis for assuming that there are more low-damage shippers out
there and thus that the Hadley test may be sensible. 155
Beyond transaction costs, the damages rule chosen could affect the
pooled price will rest quite near the high-damage price. Low-damage millers would then seek
to opt out, whether by negotiating separately with the carrier or by using a carrier that would
specialize in low-damage shipments. Whether because of moral hazard and adverse selection
or because of market separation, then, one would expect the price to stray from the center.
In addition, a pooled price would oblige the low-damage millers to subsidize the high-
damage millers. This cross-subsidization would dissuade the high-damage millers from
exercising the optimal degree of care, thus driving up net costs. See Gwyn D. Quillen, Note,
Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1125, 1129-1132 (1988).
153 With a high-damage default rule, but a superabundance of low-damage shippers,
carriers would set a pooled rate near the low-damage price. Low-damage shippers would thus
have little incentive to bargain around the rule, for their transaction costs would probably
exceed the drop in price. High-damage shippers would, of course, have no reason to divulge
their state to the carriers, because then they would pay more. So low-damage shippers would
cross-subsidize high-damage shippers. This result is inefficient, as the carrier will have no
incentive to take cost-effective precautions for high-damage shipments. The combination of
transaction costs and strategic withholding of information, however, supports this
inefficiency. See Ayres & Gertner I, supra note 143, at 110-11.
154 In game-theoretic terms, the carrier would engage in a screening game: it would
move first in order to distinguish between low-risk and high-risk shippers. See ERIc
RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 133-36 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729,
739 & n.33 (1992) [hereinafter Ayres & Gerner iU.
155 See Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law
of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STuD. 105, 120-21 (1989) (asserting that the use of a fixed tariff for
breach of contract advances the joint interests of parties to a contract). But see Eisenberg,
supra note 4, at 572 n.32 (criticizing Epstein). The carrier example may, however, be too
simplistic. As we have seen, a great many consequential damages cases, particularly those
involving perhaps disproportionate risks, involve transactions with greater complexity than
carriage. A simple sale of goods can involve myriad product defects with myriad potential
losses. To meet these, a promisor might offer a complex array of contractual loss regimes,
with different rules and different limits available for different premiums. See, e.g., Mark
Geistfeld, Note, Imperfect Information, The Pricing Mechanism, and Products Liability, 88
CoLuM. L. REv. 1057, 1063 (1988) (proposing mandatory menu of warranties for consumer
purchases of goods). But such an array would cost the promisor a good deal to put together,
increasing transaction costs, and the promisee might also find it harder to choose. We should
thus be wary about accepting too freely an assumption that one party can itself induce the
other to reveal necessary information. See, e.g., Ayres & Geriner I, supra note 143, at 103.
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tendencies of the parties to spread and reduce risk. In terms of spreading risk
under a consequential damages rule, and the associated system under which
both the basic price and the available damages are low, the high-damage miller
would probably choose to negotiate for higher damages rather than bear the risk
itself. The carrier probably can insure against its own possible delays more
cheaply than can the miller. After all, the carriage is more nearly in the control
of the carrier than of the miller, so the carrier can more cheaply avoid the risk
of delay. Furthermore, the carrier almost certainly engages in more contracts of
carriage than does the miller, so it is in a better position to arrange for third-
party insurance, should it wish to shift the risk elsewhere, or spread the risk,
should it prefer to self-insure. This should lower the cost of allocating the risk,
which argues for placing the risk on the carrier once the risk is made known to
it. Again, the basic Hadley rule seems justifiable.
Alternatively, one can focus on the risk borne, rather than on the costs of
allocating it. This rationale views Hadley as a means of finding the least cost
avoider.15 6 In its simplest form, using the facts of Hadley, the risk should rest
on the miller because, as Judge Posner put it,. "[p]rudence required that they
have a spare shaft anyway, since a replacement could not be obtained at once
even if there was no undue delay in carting the broken shaft to and the
replacement shaft from the manufacturer."' 157 True, the carrier could have
taken this risk expressly-but it did not, and so it should not be held liable.
Rather, liability should rest on "that party who was able to avert the
consequence at least cost and failed to do so." 158 This rule is problem-solving if
we assume that the parties to an agreement favor higher net profits. If they
do-a reasonable starting assumption-then they ordinarily will want to put risk
on the least cost avoider, because the contracting parties will wish to lower the
costs of doing business. The market would allocate the cost of dealing with the
risk, so the result of a least-cost-avoider rule should be a blend of lower
contract prices and higher profits.
156 This is an argument especially familiar in tort theory. See, e.g., GuiDo CALABRE,
THE CosTs op ACciDENTS 135-73 (1970). One sees the argument in contract as well. See,
e.g., George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20
HoFsRA L. REv. 941, 978-90 (1992) (developing a fault-based theory of contract law that
combines the least-cost-avoider and opportunism approaches); Richard A. Posner & Andrew
M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis,
6J. LEGAL STun. 83, 112-13 (1977).
157 EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 957 (7th Cir. 1982). It seems that
Judge Posner rather liked this argument. See Rardin v. T & D Machine Handling, Inc., 890
F.2d 24, 27 (7th Cir. 1989); Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d
1358, 1368 (7th Cir. 1985).
158 EVRA, 673 F.2d at 957.
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2. Disproportionality: A Problem Created
The Hadley rule seems to lower transaction costs and shift risk sensibly.
Problem-solving theory thus favors Hadley as a default rule. What, then, of
disproportionality? Before we look at the critiques of problem-solving default
theory as applied to our situation, let us consider the effects that
disproportionality would have on Hadley as a problem-solving default. These
effects might best be studied by making a set of strict and thoroughly unrealistic
assumptions, relaxing them one by one, and examining the results. So we shall
start by assuming a world in which the parties know fully the pertinent legal
rules (and can easily calculate their effects on a bargain), as well as their own
risks of default and their complete costs of doing business. We will also assume
for the moment that they cannot bargain around the law of consequential
damages (thus yielding a pooling equilibrium).
a. Transaction Costs
Were risk-bearers able to claim disproportionality as a defense in a breach
of contract action, and were they unable to contract around disproportionality
(perhaps by agreeing expressly to take on disproportionate risks), then the value
of their promises to perform would drop. In essence, they would promise that if
they did not perform, they would compensate fully, unless the compensation
would prove excessive. Cautious customers would insure for disproportionate
damages and, as a result, pay less for the diminished promise by the vendor.
Perhaps they might economize by doing so; they might be able to insure against
disproportionate loss more cheaply. On the other hand, as noted earlier, this
pooling equilibrium might fall prey to adverse selection and, perhaps, moral
hazard-though moral hazard should be less of a problem with a cap on
consequential damages. 159
Now introduce bargaining, so that the parties to the agreement might, if
they like, contract around the disproportionality default. The question then
becomes whether the customer would prefer to take the risk of disproportionate
loss itself, or sell it to the vendor. If the former is true, then disproportionality
analysis should lower transaction costs; if the latter, it should increase them.
This question can only be firmly answered with empirical data that do not yet
exist. We may, however, be able to approximate a conclusion by looking both
at efficient risk allocation and at the magnitude of the transaction costs. As
before, it seems a sensible first step to assume that the parties to an agreement
would rather a risk be placed with the party better able to bear it, as that would
159 Because the benefits of adding to one's risk would be attenuated in case of breach.
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lower the net costs of performance. In addition, the cost of allocating risk
specially may matter; if the cost is quite low relative to the risk, then the entire
question of transaction costs may not be very significant.' 60
Adding risk allocation, we ask whether disproportionality places the risk on
either the least cost avoider or the better risk spreader where Hadley by itself
would not. This generally seems unlikely. Disproportionality analysis, absent
bargaining, would lower the overall standard of care from that under Hadley,
because a promisor would not be liable for risks that it otherwise would have
had to bear. If the promisor were willing to sell insurance for disproportionate
risk, then this question could become moot, at least if the promisor's price were
sufficiently low. This seems not to happen. Common carriers, for instance,
though happy to sell insurance for low-level risk, typically limit the value of the
insurance one can purchase for a shipment. The relative abilities of the
promisor and promisee to deal with risk are thus critical.
b. Risk Spreading
In general, the promisor should spread risk better than the promisee. The
usual promisor will more often engage in the relevant sort of transaction than
will the usual promisee. For example, Federal Express carries more packages
than any customer ships-or, for that matter, than practically any customer
makes contracts. And even though its customers may include very large firms,
these firms may not be able to spread the risk of a single shipment over variant
and unrelated transactions.
Even more to the point, the ability to spread risk depends on one's ability to
estimate it accurately-at least as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition.
The promisor should be able to do this better. It typically comes to the
transaction innocent of the promisee's potential losses, as does the promisee of
the promisor's risk of default. But Hadley requires explicit or implicit
disclosure of the former, not the latter. True, a promisee may well know the
promisor's risk of default. Some promisors may advertise this rate, and yet
others may be obliged to make the information public-as, for instance, the
percentage of flights that arrive on time. Furthermore, some promisees may,
through repeated exposure to the promisor's performance or lack thereof, gain
a good enough sense of the promisor's default rate. 161 But more typically, the
160 We should also recall the uncertainty that may attend disproportionality. If the parties
to a contract are uncertain whether disproportionate damages might be recoverable, and if
they are risk-averse, then they will generally seek to bargain around the default rule, even if
the ultimate result under the default would prove satisfactory. This would increase transaction
costs unnecessarily, thus showing the undesirability of too flexible a disproportionality rule.
161 This would seem relatively likely where the promisee repeatedly undertakes the
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promisee will have only a hazy notion of the rate of default, and hence would
be ill-equipped to spread risk. A rule like disproportionality which could shift
risk to the promisee thus seems inappropriate for at least a solid majority of the
transactions to which it might apply. 162
c. Risk Reducing
What about risk reduction? Here we have two elements in the value of the
risk: the magnitude and the frequency. The magnitude is controlled by the
promisee-the value of the shipment, the lack of any alternative plans, and the
tightness of the timing. The frequency of breach is, however, controlled by the
promisor. 163 One cannot say that magnitude is more or less important than
frequency, any more than one can say that one blade of a scissors is more or
less important than the other. But we are talking about risk reduction, which
depends in part on timing. If everyone knows about disproportionality before
acting, then everyone can adjust risk correspondingly. The promisee can plan
more prudently, knowing that it will bear the risk of disproportionate loss
unless it can sell the risk to another. It might then reduce the magnitude of its
risk, perhaps by taking some precautions, at least to the extent that the
precautions are cheaper than whatever insurance it can buy. So in the abstract,
the promisee might well be the better risk-reducer.
But what sort of risk are we considering? Low-frequency, high-magnitude
pertinent sort of transaction and where the frequency of default would come to the promisee's
attention. These situations should not be too common. Some types of transactions are
sufficiently common that a firm of any size should engage in them often enough to gather
reasonably reliable data about default. Shipping contracts are prime examples. But will the
data about default always come forward? Perhaps not. Complete default, yes; dissatisfied
customers will make sure of that, though possibly not to the same people who decide about
the cause of the default. But modest default might not be revealed. A minor delay in shipment
may prove immaterial to a customer, and thus would go unreported to the promisee-but that
very delay may prove critical in another transaction. So one needs to be alert to the possibility
that the promisee will have enough information to spread risk accurately, while at the same
time remaining aware that the possibility is far from a probability. Then, too, the promisee
may err grievously in estimating the risk, even if it has the data. See infra Part IV.B.
162 Except perhaps where the promisee knows the likelihood of the promisor's default.
Even here, though, the other objections may apply.
163 But perhaps not entirely-a promisee can make a promisor's work easier or harder.
A promisee might also arrange for alternative performance, such as sending duplicate
messages, keeping a spare millshaft, or hiring reserve labor. But that problem may better be
controlled through doctrines like mitigation of damages than through disproportionality. And,
as we shall see, excessive precaution is costly, and must be included in our calculus.
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risk. 164 As Melvin Eisenberg has observed with respect to Hadley itself, the
degree of prudence justifiable to reduce low-frequency risks is generally low,
even when one factors in high magnitude. 165 Thus, assuming that the promisee
is ordinarily prudent to begin with, the additional risk reduction that would
result from shifting this risk to the promisee would be slight, if any. 166 This
result is reinforced by the infrequency with which such risks come about and
hence the weakness of the information that would allow a promisee to reduce its
risks appropriately. In contrast, the promisor has much better information about
the risk of default and, by definition, enough information about the magnitude
of damage. It can thus invest appropriately in risk reduction. Furthermore, the
promisor generally engages in more transactions of a given type than does the
promisee, and thus can more plausibly add up its diminished risk premiums and
spend them on risk reduction. The modest value of a disproportionate risk
justifies almost nothing for a single transaction. The sum of the risks, though,
may warrant some real expenditure. After all, risk reduction is not infinitely
divisible, allowing a firm to buy fifty cents' worth here and a dollar's worth
there. Risk reduction consists of discrete acts, each of which has real costs.
Thus, risk reduction merges into risk spreading; only the firm that can spread
risk can aggregate enough risk to reduce it. Again, disproportionality, by
shifting risk back to the promisee, impedes risk reduction and hence contractual
efficiency.
d. The Effects of Asymmetric Legal Knowledge
We have so far assumed that the parties to the risk-generating agreement
both knew the arcana of Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 351(3).
Would this statement's falsity affect the analysis? Certainly. After all, for a
default rule to prove relevant, even in a world of costless contracting, both
parties must know the rule. 167 Consider first a relatively easy case: neither
164 If the risk's magnitude is low, then its occurrence should not prove disproportionate
by definition; the outcome will not dwarf the contract price. High-magnitude risks may be
disproportionate, of course, but a high-probability, high-magnitude risk-say, the
occupational hazards of a human cannonball or a law-school dean, to indulge in redundancy-
make out a poor case for relief through disproportionality. So likely and vivid a risk must
surely have been contemplated by the parties and thus factored into the contract price. If so,
then why grant the defendant relief after it has banked its risk premium? We are thus left with
low-probability, high-magnitude risks, which, as we have seen, fairly describe the peculiar
world of disproportionality cases.
165 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 582-83.
166 See id.
167 See Ayres & Gertner II, supra note 154, at 738 n.30.
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party knows about disproportionality. Then the parties will allocate risk as
though under standard Hadley analysis. 168 If the parties actually do this, then
adding disproportionality post hoc will likely alter their bargain, which should
be avoided. 169 If, of course, the parties deal with disproportionate risk
expressly, then the default rule is irrelevant.
What if the parties do not allocate risk as though they are governed by
Hadley? It has been argued that disproportionality is useful where the parties err
in their Hadley analysis, not in fact wanting to allocate as much risk as Hadley
would do. 170 This certainly could happen, particularly for unsophisticated
parties. But how much naYvet6 should commercial law countenance? Recall that
disproportionality addresses risks that fall under the second part of Hadley:
risks that, though not flowing normally from the breach, were nevertheless
within the contemplation of the breaching party. So the breaching party knew,
or at least should have known, of the risk at issue, and still failed to allow for it.
Contract law ordinarily looks askance at attempts to avoid contractual liability
because of one's own error.171 Perhaps one could justify a limited exception,
based on mistake of law, for those instances where the bargain-in-fact differs
from the bargain-in-law. But why must disproportionality be engrafted onto
ordinary foreseeability to accomplish this, given the added uncertainty and
inefficiency that would result?172
168 See supra Part II.A.1.
169 Absent larger reasons of justice, perhaps one should respect the parties' autonomy to
make even imprudent decisions. See, e.g., CHARLEs FRIED, CONTRACT As PRomisE 7-27
(1981); MCHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LtMrrs oF FREEDoM OF CoNTRACr 8-9 (1993). But
autonomy does require some fairly strong assumptions about volition and information. See,
e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPrrAISM AND FREEDOM 13 (1962). In our circumstance, we
may assume volition; otherwise, we enter the law of duress. The other usual assumption as
well is that the parties are informed. This assumption is trivially false; we cannot know
everything about everything, or even all the potentially relevant information about any real-
world scenario. If, however, information is imperfect, and particularly if it is asymmetric,
there may be a case for impinging upon actual autonomy in order to reach the result that
perfect autonomy would yield. See, e.g., TRBImCOCK, supra, at 102-46. This point is the
subject of Part IV. The other issue this leaves aside is welfare; who gains, who loses, and
who should. Again, this issue cannot be dealt with in one footnote, or one book. Here,
though, where the typical parties are merchants, and where duress and the like are not
present, it is hard to see what principles of equity or social justice might be invoked. We may
thus leave the latter issues to one side, though we ought not abandon them entirely.
170 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
171 .f RFSrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1979); Andrew Kull, Unilateral
Mistake: The Baseball Card Case, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 57 (1992).
172 See supra notes 120-141 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of legal
uncertainty).
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Thus, if both parties are legally ignorant, a disproportionality test is at best
useless. What if only one party is ignorant of the law? If one party knows of
disproportionality and the other does not, then the party that knows of
disproportionality should take it into account by paying less, or taking less, for
risk. Should the promisee be the less knowledgeable party, then it will think it
has greater protection than it does. 173 A guileful promisor could charge the full
Hadley price to this promisee, delivering less protection than Hadley allows.174
If, in contrast, the promisee is the offeror, it may well offer too high a price,
allowing for both covered and uncovered risks. In either case, the ignorant
promisee will pay for its ignorance with a higher contract price.
Disproportionality thus allows promisors with knowledge to extract rents from
promisees without. 175
On the other hand, if a promisee knows of disproportionality and a
promisor does not, then the promisor will expect to assume more risk than it
ordinarily should. It may thus set too high a price for its activities. The
promisee will be willing to pay less than the promisor will be inclined to
charge, as it knows of the limits on its ability to recover damages. The
promisee thus has a few choices. It can wave a copy of the Restatement
(Second) at the promisor in an attempt to get it to lower its price. This scenario
is amusing, but unrealistic; seldom, if ever, would the promisee think it
worthwhile to educate the promisor, given the cost of doing so and the rather
slender gain. 176 More likely, the promisee would have to contract expressly for
173 This should be rather a common state of affairs. Many contracting situations have
repeat players on one side and infrequent players on the other, thus giving one side greater
opportunities to become knowledgeable and lower costs involved in becoming so. See, e.g.,
Ayres & Gertner I, supra note 143, at 98-99; Ayres & Gertner II, supra note 154, at 760
n.97; Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. RFv. 821, 887-89 (1992).
174 If the market consists of knowledgeable and ignorant promisees, then promisors
could in principle respond by probing them as to their acquaintance with disproportionality,
setting lower prices for the knowledgeable. This is highly unlikely to happen, given the costs
of gathering the information and its relatively slender value when gathered. A more likely
response is knowledge by proxy; a promisor may differentiate between classes of potential
promisees, attributing knowledge based on other, easily found characteristics. For example,
consumers might be charged more than businesses. Or, if knowledge of this sort is scarce, the
promisor might set the price as though it is taking on the full risk and allow the savvy few to
bargain around it, thus economizing on bargaining and information costs. In any event, it
should be possible to make at least crude price distinctions of this type, though possibly finer
ones may be difficult.
175 For a similar observation on Hadley itself, see Ayres & Gertner II, supra note 154,
at 760-61.
176 Especially in light of the uncertainty of the concept. A rational promisor might well
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disproportionality with the promisor. Though the disproportionality clause
would be legally unnecessary, given that disproportionality would itself be the
default rule, the promisor would not otherwise realize this. The clause in place,
the promisor would lower its contract price, thus giving the promisee the
equivalent of its default bargain. Here, though, the gain from trade is lowered
by the cost of bargaining. In any event, the asymmetric information would not
afford the promisee any rent-seeking opportunity equivalent to that afforded the
promisor.
Furthermore, is disproportionality a sensible way to deal with these
relatively rare cases? The focus, after all, is on the disproportionality between
the damages that came about and the value of the contract. Consider, for
example, Cardozo's concern in Kerr Steamship about the large liability that
could result from a modest transaction. 177 But these risks are, by definition,
low-probability risks, and thus must be discounted greatly. The harm caused by
a miscarried message may be, say, one hundred thousand dollars, and the cost
of the message only twenty. Disproportionate? Not if the risk of miscarriage is
one in one hundred thousand. Then the value of the risk-the proper premium
for insurance, leaving aside transaction costs-is one dollar, which falls well
within the contract price, and hardly seems disproportionate in any standard
sense of the term.
To be sure, these infrequent risks may add up. Though perhaps no one risk
would overwhelm the contract, their sum might. One might then argue that
disproportionality makes sense as a way to avoid these messy, factually
intractable frequency-and-magnitude calculations; if the class of risks would not
logically have been allocated to the promisor, given the contract price, then the
promisor should not be liable if one of the risks comes about. This analysis may
seem more logical than the conventional rationale, but in fact it helps little. The
argument amounts to asking for an exception to the normal default rule for risk
allocation; though ordinary risks may fall under the usual two parts of Hadley,
we should not expect these especially infrequent, especially large risks to
behave similarly. But why not? If the sum of the risks can be determined
approximately ex ante, then, following the earlier analysis, the risks ordinarily
should rest on the party better able to reduce them or spread them. Indeed,
summing the risks weakens, rather than strengthens, the case for
disproportionality; although a promisor might not be expected to parse out each
rare risk, it should be able to aggregate its risk of non-performance and plan
accordingly. In short, disproportionality, even for the more appealing cases,
assign disproportionality a low value, given its continued vagueness. This problem would
diminish, were disproportionality better defined, but the problems in the text would remain.
177 See Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 157 N.E. 140, 142 (N.Y. 1927).
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collapses into orthodox Hadley analysis, with the results that Hadley yields
under its ordinary two parts.
B. Information-Forcing Default Theory
Problem-solving default theory properly emphasizes transaction costs,
because they figure greatly in how we respond to legal rules and to each other,
as Oliver Williamson, among others, has pointed out.178 But this focus on
transaction costs can yield a sort of optical illusion, in which a small object in
the foreground appears to tower over a larger, distant object. In fact, other
aspects of contractual relations can prove more significant than transaction
costs, thus requiring that we qualify what conclusions we may draw from
problem-solving analysis.
1. The Problems with Problem-Solving Default Theory
Here we need to focus on information. The problem in Had/ey comes about
because the parties are not fully informed about each other's likelihood of
default, on the one hand, and damages in case of default, on the other. Were
the parties fully informed, they would edge nearer that ideal world in which the
default rule is immaterial, for the parties would reach the most efficient
outcome by themselves. 179 Because information must often be incomplete, so
too must contracts; the costs of completing contracts will often-perhaps
always-be too high to warrant covering every contingency.' 8 0 To the extent
that default rules mirror the ideal contract, the parties can adhere to it without
incurring any of the transaction costs of bargaining,' 8' thus increasing the
extent to which actual and ideal contracting converge. Hence the virtue of
178 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WlIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSnTTrIoNS OF CAPrrAuSM
(1985); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 233 (1979).
179 See supra notes 143-146 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., TEmmLcOcK, supra
note 169, at 103-26. However, even if the parties are fully informed, they will incur costs as
they process the information and bargain with it. For sufficiently minor risks, they may well
find it rational to remain ignorant-what Herbert Simon calls bounded rationality. See infra
Part IV.A; see also, e.g., BAIRD Er AL., supra note 151, at 149.
180 See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 178, at 70; Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts
in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 271 (1992); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
181 Default provisions may also gain certainty, perhaps through common use, which




But what if the transaction costs are not the sole obstacles to the ideal
results? Consider the cross-subsidization effects discussed earlier for a high-
damage consequential damages rule. 182 There the result was inefficient, but the
parties had no incentives to bargain around it-the low-damage shipper because
of transaction costs, and the high-damage shipper because of simple self-
interest. The high-damage shipper would not reveal its status, because it would
pay more for the same level of insurance. The inefficiency here stems not from
transaction costs, but from asymmetric information.
Further, this inefficiency can be exacerbated by transaction costs. In the
earlier example, cross-subsidization results from the low-damage shippers'
unwillingness to contract around an inefficient default rule where the cost of
contracting exceeds the gain from contracting. Nor can the carrier solve the
problem easily by providing an array of prices and potential liabilities. Though
a system of higher prices for higher liabilities might tease out high-damage
from low-damage shippers, it comes at a cost: this approach generates lower
gains from exchange than would be found in a world of symmetric
information. 183
2. Information-Forcing Theory and Hadley
Asymmetric information itself causes substantial inefficiencies, as well as in
tandem with transaction costs. This suggests another approach to default rules,
focusing on the reduction of these asymmetries. We thus have the information-
forcing default rule. 184 Such a rule attaches a penalty when a party fails to
disclose information, so that the party, preferring disclosure to penalty, will
hand over the information and negate its strategic, but inefficient, advantage.
Before we discuss Hadley as an information-forcing default, and then
182 See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
183 For a full explication of this result, see Ayres & Gertner II, supra note 154, at 738-
39, 767-73; on the inefficiencies of separating markets generally, see, for example,
Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 149, at 634-37.
184 The term was coined by Robert Scott. See Scott, supra note 180, at 609. This effect
was brought forward by Ayres and Gertner, though it had earlier been noted by others. See
Ayres & Gertner I, supra note 143; see also, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CM. L. REV. 89, 113 n.45 (1985);
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1299-1300 (1980); cf Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven
Shavell, Infornation and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of i adley v.
Baxendale, 7 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 284 (1991) (raising a similar approach). See generally
Ayres & Gertner 1I, supra note 154, at 735 n.24 (collecting references).
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disproportionality as it affects the flow of information, we must briefly consider
the peculiar difficulties with a default rule which compels information to flow
under a threat of penalty. After all, the law of contracts ordinarily frowns upon
penalties. Consider, for instance, the strict limits placed on liquidated damages
clauses 185-no penalty clauses allowed-and the virtual absence of punitive
damages awards for breach of contract.186 This antipathy is rooted in contract
law's goal of compensation; a breached-against party should be given the
benefit of its bargain, but no more (unlike the damages rules in tort, which
encompass deterrence and retribution as well as compensation).' 8 7 One may
also justify compensation in contract by looking at efficiency; as Alan Schwartz
has argued, a remedial system that gives supracompensatory damages will be
inefficient.' 8 8 Ordinarily, then, we should look askance at contract rules that
create penalties. Our wariness might also be heightened by the effect of this
penalty-the coerced disclosure of information. If knowledge is power, as the
saying goes, knowledge is also wealth. Why should a default rule oblige one
party to hand information to another, information which derives its value from
its asymmetry? 189
185 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1995); RpSrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrS
§ 356(1) (1979). This ban on penalty clauses, unique to the common law in its severity, has
attracted some unfavorable comment. See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769
F.2d 1284, 1288-89 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.); Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., Liquidated
Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 351; Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just Compensation Principle, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977). See generally TRErm, supra note 17, at 208-34 (reviewing
European law on liquidated damages).
186 See, e.g., REsrATEM-NT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 344 (1979); Alan Schwartz,
The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting
for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369 (1990). There are a few exceptions, most notably
for bad-faith breach of an insurance contract. See, e.g., STEPEN S. As=.E, BAD FArm
ACTIONS § 8:03 (1984). See generally Symposium, The Law of Bad Faith in Contract and
Insurance, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1203 (1994).
187 This topic is vast. For illustrative discussions, see, for example, JulFs L. COiMAN,
RISKs & WRONGS (1992); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Law, 85 HARv. L.
REV. 537 (1972).
188 See Schwartz, supra note 186. But see, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the
Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REv.
1443 (1980) (advocating punitive damages for bad-faith breach).
189 One might also ask whether such a rule is justifiable in light of a promise-based or
consent-based theory of contract. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 169; Barnett, supra note 173.
Under either, compelled disclosure is initially suspect, whether because it falls outside the
promises of the parties or falls outside the scope of their unforced consent. In either case,
though, one can still make room for disclosure, as shown below. See also, e.g., FRIED, supra
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Perhaps efficiency may justify this intrusion. Information itself has little
value, in a commercial context, except insofar as it enables one to gain through
its use. The legal system then might appropriately encourage economic actors to
acquire information. But not all information will lead to wealth creation. Some
will, of course-for example, a geologist may find ore-laden lands that
otherwise would have served as pasture, or a bibliophile may rescue a first
edition from a discard bin. Some information, though, merely redistributes
wealth-for instance, learning that one's house, soon to be sold, is infested with
termites. A party to a transaction may find this sort of information valuable, in
that it enables her to gain at the other party's direct expense. A legal regime
that encourages parties to invest in wealth-redistributing information of this sort
may, however, prove inefficient. All parties to a transaction would seek out this
sort of information in order that they might not be hornswoggled; the net result
would add nothing to wealth, but increase the costs of the transaction. In
contrast, wealth-creating information is worth the investment; even if all parties
to a transaction seek out these facts, their investments may well be repaid by the
value that the information creates. Thus we have the proposition that the legal
system should encourage economic actors to invest in wealth-creating, but not
wealth-redistributing, information, perhaps by limiting a duty to disclose to the
latter. 190
Information-forcing default rules focus on wealth-redistributing
information. In our context, for instance, the information in question is the
presence of unusual risk. Nothing involved in the transaction will increase
greatly in value as a result of the promisee's knowledge of the effect of breach;
rather, the main effect of the knowledge is to allow the promisee to shift some
of the risk of loss onto the promisor. 191 Should this information be asymmetric,
the risk might end up on the party less able to bear it or spread it cheaply. The
promisor thus has some incentive to seek out this information-but, inevitably,
note 169, at 58-67 (making a case for a limited duty to disclose). Further, promise-based or
consent-based theories may have little to say about the content of default rules, as distinct
from when a promise that may embody default rules should be enforced. See Craswell, supra
note 135.
190 See ROnERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 245-49 (2d ed.
1997); see also, e.g., TREILCOCK, supra note 169, at 106-18. Dean Kronman has proposed
a different distinction, based on whether the information is casually or deliberately acquired,
with only the latter subject to disclosure; since, however, one can casually acquire valuable
information, and work quite hard to gather information that adds nothing to net wealth, it is
hard to see the justification. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and
the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978).
191 The information might also affect the level of care taken by the promisor, as
discussed earlier. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
1998]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNVAL
at a cost. One can thus defend information-forcing default rules in general, and
the Hadley sort of rule in particular, as an attempt to reduce information costs
that yield no net wealth. 192
How well does Hadley reduce these costs, furthering efficiency by forcing
the disclosure of merely redistributive information? Fairly well. Consider first
that Hadley may not always mirror the ideal bargain of the parties; possibly the
carrier is the better risk-reducer or risk-spreader, even for unforeseeable
risks. 193 If so, Hadley itself does not yield an efficient result, in the transaction
costs sense. Still, how would we reach the efficient result of placing the risk on
the carrier when the carrier can more cheaply bear the risk? If the carrier does
not know the magnitude of the risks it takes on, it will not be able to reduce
them efficiently. 194 Furthermore, simply placing the risk on the carrier will not
solve the problem; as discussed earlier, the relatively modest risk premium that
most carriers would charge might yield an inefficient pooling equilibrium with
cross-subsidization. 195 The shipper thus will not disclose the information
willingly, even though the net gains from trade would rise were it to do so.
The carrier could seek out the risk information directly, by asking the
shipper, or indirectly, by studying the sorts of liability that result from different
types of shippers or shipments. The former seems more practicable; the costs of
indirect sleuthery would be tremendous. Nevertheless, the costs of asking all
shippers could mount. 196 The ideal mechanism, then, would induce high-value
shippers, and only high-value shippers, to divulge the potential magnitude of
'the risk of non-delivery. This Hadley does by setting the default rule to exclude
damages beyond the obvious. The default rule places the burden on shippers to
192 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 184, at 287-89. And information is a
prerequisite to exercising autonomy. See, e.g., TREmCOCK, supra note 169, at 103.
193 See generally supra Part III.A.1; see also, e.g., Ayres & Germer I, supra note 143,
at 101.
194 True, the carrier may be able to estimate aggregate risk, perhaps based on its history
of muffing shipments, and spread risk accordingly, presumably by increasing its price. At any
particular price, though, one may get adverse selection, if the risk adjustment is noticeable to
potential shippers. Furthermore, reducing risk may not lend itself to aggregation as well as
spreading risk does. Very possibly the most efficient way to reduce risk is to segregate high-
magnitude shipments from their more mundane confreres, treating the former with especial
care. If so, efficient risk-reduction requires that the carrier know the risk of each package, or
at least of the high-magnitude packages. Thus the observation in the text.
195 See supra note 152.
196 Though the carrier could, as discussed earlier, seek out the information through a
market basket of contracts, each with a different price and a different level of protection, it




divulge extraordinary risks to carriers; as the shippers already have this
information, they can release it cheaply. Should most shipments have only
foreseeable risks, this rule will prove efficient-not because it mirrors the
wishes of most parties, but because it obliges those who have unforeseeable
risks to let their hazards be known, lest they suffer the penalty of no
recovery. 197
3. Disproportionality and Information-Forcing Theory
Hadley thus avoids the tendency of those with information to withhold it
strategically, even when divulging the information would yield a net gain for
the contracting parties. But we undercut this pleasant, or at least efficient, effect
when we add disproportionality to the legal rule. For an information-forcing
default rule to compel a party to disclose information, it must impose a penalty
default on those who do not contract around it by providing the information. In
general, disproportionality has the effect of decreasing the penalty, which thus
decreases the incentive to divulge the information. One would thus expect
disproportionality, or any other rule that lowers the breached-against party's
potential recovery, to vitiate the effect of an information-forcing default rule.
Beyond this general effect, though, is the specific way in which
disproportionality reduces the penalty for non-disclosure. Disproportionality's
effect is not uniform, acting as a sort of negative multiplier for consequential
damages. Rather, its effect rests wholly on risks ordinarily unforeseeable by the
ignorant party-risks that fall under the second part in Hadley.
Disproportionality exercises its influence only when these risks come about, for
only then is the contract price likely to be dwarfed by the liability. As a result,
the promisor's liability for disproportionate risk would be diminished greatly,
and the promisee would thus lose much of its incentive to disclose the
information without getting an express agreement that the promisor would
assume the liability. So disproportionality acts in two rather different ways: it
reduces the penalty effect of disclosure where the risk would be dealt with
implicitly, but it encourages the promisee to deal with the risk expressly.
On balance, this dual effect seems more a bane than a boon. The bane is
obvious: by reducing the penalty, disproportionality would diminish the extent
to which the default rule would force out information. The boon is less obvious,
197 See Ayres & Gertner I, supra note 143, at 101-02; see also Jeffrey M. Perloff,
Breach of Contract and the Foreseeability Doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale, 10 J. LEGAL
STuD. 39, 49-51 (1981). However, an information-forcing rule may prove inefficient if
market participants adjust their preferences to reflect the existing rule, rather than respond to
the rule by disclosing information. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract
Defat Rides, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 608, 668-69 (1998).
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and less significant. True, the promisee, which has the information in question,
will stand a decent chance of recovering its damages only if it gets an express
agreement shifting risk. If, however, this risk does not follow in the ordinary
course of events, then the promisor will achieve this knowledge either if the
promisee actually handed over the information or if its expertise, perhaps
reinforced by a course of dealing, leads it to the information unbidden. Given
the range of disproportionality cases thus far, the more likely scenario is that
the promisee will have passed the information on to the promisor directly. 198
The promisee thus has already incurred the costs of informing the promisor of
risk. Unless the promisor has provided for this contingency in a form contract,
the added costs of contracting may dissuade the promisee from seeking to shift
the risk expressly. After all, the likelihood of any of these remote risks coming
about is very low; the value of contracting expressly for them therefore tends to
be slight, and even modest impediments to contracting may prove sufficient to
block any tailor-made solutions. 199
Under basic information-forcing theory, then, disproportionality undercuts
the forcing effect of the penalty and thus reduces the efficient flow of
information. Before we can close our discussion of this sort of default rule,
though, we must consider first, whether there is a discrete class of promisors
for whom disproportionality might increase disclosure, and second, whether a
more advanced form of the theory might lead to a different result.
4. Mass Dealing and Disproportionate Risk
The analysis above produces an unexceptionable general result. But is there
a class of promisors that stands apart from the mass? Possibly so. Recall that
the potential advantage created by disproportionality is its gentle pressure on
promisees to contract for disproportionate risk expressly, for even full
disclosure under the second part in Hadley may prove inadequate to shift the
risk of default. In general, this pressure will be countered by the costs of
express contracting, and thus will prove unavailing. Still, this may not always
be true. Promisors who deal with disproportionate risk in bulk may find it
expedient to create an array of contracts from which a promisee may easily
select (as, for instance, most shipping companies do).2°° In these cases,
198 See generally supra Part ll.B.
199 As we discussed in the context of problem-solving defaults, the promisor usually will
not provide in its forms for the range of contracts that make possible a separating equilibrium;
as a result, one will tend to see pooling and cross-subsidization. See supra notes 154-55 and
accompanying text.
200 See supra note 154 and accompanying text; cf John Elofson, The Dilemma of
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disproportionality may have a modestly useful role. By reducing the expected
recovery where the promisee gives the sort of notice sufficient under the second
part in Hadley-say, the sort of notice that might actually have been given in
Hadley, according to the reporter2 0 -the promisee is obliged to contract
expressly. If the express contract is drafted sensibly, it will increase the
certainty of the transaction. This should lower the likelihood of any legal
dispute and should lower the costs of resolving any dispute should it go to law.
Though a definite minority of disputes are ultimately litigated, the costs of
doing so are high enough that cheap express contracting may prove
worthwhile. 202
There is another reason why disproportionality may be helpful in these
cases-cases like Hadley and Kerr Steamship, with promisors that deal with
large numbers of promisees in similar transactions. 203 These cases rest on the
fiction that a shipping clerk or another ministerial employee can act rationally
for his employer. The law of agency imputes authority to this sort of
employee-and properly so, for the most part.2°4 But, as Cardozo suggested in
Kerr Steamship, the real ability of these employees to assess risk on their
employers' behalf is often dubious. 205 Nor would it usually be logical for a firm
Changed Circunstances in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis of the Foreseeability and
Superior Risk Bearer Tests, 30 CoLuM. J. L. & Soc. PRons. 1, 32-34 (1996) (proposing that
risk of unforeseeable events be placed depending on the importance and probability of the
event, on the one hand, and the cost of placing an exculpatory clause in the contract, on the
other).
201 In Hadley, the reporter states that Hadley actually told Baxendale's clerk that the mill
had been closed and that the millshaft had to be shipped with haste, but Baron Alderson, in
his opinion, states that no such notice had been given. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng.
Rep. 145, 147, 151 (Ex. 1854).
202 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 184, at 308-09. This is particularly
important when the costs of drafting a careful form agreement can be amortized over a good
many contracts.
203 Actually, there is more than one other reason. The effect of express contracting is a
separating equilibrium, which, in general, is more efficient than its pooling counterpart. See
supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
204 For a look at the literature assessing the law of vicarious liability, see, for example,
Bruce Chapman, Corporate Tort Liability and the Problem of Overcompliance, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1679 (1996); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231
(1984). See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Fimnn:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976)
(theory of agency costs).
205 See Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 157 N.E. 140, 141 (N.Y. 1927); see
also, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of
Employee Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1705 (1996).
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to train hordes of employees and agents who deal directly with customers in the
nuances of risk assessment and pricing, given the costs of training and the usual
lack of significance attached to these calculations. 206  Perhaps a
disproportionality test merely acknowledges the fiction of actual agency in
extreme cases, where the promisee should subjectively, and perhaps
objectively, be aware that the desk clerk has no real authority to create massive
potential liabilities for his employer or principal.
To say that disproportionality may have value here is not, however, to say
that it is valuable. Bear in mind that mass dealers in remote risk-the class of
promisors discussed here-typically deal with risk through a combination of a
blanket disclaimer and graded insurance contracts. They contract around the
default rule essentially by ignoring any information the promisee lobs their
way. For these firms, disproportionality is largely irrelevant; they have already
disclaimed risk, on the one hand, or they have bought it expressly through
insurance contracts, on the other. A very large disproportionality exception
might, one supposes, cause these firms to omit the disclaimer, but the costs of
resolving consequential damages disputes make that outcome unlikely. In
practice, then, this advantage of disproportionality is generally trivial. 207
5. Information-Forcing and Disproportionality with
Powerful Promisors
Now that we have considered a relatively straightforward application of
information-forcing default theory to consequential damages and
disproportionality, we should consider a more complex version. The refinement
here stems from Jason Johnston's observation that strategic inefficiency could
result, not merely from informational asymmetry, but also from market power:
the more powerful party could use its power to discriminate with respect to
price.208 More particularly, suppose that the carrier has market power in the
206 Compounding the problem is the use of agents, rather than employees, as is common
for carriers and telegraph companies.
207 Possibly a mass dealer in risk might choose not to disclaim liability, perhaps out of
simple ignorance. This seems improbable. Certainly the modem cases do not reflect any such
trends, dealing as they do with relatively weighty transactions. See supra Part ll.B.
Furthermore, it has been observed that under modest assumptions-mutual risk-aversion and
high transaction costs-no liability rule is efficient. See Perloff, supra note 197, at 63. Form
contracting can help solve the default rule dilemma, which one would thus over time expect to
see.
208 See Jason S. Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract
Default Rides, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 623-29 (1990).
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standard shipper-carrier illustration. 209 Then, says Johnston, the carrier will use
any information divulged by the shipper to offer coverage for the shipper's risk
at a price equal to the shipper's value.210 In such a world, the shipper may not
want to tell the carrier how it values the goods shipped; given the added cost of
carriage, the shipper may be better off not releasing the information and taking
the ordinary default measure. If, however, the shipper does this, then the
transaction will be less efficient, for the carrier will not take cost-effective
precautions against breach.
More generally, as Ayres and Gertner have observed, in a world of costless
contracting a carrier with market power can offer a menu of contracts that will
extract all the gains from trade from low-value shippers and most of the gains
from high-value shippers.211 This menu would screen shippers by offering
high-value shippers an incentive to reveal their status, perhaps by lowering the
available damages for one alternative enough to drive the high-value shippers to
the other.212 If, however, the carrier sets the low-value damages so that they
undercompensate low-value shippers, then the carrier will inefficiently under-
invest in precaution. 213 This will be true regardless of the default rule;
accordingly, fussing over disproportionality would, in this world of market
power, prove pointless. 214
Of course, our world has costly contracting. This, regrettably, adds greatly
to the complexity of the analysis. When we factor in transaction costs, even a
simple consequential damages scenario generates a wide range of efficient
separating and pooling equilibria, depending on the size of the transaction costs
and the valuations of high-damage and low-damage shippers. 215 This provokes
an important critique of problem-solving default rules: if the wealth-maximizing
default rule for even a simple scenario is all but impossible to determine, does it
make sense for legislators to attempt to do so broadly?216 Still, before giving in
209 This assumption reverses that made earlier, where high-value shippers, by refusing
to contract around an inefficient default, could effectively obtain a cross-subsidized pooled
price. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Ayres & Gertner I,
supra note 143, at 110-11.
210 See Johnston, supra note 208, at 629.
211 See Ayres & Gertuer II, supra note 154, at 738-39.
212 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
213 See Ayres & Gertner II, supra note 154, at 739.
214 See id. at 740-42.
2 15 For a full account of the range of options, see id. at 752-59.
2 16 See id. at 765-67; see also, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the
Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTRIsc. L.J. 389, 406-11 (1993) (doubting the ability
to write good default rules).
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to a sort of existential anomie, we might look more closely at the various
equilibria. After all, our interest is not in the welter of intermediate valuations
that make for complicated graphs; our interest is in high-value shipments, and
even the highest of the high, for there rests the basis for a disproportionality
claim.
Adding transaction costs and market power to our simple information-
forcing model yields, oddly enough, a simple result: the efficient outcome at
sufficiently extreme levels is the ordinary consequential damages rule.2 17 The
carrier can maximize its profits by charging a price that only high-value
shippers will accept. It could not do better through pooling, because then the
low-value shippers would still opt out, in essence through adverse selection.218
Nor could the carrier do better through offering a separating menu of contracts,
with a low-cost, low-damages contract and a high-cost, high-damages contract;
where the differences between low-damage and high-damage shippers are very
great, the carrier can fight the tendency to pool only by lowering the low-
damage contract's value to the vanishing point.219
This result suggests the unhelpfulness of disproportionality. The effect of
disproportionality is to force high-damage shippers downward, very likely to a
different means of efficient contracting. Perhaps separating contracts would
prove more efficient; perhaps pooling would prove more efficient. Without
more data than we have, it is hard to say. But the efficiency of an ordinary
consequential damages rule under these assumptions-carrier market power,
asymmetric information, transaction costs-depends greatly on the relative
magnitudes of high-value and low-value contracts. Reducing the magnitude by
changing the efficient default rule, may thus produce an inefficient result.
This extension of information-forcing default theory is necessarily vague
and abstract, depending as it does on largely hypothetical data. It likely induces
puzzlement more than certainty. Still, we can draw some tentative
conclusions-first, that our choice of default rule may prove highly complex,
and second, that adding disproportionality to a consequential damages regime
may make a once-efficient default rule inefficient. Not perhaps overwhelming
conclusions, but useful enough for at least one reason: they undercut the case
for disproportionality as a part of consequential damages analysis. When
combined with the clearer, if less nuanced, analysis under basic information-
forcing theory, the case for disproportionality grows weaker still, and, as noted,
largely irrelevant where it is strongest.
2 17 See Ayres & Gertner II, supra note 154, at 754.
218 See id. at 748-49.
219 See id. at 749 n.70, 754.
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IV. RISK, COGNrTON, AND ERROR
The analysis above rests on a good many assumptions of varying degrees of
plausibility. Important among them is an assumption about information. Both
problem-solving default rule theory and information-forcing default rule theory
assume, expressly or implicitly, that contracting parties will assimilate
information readily and will respond to it rationally. 220 Problem-solving theory
requires that the parties would reach their ideal bargain if only information
were costless and were costlessly and perfectly analyzed. If, in contrast, most
contracting parties misperceive information systematically and behave
irrationally, then problem-solving default rules seem less desirable. The rules
probably will not lower transaction costs if systematic error leads the parties
consistently away from the ideal default. On the other hand, if we instead set
the default rule at what most contracting parties actua/ly do, then we gain
lowered transaction costs but lose economic efficiency. The problem-solving
default may still be desirable, but not merely because it is what most parties
would choose to do.22 1
Information-forcing default rules are open to a similar criticism. They
assume that, if the information is disclosed, the recipient will make a rational
decision. If the information is misused or ignored, the ultimate contract will
depart from the efficient ideal. In other words, the information would be worth
less in a world of systematic cognitive error than it would in a world of
perfectly processed information; as a result, the advantages of disclosure would
be muted or effaced.222 Up until now, the analysis has assumed ideality for the
purposes of clarity; now we must add reality for the purposes of practicality.
These default theories thus themselves depend on expected utility theory.223
This theory assumes two types of ability-one informational and one
procedural. 224 Informational ability assumes that someone making a decision
220 These default theories do not require that each party actually know whether the other
can reduce or spread risk better; this information should, in principle, be transmitted through
price. One should bear in mind that price itself may be a weak signal, given the relatively low
likelihood of any particular harm; the magnitude of the risk premium will probably be
dwarfed by the price of the goods or services themselves. Still, the assumptions need not
extend to detailed knowledge, save that required to get past Hadley.
2 21 See Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rudes
for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 544 (1990).
222 See, e.g., Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive
Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 764 (1990).
223 Also known as rational choice theory.
224 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Rational Choice and Rational Cognition, 3 LEGAL
THEORY 183, 183 (1997).
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knows, or can know, all the available choices and their prices, and knows as
well what she wants or needs. 225 In a world of costly information, this
assumption is not entirely realistic, though its implications, discussed below, are
rather complex. Procedural ability requires that the rational actor be able to use
this information fully, computing the likelihood of future events, assessing
accurately the outcomes, and deciding on a course of action that will increase
maximally her welfare. 226 The rational actor must also use proper Bayesian
analysis to determine the expected values for the possible events, thus enabling
her to choose rationally. 227
To accomplish all this, expected utility theory requires that rational actors
act according to a range of axioms. These are stated variously, 228 but include,
at a minimum, dominance and invariance. 229 Dominance, which resembles the
more-familiar Pareto-superiority, holds that if one prefers A to B under at least
one set of conditions and thinks A at least equal to B in all others, then one
should prefer A to B.230 Invariance231 requires that one should come to the
same conclusion when given the same problem, however the problem is
stated. 232
225 See, e.g., LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDAnoNS OF STATSCs 16 (2d ed. 1972);
Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 213; Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the
Economic Analysis of Law, 12 HAmuNE L. Ray. 385, 386 (1989). To qualify the text
somewhat, expected choice theory does not require that a rational actor be omniscient.
Rather, the actor needs to know only what is relevant to the decision at hand.
226 Welfare, not wealth. Expected utility theory uses subjective, rather than objective,
utility, and thus may take into account risk-averse or risk-taking propensities. See, e.g., PAuL
ANAND, FOuNDATiONs OF RAnONAL CHoIcE UNDER RisK 6-7 (1993).
227 Bayesian analysis is the means by which one calculates the probability of a future
event based on its estimated likelihood and the chances of false negatives and false positives.
See, e.g., 1VcHAEL 0. FPINK EiN & BRUCE LEm,, STATSTiCS FOR LAWiES 93 (1990);
J. FRANK YATES, JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 134-36 (1990).
228 See, e.g., ANAND, supra note 226, at 12-15; YATES, supra note 227, at 31-32;
Colin F. Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF ExPERImNTAL
ECONOMICS 587, 618-19 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
229 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kabneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, in DECISION MAKING: DEscRwPTvE, NORMAT=v, AND PRESCRmTE
INTERACTIONS 167, 168-69 (David E. Bell et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter DECISION MAMNGI;
Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 AM. PSYCHOLoGIST 364, 364 (1995).
230 See ANAND, supra note 226, at 13-14, 74-86.
231 Called "extensionality" by Arrow. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Risk Perception in
Psychology and Economics, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 1, 6 (1982).
232 See, e.g., Camerer, supra note 228, at 652. Invariance is not, strictly speaking, one
of the axioms of expected utility theory, but it is implicit in a number of the more standard
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These axioms require rather strong assumptions about behavior, and thus
have been criticized rather vigorously. In the words of one theorist of expected
utility, "if [expected utility theory] is an empirical, testable theory, then it is, in
any conventional sense, untrue." 233 It is thus time to loosen the rather strict
assumptions of these default theories about information, looking to various
aspects of behavioral decision theory to see whether these assumptions are
violated and, if so, whether the violations might affect the analyses. In
particular, it is important to determine whether people systematically err, for
systematic error can yield results that vary greatly from ideal default theory.
The two major branches of behavioral decision theory that are germane here
are bounded rationality and cognitive psychology, which are discussed below.
A. Bounded Rationality
We can begin by loosening the assumption of perfect, costless information
about risk. This requires no real logical leap. Neither information nor its
processing comes free of charge, and any rational person will inevitably
economize to some degree on information. This was discussed early on by
Herbert Simon, who formulated the concept of bounded rationality. 234 This
model of thought assumes that we have limits on our ability to acquire and
process information-indeed, that it is seldom, if ever, rational to be perfectly
rational.2 35 As a result, we reach decisions based on less than perfect
axioms; if, after all, people do vary their preferences according to the manner in which they
are expressed, then at some level they are not acting rationally. See, e.g., Robert Sugden,
Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy, 101 EcoN. J.
751, 757-61 (1991). In addition, invariance is tied to preference exogeneity-the idea that
one's preferences are unrelated to the content of the default rules that apply. See Korobkin,
supra note 197, at 623-24.
233 ANAND, supra note 226, at 19; see also, e.g., Arrow, supra note 231, at 1
("Hypotheses of rationality have been under attack for empirical falsity almost as long as they
have been employed in economics."); Sugden, supra note 232, at 782 ("Savage's axioms are
much stronger than can be justified merely by an appeal to an instrumental conception of
rationality.").
234 See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONAl=TY (1982); Herbert
A. Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, in RATIONAL CHoicE: TE CoNTRAn
BETwEEN PsYCHOLOGY AND EcONOMICS 25 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds.,
1987) [hereinafter RATIONAL CHoIcE]; Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as
Product of Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REv.: PAPEns & PROC. 1 (1978) [hereinafter Simon,
Rationality]; see also, e.g., Gordon C. Winston, Imperfectly Rational Choice: Rationality as
the Result of a Costly Activity, 12 J. EcON. BEmAV. & ORG. 67 (1989); Sidney G. Winter,
Satisficing, Selection, and the Innovating Remnant, 85 Q.J. EcON. 237 (1971).
235 See, e.g., Winston, supra note 234, at 67-68.
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information, typically using a grab-bag of shortcuts that, over time, have
proved more or less satisfactory in producing sufficiently rational results. In
Simon's term, we "satisfice. '' 236 Satisficing entails potential error, though it
seeks to avoid error as far as is practicable. 237
The question, then, is whether bounded rationality and satisficing could
warp one's decisions, so that they would consistently depart from the expected
utility ideal.2 38 If so, then we might need to rethink the results derived from the
default models above. Initially, it would seem that bounded rationality should
have no effect on the mean outcome, though it would increase the scatter of
results. It has long been pointed out that individuals need not act rationally for
microeconomic theory to work; the population need only act as though it
consists of rational actors.239 If, then, errors scatter randomly, one might expect
the market to smooth out any individual aberrations. 240 Though the market
might fluctuate more as a result of random error, the mean result should, it
appears, be the same as with ideal economic actors.241
On closer inspection, though, one might see some systematic error as a
result of rationed rationality, at least for the sort of risks that might be subject to
disproportionality analysis. These risks are at the low end of the probability
scale. Thus, it is impossible to underestimate them to the same degree that it is
236 JAMES G. MARcH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 140-41 (1958); Simon,
Rationality, supra note 234.
237 In Simon's phrase, we are "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so." HERBERT A.
SIMON, ADMISRATIrvE BEHAvIOR xxiv (2d ed. 1957) (emphasis in original). Satisficing
thus seeks the best decisions practicable under the circumstances-or, at least, sufficiently
good decisions, based on some outside benchmark. See, e.g., David M. Grether et al., The
Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L.
REv. 277, 287 (1986).
2 38 Certainly the premises of bounded rationality are inconsistent with expected utility
theory. See, e.g., Joshua S. Gans, On the Impossibility of Rational Choice Under Imperfect
Information, 29 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 287 (1996).
239 See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN
PosrvE EcONOMICS 22 (1953); KNIGHT, supra note 141, at 67 n.1.
24 0 As they seem to in experimental markets. See, e.g., Dhananjay K. Gode & Shyam
Sunder, Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial
Substitute for Individual Rationality, 101 J. POL. ECON. 119, 135-36 (1993). Insolvency can
affect this result, though, because the market will select against risk-takers whose risks do not
pay off; as a result, traders become less risk-taking over time. See Douglas W. Diamond,
Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, 97 J. PoL. ECON. 828, 841-45 (1989).
24 1 See John Conlisk, Bounded Rationality and Market Fluctuations, 29 J. ECON.
BEIAv. & ORG. 233, 245-46 (1996). The market might also be affected if random error in




possible to overestimate them; while one can raise a one percent risk fully
ninety-nine percent, one can lower it only one percent. Random error hence
will not follow the sort of normal distribution that one might expect from a
more moderate risk. Instead, the distribution of error should yield a positively
skewed curve, with a long rightward tail and a short leftward tail. More
precisely, the distribution should fit a normal curve, truncated leftward.242 On
the other hand, the magnitude of a potentially disproportionate risk, though
high, can always be higher still; we thus would expect no rightward truncation
of the distribution of magnitudes.243
This is significant because a normal distribution has a mean identical to its
median, whatever the magnitude of error. For an unskewed distribution of risk
or value, then, bounded rationality should not affect the market overall. On the
other hand, a curve skewed positively has a mean higher than its median. 244
The greater the skewing, the greater the difference between mean and median.
An increase in the amount of error will thus affect the mean, so bounded
rationality, which should increase error, should also systematically increase the
mean predicted risk. With no countervailing downward shift in the mean
predicted magnitude, the net effect is overpriced risk.
The result of this is two-fold. Both parties would presumably tend to
overestimate the risk of default. The promisor would set too high a price, and
the promisee, also overestimating the risk, would tend to pay it. Promisees,
however, generally should have worse risk information than promisors.
Promisors should thus be able to predict their risks of default more accurately
than promisees with fewer bounds on rationality, less error, and less skewing.
Given the promisee's greater tendency to overvalue risk, it will be willing to
pay more to shift risk, on average, than the promisor will charge; as a result,
the promisor should not often be undercompensated for bearing risk,
undercutting a general case for disproportionality.
The fact of random scatter does allow for a limited range of possibly
disproportionate risks. If random error gives the promisor low risk and
magnitude estimates and the promisee high risk and magnitude estimates, the
promisor may grossly undercharge for shifting the risk. This may not,
however, be very worrisome. Even though undercharging will sometimes
242 The underlying risk data may not in fact be distributed normally. Even if the data are
distributed asymmetrically, though, truncating the distribution negatively will still affect the
mean in the same way.
243 The magnitude could even go below zero, if the default would prove beneficial. In
any event, the distribution of magnitudes would be far enough to the right that one would
expect no leftward truncation.
244 See, e.g., JAY L. DEVORE, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS FOR ENGINEERING AND THE
SciNcSs 15 (1982).
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occur, in the long run it should be washed out by instances where the promisor
overcharged for assuming risk. Indeed, it should more than wash out, given the
skewed risk distributions. If the promisee cannot get a refund when it overpays
for risk, it is hard to see why the promisor should get a refund when it is
underpaid, in light of the general tendency to overcompensate promisors. So
bounded rationality analysis suggests that disproportionality has little, if any,
role in modifying consequential damages.
B. Behavioral Decision Theory
Bounded rationality introduces the possibility of error into our hitherto
determinedly rational analysis. But bounded rationality is itself rooted in
fundamental rationality. After all, even bounded rationality assumes that the
satisficing party will act rationally, given its constraints on information and its
processing; it may err, but its errors will tend to be random.245 The next step is
to challenge this assumption. What if we err systematically in processing the
information we have? If we do, then expected utility theory may not prove very
helpful in predicting behavior, whether individually or collectively. As much of
the default analysis above was based on the assumption that we would be able
to react sensibly to information-that is, it was based on expected utility
theory-its conclusions might be open to question. Perhaps there is some role
for disproportionality after all.
Hence the next pages of this Article, which discuss a number of the
findings of cognitive psychology and apply them to the problem at hand-that
of risk allocation and risk pricing. Suppose that contracting parties do
undervalue the sort of risk that disproportionality covers-low-probability,
high-magnitude risk. Then the party taking on the risk will tend to charge too
low a risk premium. If it self-insures, it will find itself in arrears, over the long
run; if it buys insurance, it will pay more than it takes in (this effect
compounded by the need for the insurer to profit).246 We might thus be able to
justify attenuating the promisor's liability as a means of correcting for its
systematic underpricing of risk.247 The question, then, is whether cognitive
psychology and experimental economics lead us to conclude that this systematic
245 Though it may be satisfied, not with the best choice under the circumstances, but
with a satisfactory choice in terms of some preset standard.
246 In principle, the third-party insurer could also make cognitive errors and underprice
risk, which would tend to wash out this effect. In practice, though, this should not happen,
given learning effects which overcome cognitive biases. See infra Part V.B.7.





Before we examine the literature, we need to consider briefly whether this
exercise is appropriate. Objections to it fall into two main camps. First, market
forces will correct for cognitive error, so economics and law need not worry
about individual missteps. Second, the law should seek to advance efficiency,
so it should ignore or even counter any irrational, inefficient behavior, rather
than accommodate it. While these objections ought not dissuade lawyers from
applying cognitive insights to legal analysis, they should still be addressed.
The first objection acknowledges that individuals may err, often grievously,
in their perceptions and assessments, but declines to extend that
acknowledgment to populations. Populations, the argument goes, behave as
though they are composed of perfectly cognizant rational maximizers. 248 Put
otherwise, the market corrects for individual error. 249 Promisors will tend to
respond, not to individual caprices, but to collective outcomes, and so we
would see no economic effect from cognitive error. Any attempt to meddle with
market forces might then prove inefficient, as well as, perhaps, paternalistic.25 0
In the long run, indeed, such interference might cushion weak, inefficient
businesses from the weeding-out of the market, thus diminishing long-run
efficiency in the economic world.251
This objection lacks substance. It assumes-indeed, requires-that
individual errors wash out. This may be true for random errors which should
distribute more or less normally.252 Though the variation might be higher, the
mean should not be affected. Perhaps these errors might safely be ignored, at
248 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 239; GEORGE STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 6 (3d
ed. 1966); Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1,
6-9(1962).
249 A result shown by computer simulations of markets. See, e.g., Gode & Sunder,
supra note 240, at 135-36; Karim Jamal & Shyam Sunder, Bayesian Equifibriwn in Double
Auctions Populated by Biased Heuristic Traders, 31 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 273, 273-87
(1996). See generally Charles R. Plott, Rational Choice in Experimental Markets, in
RATIONAL CHoICE, supra note 234, at 117 (experimental markets generally correct for
cognitive errors).
250 See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE
L.J. 763, 763 (1983).
251 See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 221, at 576-78; Jack Hirshleifer, Economics from a
Biological Wewpoint, 20 J. L. & ECON. 1, 9-10 (1977); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start
Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1393, 1417 (1985); see also, e.g., Friedman,
supra note 239 (natural selection); Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic
Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211, 211 (1950) (same).
252 Though skewing or truncation may cause even random error to shift the mean. See
supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
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least from the vantage of the market as a whole. 253 But this is not so for
systematic errors, which shift the mean result, rather than just the
distribution.254 Then, too, market forces can be weak, and cognitive errors may
prove quite strong indeed, so the market might not efface cognitive error;
natural selection might not in fact affect failure rate.255 One would thus expect
to see collective departures from expected utility theory where cognitive error is
relevant, which, in fact, one does.256 This objection hence seems less than
substantial.
So does the second objection, which looks more at the individual effects of
correcting for cognitive error. The argument from efficiency is, to begin with,
somewhat dubious. It is based in part on the assumption that an allocation of
risk based on rational choice theory will be efficient-that is, that it will lead to
the optimal levels of precaution and risk spreading. For the parties to an
253 See, e.g., Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 19, at 1426-27. But cf. Gertrud M.
Fremling & John R. Lott, Jr., The Bias Towards Zero in Aggregate Perceptions: An
Explanation Based on Rationally Calculating Individuals, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 276, 293 (1996)
(errors in identifying relationships will not cancel out).
254 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Can Small Deviations from
Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 708,
708-20 (1985); see also, e.g., Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 19, at 1429-30 (cognitive error
may lead to policy problem that may not be corrected by market).
255 See, e.g., John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, Rational Erpectations and the
Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 326, 328, 336
(1985) (markets may not prove rational); Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, Behavioral Capital
Asset Pricing Theory, 29 J. FIN. & QUANTrrATIVE ANALYSIS 323, 364-65 (1994) (noise
traders not necessarily selected against by capital market); Ulrich Witt, Firms' Market
Behavior Under Imperfect Information and Economic Natural Selection, 7 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 265, 265 (1986) (firm's survival rate unaffected by profit maximization).
More precisely, cognitive error will not necessarily, or even usually, figure much in
natural selection. After all, a good many errors are random, in light of bounded rationality.
Natural selection against cognitive error requires enough significant error to provide
evolutionary pressure, and enough feedback to allow for learning and adaptation. Infrequent
cognitive error makes learning difficult at best, giving the market little chance to encourage
evolution. See infra Part IV.B.7. Beyond these learning effects, widespread error should lead
only to random, thus non-evolutionary, selection.
256 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice in the Framing of
Decisions, in RATIONAL CHoicE, supra note 234, at 67, 91; Thomas Russell & Richard
Thpler, The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in Competitive Markets, 75 AM. ECON. REv.
1071, 1074, 1080-81 (1985). See generally Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products,
and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1193, 1255-57 (1994) (surveying literature);
Robert J. Shiller, Human Behavior and the Efficiency of the Financial System Qast modified
Sept. 23, 1997) <http://www.econ.yale.edul-shiller/handbook.html> (market demon-
strations of cognitive error).
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agreement to allocate risk efficiently, though, they must correctly perceive the
risk and act rationally in accordance with their perceptions. Cognitive error will
skew these actions, leading to inefficient risk allocation. If anything, then,
taking cognitive error into account should yield more, rather than less, efficient
outcomes.
257
Furthermore, one should be wary of too great a difference between is and
ought. Law can, of course, be aspirational, and be none the worse for that.258
Certainly we do not want to tailor all our laws to actual behavior; consider, for
example, the effects on traffic. Still, at least in the realm of contract, there
remains something to be said for modeling law on practice. That was Karl
Llewellyn's goal in the U.C.C., 259 and it is behind the problem-solving
approach to default rules. 26° Indeed, one may ask whether an aspirational
approach to law is entirely desirable where, as here, cognitive error is in part
due to excessive cost; a rule that encourages uneconomic information costs
seems facially inefficient. Beyond efficiency, one may also ask whether a rule
greatly divergent from real cognitive capability is entirely fair, if cognitive error
is widespread (as, indeed, it is).261
257 Indeed, it has been suggested that cognitive error can have large macroeconomic
effects. For example, though the expected utility model predicts that consumer welfare is far
more affected by base growth rate than by business cycles, departures from expected utility
can yield massive welfare effects for cycles. See James Pemberton, Trends Versus Cycles:
Asymmetric Preferences and Heterogeneous Individual Responses, 17 J. MACROECONOMICS
241, 253 (1995); see also Akerlof & Yellen, supra note 254.
258 Cf Robert Browning, Andrea del Sarto, in THM POMICAL WORKS OF ROBERT
BROWNING 346, 346 (Horace E. Scudder ed. 1895) ("Ah, but a man's reach should exceed
his grasp, or what's a heaven for?").
259 See, e.g., Kerry Lynn Macintosh, Liberty, Trade, and the Uniform Commercial
Code: When Should Default Rules Be Based on Business Practices?, 38 WM. & MARY L.
Rav. 1465, 1466 (1997); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn
and the Merchant Rides, 100 HARv. L. REv. 465, 470-71 (1987).
260 See supra Part III.A. Of course, the problem-solving approach is not free from
difficulty; still, its basic insight-that efficiency is enhanced when default rules mirror the
ideal bargain of most parties-is sound, as far as it goes. See supra Part III.B.1. (critique of
problem-solving default rules). This is especially true where default rules alter basic
preferences, as is true for the Hadley rule. See Korobkin, supra note 197, at 637-41.
261 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Cm. L. REV. 1175,
1178 (1997); Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The
Effect of Framing on Legal Rides, 38 UCLA L. REv. 391, 400 (1990). On fairness in
economic analysis, see, for example, H. PErN YOUNG, EQUriy iN THEORy AND PRACnTCE
(1994); EDWARD E. ZAjAC, PoimcAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNEss (1995); Colin F. Camerer &
George Loewenstein, Information, Fairness, and Efficiency in Bargaining, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSrICE: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 155, 155-79
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Nor would a legal regime that takes account of cognitive error be weird or
anomalous. Indeed, current law considers cognitive capacity -and informational
asymmetry in myriad contexts, whether in common law or statute. Consumer
protection statutes, such as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,262 the Fair
Credit Reporting Act,263 or other federal and state consumer acts,264 tend to
require rather specific information disclosure in especially clear formats. These
acts were thus intended to overcome some cognitive deficiencies of otherwise
ignorant or gullible consumers. Turning to common law, we find various
defenses to contract formation, most notably infancy,265 incapacity,266 and non-
disclosure.267 These illustrations should suffice to dispel any intimations of
novelty about a legal attempt to rectify cognitive error.
In sum, the initial arguments against using cognitive psychology and
experimental economics to help fashion legal rules seem unpersuasive. The next
questions, addressed below, are whether the cognitive evidence points to errors
in risk estimation or perception, and, if so, whether the evidence supports any
role for disproportionality as part of the law of consequential damages.
Behavioral decision theory describes a plethora of cognitive errors, many of
which are not pertinent here.268 Those of interest here are availability, cognitive
dissonance, over-optimism, prospect theory, framing, and regret theory. After
these are discussed, this Article will consider further whether cognitive analysis
can be brought to bear on the question of disproportionality, and what results it
yields.
(Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds., 1993); Daniel Kalmeman et al., Fairness and the
Assumptions of Economics, in RATIONAL CHoIcE, supra note 234, at 101; cf. Bruno S. Frey
& Werner W. Pommerehne, On the Fairness of Pricing-An Empirical Survey Among the
General Population, 20 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 295, 297-98 (1993) (rise in prices to adjust
for excess demand considered unfair by about 80% of respondents).
262 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1994).
263 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994).
264 For useful guides to these, see, for example, HOwARD J. AUERiN & RoLAND F.
CHAsE, CONSUMER LAW (1986); Dan PRIDGEN, CONSUME PROCEioN AND THE LAw
(1986).
265 See, e.g., 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, §§ 4.2- 4.5.
266 See, e.g., RESrATEmENT (SECoND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1) (1979).
267 See, e.g., REsrATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 161 (1979); COOTER & ULEN,
supra note 190, at 245-49; Kronnan, supra note 190.
268 For useful reviews of a range of cognitive models, see, for example, RATIONAL




The first of these cognitive problems, availability, in a sense arises from
bounded rationality. One of the common solutions to the need to satisfice is
adopting shortcuts to analysis-playing the odds, using a rule of thumb, or the
like. Most adages (and, for that matter, most prejudices) are rooted in these
simplifying tactics. If these techniques-heuristics, in the language of cognitive
psychology-draw on the most pertinent facts, they may do well enough, even
though they are not perfect. If, however, they draw on irrelevant or misleading
information, or come to perverse conclusions on the information they use, then
they can prove harmful, all the more so because of their simplicity.269
The availability heuristic focuses on one type of simplifying error-the
tendency to pay heed to memorable, rather than pertinent, facts.270 Thus, for
instance, the perceived frequencies of a range of hazards have been shown to
correlate with the amount and vividness of newspaper reporting, but not with
the objective probabilities of the hazards. 271 Similarly, people tend to
underestimate the frequencies of relatively drab causes of death, such as
diabetes, and overestimate the frequencies of relatively striking causes, such as
floods.272 Personal experience of disasters, egoistically vivid, also induce
greater precautions. 273 Even security analysts, who have rather a large stake in
cool, unbiased behavior, are prone to overrate vivid information.274
Availability may well affect risk assessment, perhaps greatly-but how? It
is hard to see any systematic bias in availability, which may cause some to
269 As H.L. Mencken observed, "there is always a well-known solution to every human
problem-neat, plausible, and wrong." H.L. Mencken, The Divine Afflatus, in PREMUDICES:
SECOND SER s 155, 158 (1920).
270 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCiENCE 1124, 1127-28 (1974); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNmvE
PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Availability].
271 See Barbara Combs & Paul Slovic, Newspaper Coverage of Causes of Death, 56
JOURNAUSM Q. 837, 843 (1979).
272 See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J.
ExPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNNG & MEMORY 551, 551, 553 (1978); Paul Slovic
et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in' JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTANTY: HEusnCs AND BIASEs 463, 466-67 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
[hereinafter JUDGMENT].
273 See Neil D. Weinstein, Effects of Personal Experience on Self-Protective Behavior,
105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 31, 31 (1989).
274 See Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Do Security Analysts Overreact?,
80 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 52, 52 (1990).
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overestimate a given risk and others to underestimate it, depending on personal
experience or information. Though some vivid risks might be magnified, less
vivid risks would be reduced; potentially disproportionate risks fall into both
categories. 275 Generally, though, one would expect low-frequency risks to be
understated, rather than overstated; by definition, they seldom occur, and their
rarity (and thus unavailability) may lead them to be displaced and slighted.276
Initially, then, one would expect undervaluation, which might support a role for
disproportionality.
An exception might come if the promisor's heuristics differ from the
promisee's. If the promisor is less prone to availability bias than the promisee,
then it will not underestimate the risk to the same extent (or perhaps at all) and
thus will need little, if any, protection from disproportionality. Promisors that
deal very frequently in remote risk, such as common carriers, thus may well
not be prone to availability errors. Their very large volume of similar
transactions may make even improbable events quotidian.277 Otherwise,
though, the parties should tend mutually to undervalue risk-the very problem
that might warrant some intervention ex post.
2. Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance rests on the observation that people prefer consistency
to inconsistency. Dissonant beliefs are uncomfortable, so, the theory goes,
people will attempt to reduce dissonance.278 One can do this without harm; if,
for instance, one smokes, but reads repeatedly that smoking causes cancer, one
can stop smoking and thus end the dissonance between information and action.
Alternatively, one can seek out information that suggests that smoking does not
275 A great many of the risks actually found in disproportionality cases are relatively
ordinary, if infrequent-breach of warranty, construction delays, and the like. See supra Part
II.B. The risks may be more vivid to promisors, who see them more often than promisees;
still, the risks may also have become routine to promisors.
276 See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Response Mode, Framing, and Information-Processing
Effects in Risk Assessment, in NEw DHEC=ONS FOR METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND
BEHAvioRAL SCIENCE: QUEsTION FRAMING AND RESPONSE CONSISrhNCY 21, 24 (Robin M.
Hogarth ed., 1982); Valerie S. Folkes, The Availability Heuristic and Perceived Risk, 15 J.
CONSUMmREs. 13 (1988) (consumer estimates of product risk).
277 Indeed, if the promisor sees low-frequency, high-magnitude risks often, availability
may cause the promisor to overestimate risk. See, e.g., Noll & Krier, supra note 222, at 769-
71.
278 See, e.g., LEON Fs NGER, A THEORY OF COGNI DISSONANCE 3 (1957). See
generally ELuOT ARONsON, THm SOCIAL A~i.MAL 175-245 (7th ed. 1995) (extended
discussion of cognitive dissonance).
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cause cancer, or pooh-pooh the information that conflicts with one's smoking.
The latter two possibilities may, however, prove unfortunate, as they may lead
to inferior decisionmaking-for instance, by causing one to overweight
convenient information, or search out only information that conforms to one's
predispositions. One may thus see an attempt to maximize one's psychological
well-being, and hence one's utility, though at some tangible cost.279
This phenomenon can have a good many consequences, economic and
otherwise. 280 For instance, it may explain the persistence of advertising
unrelated to product quality. We buy in large part to satisfy our needs and
desires; advertisements often feed into these by suggesting that we will be
happier, healthier, brighter, more attractive people if we buy whatever the
advertiser is selling. Purchasing the goods feeds into our desire to avoid
cognitive dissonance, by letting us satisfy our wishes-and by creating
dissonance if we would otherwise feel disappointed in our lack of success. 281
As a corollary, those who have bought goods avoid reading advertisements for
other brands, but read more for the brand chosen, thus reinforcing their choices
and slighting others. 282
Cognitive dissonance might figure in consequential damages to the extent
that the parties to a potential agreement come to the negotiations with a bias
toward success. This would be true particularly for relational contracts, in
which the parties engage repeatedly with each other and thus may have
developed their own norms of behavior (or may have bought into pre-existing
norms of the trade).283 There the parties may have invested a good deal in
279 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences
of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REv.: PAPERS & PRoc. 307, 308 (1982); Orn B.
Bodvarsson, The Welfare Effects of Disclosure Under Cognitive Dissonance, 19 ATLANuc
ECON. J. 33 (1991).
280 For a discussion of cognitive dissonance and morality, see Matthew Rabin, Cognitive
Dissonance and Social Change, 23 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 177 (1994).
281 See, e.g., ARTHuR A. LEFF, SwmrNDG AND SELuNG 167-75 (1976); Akerlof &
Dickens, supra note 279, at 316-17; cf. Overton v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 517 N.W.2d 308,
309-10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (unsuccessful suit for violation of consumer protection statute
and breach of contract, on theory that purchasing and consuming beer did not bring about
buyer's fantasies as in manufacturer's television commercials).
282 See Danuta Ehrlich et al., Postdecision Exposure to Relevant Information, 54 J.
ABNORMAL& Soc. PSYCHoL. 98 (1957) (study of new car owners).
283 For the classic study of relational contracting, see Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963). See
also, e.g., IAN R. MAcNEuL, THE NEw SOCiAL CONTAcr 71-117 (1980); Lisa Bernstein,
Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry,
21J. LEGALSTUD. 115 (1992); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S.
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trusting each other, and so may be inclined to disregard information that
undermines this trust. A good many of the disproportionality cases are basically
relational, whether because the parties had long-standing business relations or
because the parties operated in the same trade and in the same locality, and thus
would have had reference to the same trade norms.2 84 For single-shot
transactions, or for first transactions, the effect might be lower; there
information about risk might be more salient (invoking the availability
heuristic), and the parties would be less likely to have beliefs about
performance that might provoke dissonance. 285 Even there, though, the
potential parties might tend to underweight their risks, finding it uncomfortable
to contemplate the effects of breach (much as workers in dangerous industries
tend to undervalue the effects of safety precautions). 286 Cognitive dissonance
thus should tend to lead to the undervaluation of risk and, as a result, its
underpricing, particularly in the relational world.287
CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 43 (1993); Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual
Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus", 75 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1018 (1981); Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term
Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. REy. 369 (1981).
284 See, e.g., International Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control Servs., Inc., 38 F.3d
1279 (2d Cir. 1994) (cargo inspection); Sundance Cruises Corp. v. American Bureau of
Shipping, 7 F.3d 1077 (2d Cir. 1993) (vessel inspection); Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-
Chalmers Corp., 465 N.Y.S.2d 606 (App. Div. 1983) (sale of farm equipment). The role of
norms in contracting has received a good deal of scholarly attention of late, though the topic is
old; indeed, a good deal of Llewellyn's effort in the drafting of Article 2 of the U.C.C. was
directed toward reinforcing commercial norms of behavior (in, for instance, such areas as the
role of trade usage). On Llewellyn, see, for example, Macintosh, supra note 259; Wiseman,
supra note 259. See also, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765
(1996); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 377 (1997). See generally Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 1643 (1996).
285 Professors Schwartz and Wilde have suggested that dissonance is unlikely in the case
of consumer purchases of new items. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 19, at 1436. On the
other hand, cognitive dissonance springs into force immediately after one makes a bet at a
horse race, which is a classic single-shot transaction. See Robert E. Knox & James A.
Inkster, Postdecision Dissonance at Post Time, 8 J. PERSONAL=TY & Soc. PsYcHOL. 319
(1968).
286 See Akerlof & Dickens, supra note 279, at 308.
287 A potential party to an agreement might also distort information before coming to a
conclusion in order to help the leading choice prevail over its rivals. This effect has been
observed experimentally, where it proved more powerful than cognitive dissonance. J.
Edward Russo et al., The Distortion of Information During Decisions, 66 ORG. BEHAv. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 102 (1996). In a contracting world of trust, this would lead, as
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Before leaving this topic, though, we should consider one criticism of
cognitive dissonance in the economic realm. Professor Gillette has suggested
that cognitive dissonance, whatever its role for individual behavior, should
prove largely, if not entirely, irrelevant for commercial activity. 288 He argues
that commercial actors do not ordinarily face the stark choices of, say, workers
in hazardous industries, who routinely face considerable risks. Thus the need of
those in commerce for cognitive dissonance is correspondingly low. 289 Further,
he suggests that businesses have available to them fairly cheap methods of
allocating the risk of remote events, so they need not feel the pressure to
conform, which is characteristic of cognitive dissonance. 290
Gillette's critiques tell only part of the story. Though very seldom does the
fate of a business ride on any one contract, more often might the fate of an
employee rest on productivity success, or other performance-driven
measures. 291 These employees have powerful incentives to avoid failure, and
thus may be prone to cognitive dissonance; and as they act, so acts the
business.2 92 Nor does the presence of cheap risk-shifting mechanisms-here,
insurance-efface dissonance; indeed, the failure to seek insurance has been
pointed to as an economic consequence of cognitive dissonance.293 Though
Gillette's points serve usefully to remind us of the constraints on cognitive
dissonance, they do not remove it from our range of relevant cognitive errors.
would cognitive dissonance, to the overvaluation of information suggesting performance by
the promisor and the corresponding undervaluation of information indicating non-
performance.
288 See Gillette, supra note 19, at 548-49; see also Akerlof & Dickens, supra note 279,
at 308 ("In most economic transactions there is no gain to rationalizing and cognitive
dissonance plays no role.").
289 See Gillette, supra note 19, at 549-50.
290 See id.
291 As might be predicted from agency theory; given that businesses need to act through
agents, they must counter the tendency of agents to act for themselves, rather than for the
business, by aligning the agents' incentives with those of the business. See, e.g., George P.
Baker et al., Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory, 43 J. FIN. 593 (1988)
(evaluating various incentive systems); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 204, at 308.
292 See, e.g., Samuel B. Bacharach et al., The Organizational Transformation Process:
The Micropoitics of Dissonance Reduction and the Alignment of Logics of Action, 41 ADMIN.
Sac. Q. 477 (1996) (finding cognitive dissonance in airline executives and workers); Bernard
Bumes & Hakeem James, Culture, Cognitive Dissonance and the Management of Change, 15
INT'LJ. OPERATIONS & PRODUCTION MGMT. 14, 26 (1995) (finding cognitive dissonance in
manufacfing firm).
293 See Akerlof & Dickens, supra note 279, at 308, 317.
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3. Over-Optimism
One of the early cognitive errors pointed out in the literature is over-
optimism-the tendency to underestimate potential liabilities.294 Its relevance is
patent: if the parties to an agreement underestimate the risk of breach, then they
will tend to assign it too low a value and provide too small an allowance for it
in the contract. The party left with the risk thus will not be able to insure
against the risk adequately without drawing on other resources, or,
alternatively, will be able to insure against only a part of the risk. In either case
one might argue for some degree of risk-splitting of the sort contemplated in
disproportionality analysis.
Perhaps some degree of optimism is part of human nature, so that we can
carry out our daily rounds with a minimum of wasteful brooding.295 In any
event, over-optimism is all but ubiquitous. The phenomenon is present in the
inexpert- college students, 296 consumers,297 and drivers,298 for instance. But
over-optimism is prevalent in businesspeople and businesses as well. For
example, a good many empirical studies have shown that entrepreneurs,
2 94 As usual, Adam Smith was first off the mark, at least for the world of economics.
See ADAm SMrm, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSEs OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONs
124 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modem Library 1994) (1776).
Note that the definition in the text does not address overestimating expected gains. While
there is some evidence that this occurs, there is also evidence, discussed below, that people
tend to be risk-averse with respect to gains. See infra Part IV.B.4. This difference may be
explained by a combination of anchoring and compartmentalization, leading to overly
optimistic forecasts and overly cautious behavior. See Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo,
Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI.
17, 17 (1993). In any event, consequential damages and disproportionality focus on the losing
side of risk, so the somewhat variant data about gains are immaterial for this Article.
295 Interestingly, the clinically depressed are very nearly the only people who are not, as
a group, prone to over-optimism. See, e.g., Lauren B. Alloy & Lyn Y. Abramson, Judgment
of Contingency in Depressed and Nondepressed Students: Sadder but Wiser?, 108 J.
ExPERMENTAL PSYCHOL. 441,441 (1979).
29 6 See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONArTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980) (college students think themselves much more
likely than average to like their jobs and own their own homes, and much less likely than
average to drink to excess or divorce).
297 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARmING ABoTr R~sK 94-95
(1987) (only 3% of consumers think their homes pose greater than average risks for a child's
poisoning with drain cleaner).
298 See, e.g., Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow




particularly successful ones, are highly over-optimistic (or, put otherwise, have
very low risk-aversion).299 Nor is this behavior limited to individuals;
businesses also display over-optimnism. 30°
The causes of over-optimism are many, and bear directly on the problem of
consequential damages and disproportionality. Perhaps the foremost, at least in
the literature, is overconfidence. People tend to overestimate the probability that
they are correct. 301 This overconfidence causes them to overestimate the
likelihood of more probable events and underestimate the likelihood of less
probable events. Most risks are relatively improbable, so overconfidence
attaches too little weight to them, yielding over-optimism.302 Another way to
connect overconfidence with over-optimism is through variance.
299 See, e.g., KENN=nR. MACCRimmON & DONALD A. W rmUNG, TAKING Ris 99,
194-95, 260-65 (1986); James M. Buchanan & Roger L. Faith, Entrepreneurship and the
Internalization of Externalities, 24 J.L. & EcoN. 95, 98 (1981) (entrepreneurial optimism);
Manfred J. Holler et al., Decisions on Strategic Markets-An Experimental Study, 8
ScAmrINAv AN J. MGMT. 133, 133 (1992) (successful entrepreneurs have low risk-aversion);
Kenneth R. MaeCrimmon & Donald A. Wehrung, Characteristics of Risk Taking Executives,
36 MG T. Scr. 422, 433 (1990) (same); Leslie E. Palich & D. Ray Bagby, Using Cognitive
Theory to Explain Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking: Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 10 J.
Bus. VENTRING 425 (1995) (entrepreneurial optimism).
300 See, e.g., Richard Z. Gooding et al., FiXed Versus Variable Reference Points in the
Risk-Return Relationship, 29 J. EcoN. BE-Av. & ORG. 331, 345 (1996) (firms tend to be
over-optimistic about expected return); Jakob Brchner Madsen, Tests of Rationality Versus
an "Over Optimist" Bias, 15 J. ECoN. PSYCHOL. 587 (1994) (manufacturing firms tend to be
over-optimistic about expected production).
301 More formally, they tend to assume too narrow a confidence interval for their
probability estimates. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Intuitive Prediction:
Biases and Corrective Procedures, in 12 TIMS STUDIES IN THE MANAGEMENT Sc cs:
FORECASMNG 313, 321-26 (S. Makridakis & S.C. Wheelbright eds., 1979); Gordon F. Pitz,
Subjective Probability Distributions for Imperfectly Known Quantities, in KNOwLEDGE AND
COGNmON 29, 34-41 (Lee W. Gregg ed., 1974). This behavior extends well beyond
psychology students to CIA analysts, psychologists, and others. See, e.g., R.M. Cambridge
& R.C. Shreckengost, Are You Sure? The Subjective Probability Assessment Test (CIA 1978),
described in Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Calibration of Probabilities: The State of the Art to
1980, in JUDGMENT, supra note 272, at 306, 314; Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-
Study Judgments, in JUDGMENT, supra note 272, at 287 (psychologists); Baruch Fischhoff et
al., Knowing With Certainty: The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence, 3 J.
EXPERMENTAL PSYCH OL.: HUM. PERCEPMION & PERFORMANCE 552 (1977) (students);
Shiller, supra note 256 (investors). See generally YATES, supra note 227, at 75-108
(overview); Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT, supra note 272, at 422, 439-40
(same).
302 See Madsen, supra note 300, at 589-90. Cognitive dissonance would magnify this
effect. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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Overconfidence amounts to a tendency to assign too low a variance to one's
probability distributions. The point of reducing risk is to reduce the magnitude
of these distributions; if they are too low to start with, one is unlikely to engage
in the optimal level of precaution.303 Finally, one may explain over-optimism
with availability. Because people tend to overvalue their own experience in
assessing risk, and because most people tend not to have experienced rare
events, they will tend to undervalue rare events; since most potentially
disproportionate outcomes to contracts are quite rare, people will slight them
when they assess probability. 304
As these causes suggest, over-optimism leads those prone to it to
undervalue remote risk. To some extent, familiarity may efface over-optimism,
at least if the over-optimism is an artifact of availability. The effect may thus be
somewhat asymmetric, proving more prominent in those relatively
inexperienced with remote risk; if so, disproportionality is not as good an idea
when the promisor is less prone to over-optimism than the promisee.3 05
Nevertheless, to the extent that the parties are over-optimistic, they may fail to
provide properly for shifting low-frequency risks in their agreements, thus
providing some basis for disproportionality analysis post hoc.
4. Prospect Theory
Economic analysts of risk have tended to make either of two assumptions
about how economic actors will respond to risk. One assumption is risk-
neutrality. This arises from the notion that people generally want to maximize
their expected returns. A risk-averse person will forego risky endeavors with a
positive expected value; a risk-seeking person will take on risky endeavors with
a negative expected value (but high potential gains). 306 The more common
alternative is risk-aversion, which is based on the observations that we seek to
maximize utility, rather than wealth, and that wealth has diminishing marginal
utility.307 As a result, risky gains come at a steeper discount than ordinary
303 See Camerer, supra note 228, at 594-95.
304 See Slovic et al., supra note 272, at 468-70; see also supra Part IV.B.1. (availability
heuristic).
305 Or at least the promisor should not be able to place as much of the risk on the
promisee as it would were the over-optimism evenly distributed.
306 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Pomer, The Positive Economic Theory
of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. Rnv. 851, 867-68 (1981) (applying and defending risk-neutral
analysis).
307 On diminishing Marginal utility, see, for example, KUR SHAPIRA, RISK TAKING: A
MANAGERIAL PMPECrivE 7-8 (1995); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Risk Aversion, in
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probability would suggest, leading to the possibility that one might choose a
certain outcome over a probabilistically superior gamble.308
Risk-neutrality and risk-aversion are both consistent with expected utility
theory; a risk-neutral or risk-averse person is trying to maximize her subjective
utility, though not, perhaps, her objective wealth. In contrast, prospect
theory 309 looks beyond expected utility. People presumably do try to maximize
utility, but, as experiments have repeatedly shown, tend to fail. Using these
observations, prospect theory attempts to model how people actually decide.
The core of prospect theory is a set of statements about risk. People are
risk-averse, but only as to gains; people are risk-seeking with respect to losses;
and people react more strongly to losses than to gains ("loss- aversion"). 310
These propositions may be illustrated with the results of one experiment. When
the subjects were asked whether they would prefer a certain gain of £3000 or
an eighty percent chance of gaining £4000, eighty percent of the subjects chose
the certainty-even though the certain result was worth less than the uncertain
result. This illustrates risk-aversion with respect to gains; by itself, though, it is
consistent with general risk-aversion. When, however, the subjects were asked
whether they would prefer a certain loss of £3000 or an eighty percent chance
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RiSK-BEARNG 90, 90-91 (1971).
308 See, e.g., CooTER & ULEN, supra note 190, at 45-47; John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion
in the Small and in the Large, 32 ECONOMEmCA 122 (1964). The phenomenon was
remarked on rather earlier than these, though. See ADAM SMrrH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENIMENTS 212-17 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1759).
It should be noted that risk-aversion is linked to the relative sizes of the gamble and of
the player's wealth; as the latter rises with respect to the former, the player will tend toward
risk-neutrality. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of
Litigation, 70S. CAL. L. REv. 113, 117 n.13 (1996).
309 Called this because, in the argot of the originators of prospect theory, a lottery is a
prospect (presumably of gain or loss). See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMmRCA 263, 274 (1979)
[hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect].
310 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 341-42 (1984) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Choices];
Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect, supra note 309, at 279; George A. Quattrone & Amos
Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice, 82 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 719, 721 (1988). More precisely, one must add to these propositions the use of
reference points for determining gains and losses (rather than the use of net wealth) and the
presence of the availability heuristic for low-probability events. See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer
& Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: Policy Implications,
8 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565, 572 (1989); Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect, supra
note 309, at 274, 282-83; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless
Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1039-40 (1991).
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of losing £4000, ninety-two percent chose the risk-even though the net loss for
the risk exceeded the certain loss. 311 Far from showing risk-aversion, this
shows risk-seeking, though with respect to losses. Further, the percentage
choosing the counterintuitive result for losses exceeded that for gains,
suggesting relative loss-aversion (given that the amounts in question were
identical). 312
The evidence for prospect theory is robust, and need not be recounted at
length here.313 More interesting is its application to commerce. Most studies
directed toward business managers and commercial situations vindicate prospect
theory. For example, financial planners are risk-averse for gains, but risk-
seeking for losses.314 Investment club members show risk-aversion as to
gains.315 Foreign exchange managers are loss-averse. 316 Indeed, financially
troubled firms, their shareholders, and their creditors show loss-aversion and
311 See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect, supra note 309, at 268.
312 Indeed, it has been estimated that losses are weighted about twice as heavily as gains.
See Richard H. Thaler et al., The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An
Experimental Test, 112 Q.J. ECON. 647, 648 (1997); see also, e.g., Avi Fiegenbaum,
Prospect Theory and the Risk-Return Association: An Empirical Examination in 85 Industries,
14 J. ECON. BERAv. & ORG. 187, 195 (1990) (finding about a three-fold difference).
313 See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer, An Experimental Test of Several Generalized Utility
Theories, 2 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 61 (1989) (prospect theory provides the strongest
explanation of violations of expected utility theory); Peter C. Fishbum & Gary A.
Kochenberger, Two-Piece Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Fwnctions, 10 DECISION Sci.
503 (1979); Kalneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 310; Kahneman & Tversky,
Prospect, supra note 309; cf. Raymond C. Battalio et al., Testing Between Alternative Models
of Choice Under Uncertainty: Some Initial Results, 3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 25 (1990)
[hereinafter Battalio et al., Testing] (qualified support for prospect theory, but not in al
experiments). Interestingly, risk-seeking for losses and risk-aversion for gains have been
found in rats as well as humans, suggesting a substantial degree of generality for prospect
theory. See, e.g., Raymond C. Battalio et al., Animals' Choices Over Uncertain Outcomes:
Some Initial Faperimental Results, 75 AM. ECON. Rnv. 597, 597-98 (1985); Don N.
MacDonald et al., Animals' Choices Over Uncertain Outcomes: Further Experimental
Results, 103 ECON. J. 1067 (1991).
314 See Michael j. Roszkowski & Glenn E. Snelbecker, Effects of "Framing" on
Measures of Risk Tolerance: Financial Planners Are Not Immune, 19 J. BE1Av. ECON. 237,
244-45 (1990).
315 See Gerrit Antonides & Nico L. van der Sar, Individual Expectations, Risk
Perception and Preferences in Relation to Investment Decision Making, 11 J. EoN.
PSYCaOL. 227 (1990). This observation is, however, consistent with both prospect theory and
expected utility theory.
316 See Benn Steil, Corporate Foreign Exchange Risk Management: A Study in Decision
Making Under Uncertainty, 6 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 1, 20-21 (1993).
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risk-seeking with respect to losses. 317 Other studies of commercial situations
show much the same effects. 318
The situation at issue here-how parties to an agreement value low-
probability, high-magnitude risk-is potentially affected by prospect theory, as
opposed to expected utility theory. Under prospect theory, these risks would
generally be undervalued, as people tend to be risk-seeking with respect to
losses. On the other hand, low-frequency events tend to be given greater weight
than their actual probabilities would suggest, subject to the tendency of
availability theory to eliminate these risks from consideration altogether.
Furthermore, loss-aversion implies that the parties will look kindly on options
that eliminate risk, even if they are not actuarially sound.319
These considerations point in different directions, and thus may prove a bit
frustrating in practice. The most probable result overall is mild underpricing of
risk. Where the availability heuristic leads to the underweighting of remote risk,
loss-aversion will likely be countered. Then the general tendency to seek risk
for losses will operate, causing the parties to the contract to undervalue the
317 See Richard A. D'Aveni, Dependability and Organizational Banbuptcy: An
Application ofAgency and Prospect Theory, 35 MGMT. SCd. 1120, 1121-24 (1989); see also,
e.g., Avi Fiegenbaum & Howard Thomas, Attitudes Toward Risk and the Risk-Return
Paradox: Prospect Theory Explanations, 31 AcAD. MGMT. J. 85, 85-86, 97 (1988); Marc
Jegers, Prospect Theory and the Risk-Return Relation: Some Belgian Evidence, 34 AcAD.
MGMT. J. 215, 215-16 (1991).
318 See, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the
Equity Premium Puzzle, 110 Q.J. ECON. 73, 75 (1995) (loss-aversion for equity investments);
Alan Collins et al., Prospect Theory and Risk Preferences of Oregon Seed Producers, 73 AM.
J. AGRic. EcoN. 429, 429-34 (1991) (risk-seeking for losses); Gooding et al., supra note 300
(risk-aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses); Dan J. Laughhunn et al., Managerial
Risk Preferences for Below-Target Returns, 26 MGMT. Sc. 1238, 1247-48 (1980) (risk-
seeking for losses by corporate managers); Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition to
Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777,
785-90 (1985) (loss-aversion for equity investments); Thaler et al., supra note 312 (loss-
aversion for experimental portfolio management); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kabneman, The
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453-55 (1981) (risk-
aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses); see also Shiller, supra note 256 (financial
demonstrations of prospect theory). But see, e.g., Elke U. Weber & Richard A. Milliman,
Perceived Risk Attitudes: Relating Perception to Risky Choice, 43 MGMT. Scr. 123, 123,
133-34, 142 (1997) (no change in risk preferences for losses versus gains for individuals).
Weber's results may be explained in part by the frequent feedback in her experiment, which
would tend to exaggerate loss-aversion (which she found). See infra Part IV.B.7.
3 19 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cwnulative
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RisK & UNCERTANTY 297, 316 (1992). This is related to
insurance framing, an important offshoot of prospect theory. See infra notes 338-48 and
accompanying text.
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remote risks involved in performance. If, on the other hand, the parties
overweight the remote risk, then loss-aversion can operate, encouraging the
parties to insure against the risk. Availability here should tend to cause the
parties to underweight, rather than overweight, the risk of default, so the net
effect should be undervaluation, which provides a role for disproportionality
analysis. A notable exception would arise if the promisor did not underweight
the risk of non-performance, but the promisee did. Then, much like under pure
availability analysis, the promisor should be able to value the risk relatively
well, and should not garner judicial sympathy if in fact it errs.
Prospect theory does not explain all violations of expected utility theory-
for example, it does not address preference reversals or ambiguity.3 20 Nor by
itself does it explain why people respond differently to similar problems with
risk; there one must resort to framing theory, discussed below. Pending that
discussion, though, prospect theory suggests broadly that, more often than not,
risk-seeking for losses will cause the parties to undervalue the risks they face.
5. Framing
Prospect theory shows that one's response to risk depends greatly on
whether the risk is for gain or for loss. This suggests a possible corollary to
prospect theory: how a risk is described-is framed-will determine, in part,
hQw one treats it. This corollary does not necessarily follow; perhaps people see
through descriptions, penetrating to the essence of a risky situation. If so, then
the manner in which a problem is described would be immaterial, save for the
careless or lazy, and thus the law could safely ignore those who failed to
perceive the problem correctly.321 Expected utility theory assumes that this
corollary is false and that rational people will respond identically to identical
risks, however described. 322 This assumption seems innocuous; though some of
the other axioms of expected utility theory may be empirically dubious, this
one, at least, should hold. But it does not.
The corollary above is referred to as a framing problem. 323 Framing is
320 See, e.g., Paul J. H. Schoemaker, Are Risk-Attitudes Related Across Domains and
Response Modes?, 36 MGMT. Sci. 1451, 1451 (1990).
32 1 Except where the failure is caused by a lack of capacity, for which contract law
already makes allowances.
322 A characteristic termed invariance. See, e.g., Camerer, supra note 228, at 652;
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 256, at 69; see also supra notes 231-32 and accompanying
text.
323 See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 310, at 343-44; Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 256, at 74-75. Framing is a corollary of prospect theory, rather than a
free-standing theory, because framing is material only if we differ in our responses to gains
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found widely, but perhaps is starkest when shown with identical wagers. In the
classic experiment, Kahneman and Tversky asked two groups different
questions. One group was asked to choose between two methods to stem an
outbreak of a rare disease, expected to kill six hundred people. One program
would save two hundred people; the other had a one-third chance of saving all
six hundred, and a two-thirds chance of saving none. That group chose the
certain outcome seventy-two percent of the time, which fits with risk-aversion
for gains, as predicted by prospect theory. The other group was told about the
same disease, but was given different choices. The first choice would let four
hundred people die; the second had a one-third chance of letting none die, and a
two-thirds chance of letting all die. Here, only twenty-two percent chose the
certainty; the great majority preferred the gamble, with its chance of letting no
one die-as one would expect, given prospect theory's prediction of risk-taking
for losses. 324 The different responses are particularly striking because the two
groups were asked, in essence, the same things; not only was the certain choice
equal in value to the less certain choice, but the questions asked the first group
matched exactly the questions asked the second. The questions differed,
however, in framing; the first group was asked about gains, and the second
about losses. An insignificant difference, if expected utility theory is accurate-
but consider the huge variation in the two groups' responses. 325
Framing occurs in a wide range of contexts, many of commercial
inportance. 326 Commercial buyers show differing inclinations to take on risk,
depending on how the risk is framed and on their internal frames-that is, their
internal benchmarks for gauging risk.327 They also adjust their price targets,
depending on whether the buying decision is framed as a price rise or a price
and losses. The non-linearity of the preference curve described by prospect theory gives
framing a role in describing behavior.
324 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 ScimNcE 453, 453 (1981).
325 Even more remarkably, when some subjects were given both sets of questions, their
answers often differed. Even after this inconsistency was explained to them, many of the
subjects stuck to their answers. See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 310, at 343;
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 229, at 76. It should be added that not all studies show
robust framing effects. See, e.g., N.S. Fagley & Paul M. Miller, The Effects of Decision
Framing on Choice of Risky vs. Certain Options, 39 ORG. BmHAv. & HUM. DECIsIoN
Panocs 264 (1987).
326 See generally Rachlinski, supra note 308, at 124-25 (collecting studies).
327 See Christopher P. Puto et al., Risk Handling Strategies in Industrial Vendor
Selection Decisions, J. MARKErG, Winter 1985, at 89, 91, 97; William J. Quails &
Christopher P. Puto, Organizational Climate and Decision Framing: An Integrated Approach
to Analyzing Industrial Buying Decisions, 26 J. MARKE G RKs. 179, 190-91 (1989).
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drop. 328 Other financial contexts in which framing has been observed include
hiring, 32 9 financial planning,330 project commitment, 331 and retail pricing.332
Framing theory may thus be applied helpfully to the problem of allocating low-
frequency, high-magnitude risk by contract. 333
At the time of contracting, then, how will the promisor and promisee view
these risks-as gains, or as losses? It is logical to assume initially that both sides
would view these as losses, and accordingly would tend to seek risk, rather than
fear it. Against this, though, is the tendency to overestimate remote risk and
328 See Christopher P. Puto, The Framing of Buying Decisions, 14 J. CONSUMR RES.
301,311-13 (1987).
329 See Greg W. Marshall et al., Risk Taking in Sales-Force Selection Decisions: The
Impact of Decision Frame and Time, 12 PsYcHoL. & MARKET3NG 265, 281 (1995). Sales
managers did sometimes prefer the riskier candidate in the gain frame and the safer candidate
in the loss frame, both of which appear to contradict prospect theory. If, however, one
assumes that people discount gain less sharply than loss over time, then these preferences
could reverse. See id. at 268-69, 281-82.
330 See Roszkowski & Snelbecker, supra note 314.
331 See Thomas S. Bateman & Carl P. Zeithaml, The Psychological Contest of Strategic
Decisions: A Model and Convergent Experimental Findings, 10 STRATEGic MGMT. J. 59, 69-
70 (1989); Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Opportunity Costs and the Framing
of Resource Allocation Decisions, 37 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DEcSoN PROCEs 348, 354-
55 (1986); David J. Sharp & Stephen B. Salter, Project Escalation and Sunk Costs: A Test of
the International Generalizability of Agency and Prospect Theories, J. INIr'L Bus. STUDMS,
1st Quarter 1997, at 101, 103-04, 115-17.
332 See Mark J. Machina, Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved, in
CURRENT IssS IN MICROECONoMICS 12, 41 (John D. Hey ed., 1989); Joel E. Urbany &
Peter R. Dickson, Evidence on the Risk-Taking of Price-Setters, 15 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 127,
127-32, 144-47 (1994); Joel E. Urbany & Peter R. Dickson, Prospect Theory and Pricing
Decisions, 19 J. BE-AV. ECON. 69, 77-79 (1990). Urbany and Dickson, like Marshall and
colleagues, observed some apparent departures from prospect theory; here, too, they can be
explained by taking into account time, including the possibility of long-term gain as against
short-term loss.
333 It Should be added that prospect theory and framing may not explain fully the
mechanics of risk behavior. Sim Sitkin and colleagues have suggested that risk propensity
must be added to reconcile a range of experimental and archival results. See, e.g., Sim B
Sitkin & Amy L. Pablo, Reconceptualizing the Determinants of Risk Behavior, 17 AcAD.
MGMT. REv. 9, 30-34 (1992); Sim B Sitkin & Laurie R. Weingart, Determinants of Risky
Decsion-Making Behavior: A Test of the Mediating Role of Risk Perceptions and Propensity,
38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1573, 1585-90 (1995); see also, e.g., Eric H. Kessler et al., Object
Valence as a Moderator of the Framing Effect on Risk Preference, 30 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 241 (1996). This work does not suggest that prospect theory is valueless; rather, it
suggests that prospect theory is only a part of the complex process of responding to risk.
Thus, for example, the range of cognitive theories discussed in this Article.
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react more, rather than less, vigorously to it.334 This tension may be eased
when one considers the specific context in which this problem arises. One
normally expects those about to enter into a contract to focus on the
performance, rather than on the possibility of breach; after all, most contracts
are performed, and, pace Holmes, most people look at a contract as more than
an opportunity to recover damages. 335 But low-frequency, high-magnitude risks
ordinarily fall under the second part of Hadey, so both the promisor and the
promisee have brought the risks to the fore. 336 They might still disregard the
risks, focusing instead on the high probability of performance. 337 Perhaps more
likely, though, particularly for single-shot transactions, is greater attention
toward the risk, with the higher valuations that should result.
There is one more framing problem that arises here: the insurance frame.
Contracts that allocate risk can be looked at as insurance contracts, in whole or
in part, with the cost of shifting the risk treated as an insurance premium.
Indeed, some form contracts, most notably for carriers, do this explicitly, by
combining a general waiver of liability with the opportunity to buy a measure of
protection in case of breach. The risk premium thus pays for either third-party
insurance or self-insurance. Framing a risk problem as an insurance problem
does seem to affect the result. One study asked some subjects whether they
preferred a certain loss of $5 or a one-tenth of one percent chance of losing
$5000, and other subjects whether they would prefer to pay an insurance
premium of $5 or face a one-tenth of one percent chance of losing $5000.
These questions are functionally identical, as an insurance premium is in
essence a certain loss. Nevertheless, while sixty-five percent of the subjects
chose the certain loss when it was framed as insurance, only twenty percent
chose it when it was framed as a loss. 338 The result persisted even when
334 See, e.g., Katmeman & Tversky, Prospect, supra note 309, at 280-84.
335 Compare Holmes, supra note 129, at 462 ("The duty to keep a contract at common
law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing else."),
with U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 1 (1995) (stating that "the essential purpose of a contract between
commercial men is actual performance and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a
promise plus the right to win a lawsuit").
336 More accurately, this sort of risk does not flow naturally from the breach, but still
should be known to the promisor. If the promisor has not been given actual notice, then the
promisor would have to be familiar with the risk from common trade practice or the like. In
any event, the promisor must at least know generally of the risk and its magnitude for
disproportionality even to be an issue. Should a party know of the underlying rule, the party's
underlying preferences may also be altered. See generally Korobkin, supra note 197 (showing
status quo effect experimentally).
337 Particularly in relational contracts or in the middle of extended courses of dealing.
338 See Paul Slovic et al., Response Mode, Framing, and Information-Processing Efforts
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subjects already asked the problem in one context were asked the problem in
the other.339
Insurance framing seems to undercut disproportionality analysis, when the
risk is dealt with in an insurance frame. Promisees seem much more willing to
shift risk when they can do so by purchasing insurance, rather than by taking a
certain loss. If anything, promisees seem to overprice low-probability risk when
put as insurance, as the study above shows.340 We might conclude that framing
counts in our context; if the promisor offers to deal with risk by separating the
contract into performance and insurance contracts, or otherwise by making
clear the insurance aspect of the deal, then it should be able to secure a
reasonable price for the insurance, and should not be able to invoke
disproportionality. If the risk is not put as insurance, though, the parties are
likely to prove risk-seeking, and the contract will probably close with too small
an allowance made for risk.
To round out this discussion of the insurance frame, however, two more
experimental observations must be added to the mix. One relates insurance to
ambiguity, based on a cognitive theory that posits ambiguity aversion-that is,
a tendency to overweight risk depending on its degree of uncertainty, to make
the Knightian distinction.341 This aversion is most marked at low frequencies,
largely dissipating, or even reversing, as frequencies near unity.342 Notably,
though, experimental participants serving as promisors charged considerably
in Risk Assessment, in DEcISIoN MAKmG, supra note 229, at 152, 157 [hereinafter Slovic et
al., Response]; see also John C. Hershey & Paul J. H. Schoemaker, Risk Taking and
Problem Context in the Domain of Losses: An Expected Utility Analysis, 47 J. RIsK & INS.
111, 111, 130 (1980) (showing risk-aversion in insurance frame); Robin M. Hogarth &
Howard Kureuther, Ambiguity and Insurance Decisions, 75 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERns &
PRoc. 386 (1985) (same); Paul J. H. Schoemaker & Howard C. Kunreuther, An
Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions, 46 J. RISK & INS. 603, 616 (1979) (same); Paul
Slovic et al., Preferences for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications,
44 J. RISK & INS. 237, 253-56 (1977) (same).
339 See Slovic et al., Response, supra note 338, at 157-58.
340 See id.; see also Hogarth & Kunreuther, supra note 338, at 388.
341 See, e.g., Hillel J. Einhom & Robin M. Hogarth, Ambiguity and Uncertainty in
Probabilistic Inference, 92 PSYCHOL. REv. 433, 454-59 (1985). The distinction between risk,
for which one has a probability distribution, and uncertainty, for which one does not, comes
from KNIGHT, supra note 141, at 233-34.
It should be noted that ambiguity aversion remains open to dispute. Fox and Tversky, for
example, have linked it to comparisons with more certain events, rather than to any free-
standing aversion. See Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative
Ignorance, 110 Q.J. ECON. 585, 599 (1995). For our purposes, though, the basic principles
are not especially controversial.
342 See Hogarth & Kunreuther, supra note 338, at 388.
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more to bear remote risks than the participants serving as promisees were
willing to pay in order to shift the risks.343 This finding suggests that promisors
may tend to overprice insurance for remote risks, further undercutting the
argument that they might have been undercompensated for bearing these
risks.344 The other observation comes from a study of experimental markets in
self-insurance. Though the participants showed a substantial tendency to
overvalue remote risk, they showed a lower and lower tendency to do so as
they went through repeated trials. The markets thus transmitted enough
information to allow the participants to correct for a good deal of their error.345
In practice, many, perhaps most, promisors will self-insure for potential
consequential damages. 346 Thus, promisors who rarely face low-frequency
risks may tend to overprice them greatly, but will offer more reasonable prices
over time. This learning behavior will be discussed further below. 347 For the
moment, it is sufficient to note that frequent market participants are likely to
adjust their prices enough to yield something like an efficient risk-allocation
price. 348
Framing thus leaves us with two rather distinct outcomes. On the one hand,
risks framed as insurance will probably be shifted at a fair price, undermining
the case for post hoc disproportionality adjustments. On the other, risks not
framed as insurance will probably be undervalued by the parties to the contract,
leading to an inadequate risk premium and an insufficient allowance for
343 See id. at 388-89.
344 And also explaining the tendency not to buy insurance for remote risks; the insurance
may simply be overpriced. See, e.g., HowARD KUNREmUiTHEr AL., DisAsR INSURANCE
PROT'CON: PUBiC PoLICY LESSONS 7, 36-41 (1978) (discussing the low use of earthquake
insurance). This tendency might also be explained in part by cognitive dissonance, given
one's investment in living where one lives.
345 See Jason F. Shogren, The Impact of Self-Protection and Self-Insurance on Individual
Response to Risk, 3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 191 (1990). This effect may be due in part to a
blunting of negative affect by the participants, as people who tend to react strongly to loss
tend to be willing to pay relatively high amounts for insurance. See Haim Mano, Risk-Taking,
Framing Effects, and Affect, 57 ORG. BEHAv. & HUM. DECIION PRocassEs 38, 55-57
(1994).
346 See supra note 133 (general unavailability of liability insurance for consequential
damages).
347 See infra Part IV.B.7.
3 48 In addition, a recent study suggests that this relative attraction for insurance stems
maily from its investment appeal; people like to invest in insurance if they can salvage
something from a bad situation. See Robert A. Connor, More than Risk Reduction: The
Investment Appeal of Insurance, 17 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 39 (1996). If so, then the investment
appeal would likely be greatest when frequent risk-creating activity gives some actual return.
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insurance. This divergence suggests that framing should figure into a court's
judgment about whether a promisor should successfully be able to assert
disproportionality to avoid paying consequential damages.
6. Regret-Aversion
Another way to look at risk-avoidance and similar behaviors is through
regret theory. This branch of cognitive theory is built on the unremarkable
premise that we have a tendency to kick ourselves when a decision goes
wrong-not entirely because of the result, but also because there was something
else we could have done that would have turned out better (or so we think).
Second-guessing seems a part of human nature, as some reflection on our own
experiences and those of others will show. From this observation, regret
theorists posit that people measure the value of the outcome of their decisions in
part by referring to the values of the rival outcomes-to what might have
happened had they made other decisions. Related to this is regret-aversion
proper; that is, people dislike regret enough that they will adjust their
preferences to avoid it.349 Thus, for example, as Allais suggested, more people
prefer a certain award of one hundred million francs to a gamble with a ten
percent chance of yielding five hundred million francs, an eighty-nine percent
chance of yielding one hundred million francs, and a one percent chance of
yielding nothing-even though, as a moment with the calculator will show, the
gamble is worth significantly more than the certainty. 350 Or, as Loomes and
Sugden have observed, a loss due to a rise in income tax is less painful than a
lost bet on a horse race. 351
Regret theory thus provides an alternative to prospect theory. Under
prospect theory, the problem of preference reversal is explained as a violation
of procedure invariance-that is, a violation of the principle that similar risks
will be acted upon similarly, however they are described.352 In contrast, regret
theory explains preference reversal as a violation of transitivity-the principle
349 See, e.g., Richard P. Larrick & Terry L. Boles, Avoiding Regret in Decisions with
Feedback: A Negotiation Example, 63 ORG. BaAv. & HUM. DEClsON PROCESSS 87, 87
(1995).
350 See Maurice Allais, Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque:
Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine, 21 ECONOMErCA 503, 527
(1953).
351 See Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of
Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805, 808 (1982).
352 See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 310, at 343-44.
[Vol. 59:339
DISPROPORTIONAITY
that if A is preferred to B and B to C, then A will be preferred to C. 353 Finally,
regret theory focuses on affect-regret, disappointment, and the like-while
prospect theory focuses on risk assessment. 354
If regret-aversion exists, then its effects on risk assessment could be
significant. Those subject to regret-aversion would, for instance, be willing to
buy insurance rather than experience regret; the regret from a small loss
through paying the insurance premium might outweigh the regret from the
large, though improbable, loss that would come about from an uncompensated
default. 355 Insurance would be most appealing with a low risk of default and a
high magnitude of potential loss, for there the difference between a losing
wager (default) and the certain outcome (insurance) is far greater than the
difference between a winning wager (performance) and the certain outcome.
Indeed, the promisee should be willing to avert risk by paying more than an
actuarially sound premium to shift the risk to the promisor. Of course, if the
promisor were also subject to regret, the aversion would be mirrored, with no
real net effect. If, however, the promisor is better at spreading risk, it may feel
less regret when a risk becomes an unfortunate certainty. More concretely,
claims may pinch less if they come about once a day than if they come about
once a year. Thus, the promisor might be more willing to take on risk than the
promisee, and should ordinarily be able to exact fair compensation. 356 To some
extent, then, comparative regret theory suggests a limited role for
disproportionality; if the promisee is willing to pay a reasonable risk premium
in order to shift the risk to the promisor, then the promisor has little claim for
353 See, e.g., Camerer & Kunreuther, supra note 310, at 576; Robert Sugden, An
Axiomatic Foundation for Regret Theory, 60 J. ECON. THEoRy 159, 165-67 (1993); Amros
Tversky et al., The Causes of Preference Reversal, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 204, 205-06 (1990).
Intransitivity comes about under regret theory because an individual wishes to avoid the
possibility of large losses, but may be willing to take small chances; accordingly, it is possible
to arrange gambles in a circle so that each gives a lower-magnitude loss than the next, thus
making it preferable. See, e.g., Loomes & Sugden, supra note 351, at 815.
354 See, e.g., Larrick & Boles, supra note 349, at 87; Marcel Zeelenberg et al.,
Consequences of Regret Aversion: Effects of Erpected Feedback on Risky Decision Making,
65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DEC sON PROCEssE 148, 148-49 (1996). For more general
expressions of regret theory, see, for example, David E. Bell, Regret in Decision Making
Under Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS RE.S. 961 (1982); Graham Loomes, Further Evidence of
the Impact of Regret and Disappointment in Choice Under Uncertainty, 55 ECONOMICA 47
(1988).
355 See, e.g., Loomes & Sugden, supra note 351, at 814.
356 Some of this analysis resembles that used under insurance framing, a theory with a
very different set of assumptions. See supra notes 338-48 and accompanying text.
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relief on the grounds that it should not be expected to bear the risk.357
The remaining question, then, is whether regret-aversion exists.
Unfortunately, that question is difficult to answer. Its early advocates made a
purely theoretical case for it.358 The early experimental studies generally
supported regret-aversion, at least tepidly.359 Since then, though, the results
have been mixed. A number of experiments have shown that regret-aversion is
slight to non-existent, and two-the first two that focused on losses-showed, if
anything, the reverse result to that predicted by regret theory.360 On the basis of
these studies, the regret-aversion effect was explained as driven by the manner
of display, arising mainly when the range of negative outcomes was scattered
rather than lumped.361 Not, it would seem, a useful construct.
Still, there is other evidence that supports regret-aversion, at least in some
form. For example, investors tend to sell rising stocks and hold falling stocks;
this has been explained as, on the one hand, an attempt to minimize the regret
of holding past a market peak, and, on the other, an attempt to avoid realizing
the regret of losing money. 362 The failure of foreign exchange managers to
357 Under the right circumstances, a different effect of regret-aversion might be
obtained-an unwillingness to act, for fear that one will regret the effects of one's actions.
See, e.g., Ruth M. Corbin, Decisions that Might Not Get Made, in COGNITVE PROCESSES IN
CIoicE AND DECISION BEHAVIOR 47, 56-57 (Thomas S. Wallsten ed., 1980) [hereinafter
COGNrnVE PROCESSES]; Daniel Kahnemnan & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences,
Sci. AM., Jan. 1982, at 160, 170, 173; Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to
Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambiguity, 3 J. BEHAv. DECIsION MAKING 263 (1990);
William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RisK &
UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). Here, however, the potential promisee must make some act that will
increase risk; the question is who should bear the added risk.
358 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 354; David E. Bell, Risk Premiums for Decision Regret,
29 MGMT. Sci. 1156 (1983); Lonomes & Sugden, supra note 351; Graham Loomes & Robert
Sugden, Some Implications of a More General Form of Regret Theory, 41 J. ECON. THEORY
270 (1987).
359 See, e.g., Loomes, supra note 354; Graham Loomes et al., Observing Violations of
Transitivity by Experimental Methods, 59 ECONOMETRICA 425, 437 (1991); Graham Loomes
et al., Are Preferences Monotonic? Testing Some Predictions of Regret Theory, 59
ECONOMICA 17 (1992); Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Testing for Regret and
Disappointment in Choice Under Uncertainty, 97 ECON. J. 118 (1987).
360 See Battalio et al., Testing, supra note 313, at 38-40 (no regret-aversion for losses
and weak regret-aversion for gains); Robert A. Josephs et al., Protecting the Selffrom the
Negative Consequences of Risky Decisions, 62 J. PERSONA=rrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 26 (1992);
see also, e.g., David W. Harless, Actions versus Prospects: The Effect of Problem
Representation on Regret, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 634 (1992); Tversky et al., supra note 353.
361 See Camerer, supra note 228, at 654-56.
362 See, e.g., Chinmoy Ghosh, A Regret-Theoretic Explanation of Corporate Dividend
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engage in probabilistic hedging has also been explained as due to regret
avoidance.363 Further, the predicted effects of feedback on regret avoidance
have been confirmed, independent of whether the risk was high or low or
whether the risk was of a gain or a loss. 364 To be sure, the financial studies
may be explained using classic prospect theory as well as regret avoidance, so
their support may be termed equivocal. Still, the experimental work seems
inconclusive, as must be this analysis. Perhaps the safest conclusion is
conditional: if regret avoidance exists, then it undermines to some extent
disproportionality analysis. Whether this condition precedent has come about,
or ever will, is another, and an open, question.
7. Learning and Error
The net effect of the cognitive points above is a tendency for promisors and
promisees to undervalue risk. This tendency is not ubiquitous; it does not
appear, for instance, when risks are framed as insurance, or when parties often
face the types of risks at issue. Still, behavioral decision theory does suggest a
role for disproportionality analysis, a role that will be explored further in the
conclusion to this Article. Before we leave this discussion of behavioral
decision theory, though, we need to deal with one last objection to using
cognitive analysis. People can learn to eliminate cognitive errors, as a
moment's reflection will show. 365 If So, then the law might wish to encourage
learning by making no allowances for errors.366 The balance of this Part will
thus deal with the scope and effect of learning as a means of overcoming
cognitive biases.
First, the good news: learning works, at least some of the time and for
some of the subjects. Very often, simulated markets show rapid convergence
toward a Bayesian ideal, as the traders gain more experience. 367
Policy, 20 J. Bus. FIN. & Accr. 559 (1993) (borrowing to pay dividends explained by regret-
aversion); Shefrin & Statman, supra note 318, at 785-90; cf Meir Statman, A Behavioral
Framework for Dollar-Cost Averaging, 22 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 70, 74 (1995) (explaining
dollar-cost averaging in part as a means of avoiding regret).
363 See Steil, supra note 316, at 4-8.
364 See Zeelenberg et al., supra note 354; see also Larrick & Boles, supra note 349.
365 As Professor Latin puts it, "People can learn to improve some kinds of decisions in
some kinds of circumstances; otherwise teachers would be out of work." Latin, supra note
256, at 1252.
366 See, e.g., Richard E. Nisbett et al., The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday
Inductive Reasoning, 90 PSYCHOL. REv. 339, 340 (1983); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for
Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 381-82 (1988).
367 See, e.g., Marc Knez & Vernon L. Smith, Hypothetical Valuations and Preference
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Overconfidence and over-optimism can be reduced greatly by training. 368
Furthermore, some occupations seem less prone to cognitive error than others,
suggesting a role for expertise in reducing cognitive error. Auditors, for
example, make fewer, and lesser, errors than laypeople. 369 Likewise,
professional traders err less than do M.B.A. students in market simulations.370
And weather forecasters are almost perfect Bayesians. 371
Now for the bad news. Though learning can work, at least to some degree,
it requires conditions that may not always come about outside the laboratory.
First, learning requires accurate and rapid feedback, with enough potential gain
to warrant using one's resources to learn. 372 Thus, the feedback should go
Reversals in the Context of Asset Trading, in LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS IN ECONOMICS: Six
Poinrs oF VIEw 131 (Alvin E. Roth ed., 1987); Charles L. Plott, Rational Choice in
Experimental Markets, in RATIONAL CHOICE, supra note 234, at 117; Vernon L. Smith,
Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, 99 J. POL. ECON. 877
(1991). See generally Camerer, supra note 228, at 675 (collecting studies).
368 See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT, supra note 272, at 422, 434-
35, 437-40.
369 See James F. Smith & Thomas Kida, Heuristics and Biases: Expertise and Task
Realism in Auditing, 109 PsYcHoL. BULL. 472, 485-86 (1991). Auditors will, however,
depart from the Bayesian ideal when faced with an audit task. See Stephen K. Asare &
Arnold Wright, Normative and Substantive Expertise in Multiple Hypotheses Evaluation, 64
ORG. BEHv. & HUM. DECISION PRocEssEs 171, 176-78, 180 n.9 (1996). These Bayesian
errors usually did not carry forward into actual substantive errors, though, suggesting that
auditors have ways to correct internally for their probabilistic mistakes.
370 See Matthew J. Anderson & Shyam Sunder, Professional Traders as Intuitive
Bayesians, 64 ORG. BEaAv. & HUM. DECISION PRocEssEs 185 (1995); cf. John T. Hazer &
Scott I-ighhouse, Factors Influencing Managers' Reactions to Utility Analysis: Effects of SD,
Method, Information Frame, and Focal Intervention, 82 J. APPLmD PSYCHOL. 104 (1997)
(less knowledgeable managers showed framing effects, but more knowledgeable managers did
not).
371 See, e.g., Allan H. Murphy & Robert L. Winkler, The Use of Credible Intervals in
Temperature Forecasting: Some Experimental Results, in DECISION MAKING AND CHANGE IN
HUMAN AFAias 45 (Helmut Jungermanu & Gerard de Zeeuw eds., 1977); Allan H. Murphy
& Robert L. Winkler, Subjective Probability Forecasting Experiments in Meteorology: Some
Preliminary Results, 55 BULL. AM. MmOROLOGICAL SOC'Y 1206 (1974); cf., e.g., Howard
Garland et al., De-Escalation of Commitment in Oil Exploration: When Sunk Costs and
Negative Feedback Coincide, 75 J. APPLmD PSYCHOL. 721 (1990) (petroleum geologists did
not show sunk-cost fallacy predicted by prospect theory).
372 See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 256, at 90-91; Sarah E. Bonner &
Nancy Pennington, Cognitive Processes and Knowledge as Determinants of Auditor
Expertise, 10 J. Accr. LIG. 1, 34-36 (1991); Hillel J. Einhom & Robin M. Hogarth,




beyond the mere result, extending into what should have happened or why the
response was inappropriate. 373 In addition, the larger the financial gain or loss,
the faster the learning.374 This sort of feedback will not often be available in
real markets for low-probability, high-magnitude risk. Defaults are relatively
rare, so negative feedback will occur so infrequently for most market
participants as to eliminate the value of learning.375 Only high-volume
traffickers in a given type of risk will get sufficient feedback to make learning
possible.
In addition, learning does not always take place. Some cognitive errors
resist feedback, just as some areas of purported expertise show little gain from
experience. 376 For that matter, some types of errors are learned-for example,
3 7 3 See, e.g., Bonner & Pennington, supra note 372; William Remus et al., Does
Feedback Improve the Accuracy of Recurrent Judgmental Forecasts?, 66 ORG. BEIIv. &
HuM. DEMSION PROmES 22 (1996).
374 See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, Economic Incentives Transform
Psychological Anomalies, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 215, 225-26 (1994); Vernon L.
Smith & James M. Walker, Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Erperimental
Economics, 31 EcoN. INQUIRY 245 (1993). On the other hand, experiments do show that
cognitive error exists even when real money rides on the quality of the cognition. See, e.g.,
David M. Grether & Charles L. Plott, Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference
Reversal Phenomenon, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 623 (1979); Werner W. Pommerehne et al.,
Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon: A Reeramination, 72
AM. ECON. REV. 569 (1982); David B. Wiseman & Irwin P. Levin, Comparing Risky
Decision Making Under Conditions of Real and Hypothetical Consequences, 66 ORG. BEHIAv.
& HUM. DECION PRocEsSES 241 (1996).
375 Excessive precaution should prove even harder to eradicate through learning,
because one can never be certain whether a particular precaution was superfluous. Aggregate
data might help, but these data will not usually be available 'and useful unless one has a
relatively sophisticated financial system and suitable comparative information.
376 A notable example of stubborn error is the "winner's curse," which is the tendency
of bidders at auctions to overbid when they win, largely because of scattered errors in
assessing value. See, e.g., Richard Thaler, The Winner's Curse, in THE WINNER's CURSE 50
(1992). This error resists feedback and experience. See Peter Foreman & J. Keith Murnighan,
Learning to Avoid the Winner's Curse, 67 ORG. BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 170
(1996). Psychological diagnosis is an instance of the dubious virtues of experience; some
rather frightening studies showed little difference in accuracy among experienced
psychologists, students, and briefly trained laypeople. See STUART OSKmM, ThE
RELATIONSHP OF CLINICAL EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING METHODS TO SEvERAL CRrrERiA OF
CLINIcAL PREDICTION (Psychological Monographs No. 547, 1962); Lewis R. Goldberg, The
Effectiveness of Clinicians' Judgments: The Diagnosis of Organic Brain Damage from the
Bender-Gestalt Test, 23 J. CONSULTiNG PSYCHOL. 25 (1959). There is also some reason to
doubt that there is much spillover from one type of learned error avoidance to another, though
the studies conflict. Compare John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, The Winner's Curse and Public
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risk-aversion for gains. 377 Others can be strengthened by learning-for
example, regret-aversion. 373 Finally, satisficing may reinforce error through
spurious feedback; if one sets modest goals, one can meet them by error-filled
means.
379
These general problems with learning, though interesting, generally do not
affect our basic fact pattern. 380 More troubling are the relatively stringent
conditions under which effective learning occurs. The purity of laboratory
conditions can promote effective learning, but sordid reality can interfere with
learning, especially through infrequent and cloudy feedback. Only those who
deal in risk by the bushel basket should be expected to overcome cognitive
error significantly, yet another element for courts to take into account as they
weigh the merits of limiting consequential damages.
V. CONCLUSION
In short, then, excessive-or, in any event, large- consequential damages
have long been a concern of contract lawyers and judges, who have addressed
them through a range of legal rules. Hadley itself was an attempt to rein in
juries, which at that time could hold defendants liable for the most
unforeseeable consequential damages with only modest judicial oversight. Soon
after Hadley, though, some courts sought means of limiting further potential
liability for consequential damages, whether through the now-exploded tacit
agreement test, through a narrow reading of Hadley, or through
disproportionality limits on otherwise recoverable damages.
The current vogue for disproportionality is, as we have seen, difficult to
explain using conventional default rule analysis, whether with problem-solving
theory or information-forcing theory. The uncertainty that ordinarily attends
disproportionality, at least in its modern attire, is itself a cost. Beyond the added
uncertainty, though, disproportionality seems to undercut the basic principles of
default theory, whether because it may deviate from the ideal bargain of most
parties or because it discourages the disclosure of cost-reducing information. So
Information in Common Value Auctions, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 894, 917 (1986) (no spillover),
with Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning, 43 AM.
PsYcHoLoGisT 431 (1988) (spillover).
377 See James G. March, Learning to be Risk Averse, 103 PsYcHOL. REv. 309 (1996).
378 See, e.g., Larrick & Boles, supra note 349, at 95; Zeelenberg et al., supra note 354,
at 156-57.
379 See, e.g., Hillel J. Einhom, Learning from Experience and Suboptimal Rules in
Decision Making, in CoGNrnvE PRocssEs, supra note 357, at 1, 6-7.
380 Though learned regret avoidance may increase the extent of risk underpricing.
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far, then, the modem trend toward disproportionality seems misguided at best.
But default theory is based, for the most part, on expected utility theory,
which makes rather sweeping assumptions about how people deal with risk.
These assumptions are empirically faulty; though there is still some question
about their degree of fault, it seems great enough that we should look to
behavioral decision theory to supplement our analysis. Though this body of
disparate and at times divergent theories and observations does not speak with
unanimity here, the great majority of the cognitive literature favors, at some
level, limits on even foreseeable consequential damages. In general, the remote
risks at play here will be undervalued by contracting parties, particularly those
who seldom deal with these risks; as a result, they will make too small an
allowance for them in the contract price, and thus will not compensate
adequately the risk-bearing promisor.
This leaves two issues unresolved: when disproportionality analysis should
be applied, and how a court should apply it. The first issue is easier to resolve.
The strongest case for protecting the promisor from bearing foreseeable risk
comes when the promisor deals infrequently with the sort of risk involved and
when the risk is quite remote. The infrequency reduces the likelihood that
learning will efface any cognitive biases; the remoteness of the risk increases
the likelihood that the risk will be undervalued. Drab, rather than vivid, risks
also will likely be undervalued. Further, one should consider whether the
promisee has a better opportunity to assess the risk accurately than the
promisor; though this will rarely be true, it would undercut any argument by
the promisee that the promisor was better positioned to deal with the risk.
Similarly, the promisee's frequency is germane; if the promisee deals
infrequently with a given type of risk, but the promisor deals with it often, then
the promisor is ill-positioned to complain that the promisee should have to
shoulder the burden. The promisor is better able to assess the risk and allow for
it, and also can more easily learn from its errors.
These factors-relative frequency, remoteness, availability, relative
knowledge-do appear in a good many of the reported disproportionality
cases. 381 In International Ore, for example, the court declined to relieve the
promisor of an apparently disproportionate risk precisely because it dealt
expertly and frequently in the field, which would allow it to assess its potential
liability accurately and charge for it appropriately; furthermore, the sort of risk
at issue here-negligent work-was obvious enough a peril that the promisor
381 Cf. Bradford Stone, Recovery of Consequential Damages for Product Recall
Expenditures, 1980 BYU L. REy. 485, 535 (factors to consider when allocating risk for
product recall include relative degree of fault, relative volumes of business, relative profit
expectation).
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should have guarded against it.382 Similarly, in Perini the court found
disproportionality inapt because the promisor was a seasoned general
contractor, familiar with the vicissitudes of casino construction.383 In contrast,
the same court found potential disproportionality with a far lower ratio of
damages to contract price, where the risk- liability under a state environmental
protection statute-was legally uncertain and, given standard real estate
practice, highly improbable. 384 The relative abilities of the parties also figured
in Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, where a franchisee's breach of a franchise
agreement was found a good case for limiting consequential damages. 385
Interestingly, though, one class of cases seems wholly wrong, following
modem cognitive analysis-the common carrier and telegraph cases. There the
promisor performs huge numbers of similar contract, and thus can accurately
assess its risk of default and learn to overcome any lingering cognitive biases. A
common carrier also is in a better position to know its default rate than is a
customer.386 Further, the promisor knows, at least nominally, of the magnitude
of the risk, for the damages in question must already have passed the Hadley
test. One properly trembles before suggesting that Cardozo was wrong, but
Kerr Steamship seems almost a classic instance of when not to apply
disproportionality.38 7
382 See International Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control Servs., Inc., 38 F.3d 1279,
1284-85 (2d Cir. 1994). It is thus difficult to defend the holding in Vitol Tracdng S.A. v. SGS
Control Services, Inc., 874 F.2d 76, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1989), in which, on very similar facts
(and with the same defendant), the promisor was not held liable for consequential damages.
Perhaps it should be pointed out that the portion of the opinion tying this result to
disproportionality was not joined by the other judges on the panel, and thus is dictum. See
Vitol, 874 F.2d at 82 (Feinberg, J., concurring), 82-83 (Pratt, J., concurring).
383 See Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 380-82 (N.J.
1992).
384 See Dixon Venture v. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co., 584 A.2d 797, 798-800 (N.J.
1991).
385 See Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 371-75 (Ct. App.
1996).
386 And, as we have seen, can often offer a separating menu of insurance options to
place risk precisely.
387 Another is General Star Indemnity Co. v. Banknqptcy Estate of Lake Geneva Sugar
Shack, Inc., 572 N.W.2d 881 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997), in which the court invoked
disproportionality to absolve an insurance company from liability for consequential damages.
If any business should be free of cognitive error in accessing risk, it should be an insurer-
and insurance policies are intended to provide protection against low-probability, high-
magnitude risk. One hopes that this decision is less a harbinger than, in Justice Frankfurter's
evocative phrase, "a derelict on the waters of the law." Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,
232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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In principle, one could apply these factors to any consequential damages
fact pattern, and find some respect in which the parties might not have allowed
adequately for the risk shifted. Far from a rarity, then, disproportionality
analysis would then become a routine part of consequential damages
assessment. Though one is tempted to propose such a thing-think of the
citations one could muster!-a moment's reflection suggests otherwise. The
expectation measure of damages, after all, only nominally serves its purpose of
putting the breached-against party where it would have been if the contract had
been performed.388 Expectation can overcompensate, as in some of the cost of
completion cases389 or the bad-faith breach of insurance contract cases.390
Perhaps more often, it can undercompensate, given the want of attorney's fees
and costs, the duty to mitigate, the general lack of damages for pain and
suffering, the problems of proof for new businesses-and, of course, Had/ey
itself.391 One could twiddle endlessly with the expectation measure to bring it
closer to proper compensation, but at some point the costs-and the
uncertainty-would prove overwhelming. In the realm of consequential
damages, perhaps it is better to correct only gross error, focusing only on the
relatively limited range of cases where a substantial risk was almost certainly
not shifted far from the promisee. Disproportion is not the ideal way to get to
this result; even a relatively modest risk can be subject to a wide range of
cognitive error. Still, its focus on the combined risk and magnitude serves to
winnow away minor errors, thus making more certain ex ante assessment of
potential liability and aiding reliance and planning.
The second question-what to do if a risk proves disproportionate-is
much thornier. The Restatement (Second) and the current draft of Article 2 of
the U.C.C., after all, leave the task to the court with a minimum of
guidance. 392 The modem cases applying disproportionality analysis have not
388 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 344(a) (1979).
389 See, e.g., Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939).
390 In which punitive damages are not infrequently awarded. See, e.g., STEvEN J.
BURTON & ERIc G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FArrH § 9.2 (1995).
391 See, e.g., Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929)
(duty to mitigate); Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 362 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. 1984) (no
emotional distress damages). See generally John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecunimy
Damages in Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full
Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1565 (1986); Jeffrey Standen, The Fallacy of Full
Compensation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 145 (1995).
392 The Restatement (Second) itself merely states that the remedy may be limited as
justice requires. See REsrATEMNT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 351(3) (1979). According to
the comment, this may entail denying recovery for lost profits or restricting recovery to the
reliance measure. See id. at cmt. f. Additionally, in the American Law Institute's discussion
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added much to the analysis; for the most part, they merely approve or deny
consequential damages, rather than engage in any more nuanced allocation.
This seems less than wholly satisfactory, at least to the extent that one craves
certainty and predictability. The problem is complicated by the type of analysis
that has brought us to a partial solution. If the question is framed as whether the
risk was shifted, then a yes or no answer allows one either to put the whole risk
on the promisor or the promisee. As the comment to the Restatement (Second)
suggests, though, this dichotomy is false. Part of the risk may be shifted; part of
the damages may be removed. As Professor Young observed, this provision
calls, unusually in contract law, for half measures. 393
But what is to guide a court as it decides how to reduce damages? The ideal
answer might be to determine how much of the risk was shifted to the
promisor, holding the promisor liable for only that percentage. This is a
familiar idea from the law of contributory negligence, so a court would not
have to carry out a wholly novel task. But, of course, in negligence juries
determine the degree of contribution, subject to relatively modest judicial
constraint. This troubles few; routine negligence cases deal with routine risks,
so jurors can draw on their backgrounds to guide them to sensible results. In
disproportionality cases, however, the context is quite different, and far less
familiar. Perhaps Llewellyn's cherished merchant jurors could have determined
risk allocation from their collective experiences, but one may doubt whether
random draws from the venire would do as well. 394
Of course, there is a way to determine the allocation precisely, at least in
principle. One could determine what the risk of breach and the magnitude of
the loss were at the time of contracting, which would provide the risk premium.
of this provision, Professor Farnsworth, the reporter, suggested that it could also entail
distinguishing between essential and incidental reliance, though he could think of no cases
where this had happened. See 56 A.L.I. PRocEnDINGs 337-40 (1979).
393 See Young, supra note 14, at 24-30; see also, e.g., Comment, Lost Profits as
Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992,
1021-24 (1956) (proposing that damages in disproportionality cases be split to allow for
protecting expectation interest, compensating for losses caused by breach, reasonableness of
the parties' conduct, risk of similar losses in the future, ability to spread risk, and
undesirability of impeding future contracting). Sharing risk is more generally accepted, or at
least contemplated, in the law of impracticability and frustration-themselves fields in which
risk allocation is foremost, and errors motivate risk-shifting. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpem,
Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for "The Wisdom of
Solomon", 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1123 (1987); A. Mitchell Poliusky, Risk Sharing Through
Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983); Philip D. Weiss, Comment,
Apportioning Loss After Discharge of a Burdensome Contract: A Statutory Solution, 69 YALE
L.J. 1054, 1075-89 (1960).
394 On merchant juries, see, for example, Wiseman, supra note 259.
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This ideal risk premium could then be compared with the actual risk premium.
If the actual risk premium were, say, seventy percent of the ideal risk premium,
then the promisor would be liable for only seventy percent of the consequential
damages for that risk. In essence, the promisor would bear as much of the risk
as it was paid to bear, and no more.
This approach would work, were the data available. Unfortunately, they
probably would not be, at least not with any accuracy. The risk of breach might
be easy to determine for, say, a common carrier, where millions of transactions
would yield a fairly predictable default rate. For less frequent transactions,
though, the likelihood of the risk would largely be guesswork. The magnitude
of damage would be easier to determine, as that normally should differ little
from the actual damages proved.395 The accuracy of the ideal risk premium
thus would depend mainly on the accuracy of the measured risk. These
uncertainties pale, though, when compared with the uncertainties that attend
measuring the actual risk premium. Possibly the promisor had purchased
liability insurance that would cover these claims, and could determine from its
accounting records how much of the cost of this insurance was allocated to the
contract in question. More likely, though, such costs would be lumped together
with others, whether through a general overhead allowance or the like, and
would be quite difficult to parse out. Nor could one get to the actual risk
premium by subtracting everything else; that everything includes profit and
other hard-to-determine items. Moreover, the risk allowance for a contract
should ordinarily be a very small percentage of the contract price, the odd
contract to juggle chainsaws aside, so the effect of even a small error on the
larger items could be very great.
Nor do other approaches to risk allocation seem more promising. Though
some writers on impracticability have advocated loss sharing, seldom have they
proceeded beyond advocacy to standards. 396 Another possible analogy is gain
sharing in corporate mergers between controlling shareholders and minority
shareholders, for which Professors Brudney and ChireIstein have proposed
allocating gain according to the relative percentage of pre-merger values.397
395 In any event, the second part of Hadley requires notice of unusual risk; though this
notice need not come with a price tag, it should delimit the damages fairly well.
396 See, e.g., John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of
Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 750 (1964); Halpern, supra note 393; Jeffrey L.
Harrison, A Case for Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L. Ray. 573 (1983). It is fair to say that this
sort of ex post readjustment is not universally popular. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Judicia!
Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The United States, 64 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1984).
397 See Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and
Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REv. 297, 318-25 (1974). I am indebted to Barbara Banoff for this
observation.
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The analogy is appealing; after all, one of the definitions of a firm is based on
internalizing the gains from contracting.398 But what is each side's stake in a
contract? The expected value? The investment that makes performance
possible? The assets of the promisor and promisee? Here the analogy weakens,
perhaps fatally; in any event, it is hard to press this promising analogy very far.
So there is no wholly satisfactory way to apportion the risk ex post. Though
the methods above should work well enough in vitro, they would run into a
good many problems in vivo. Perhaps, then, the best result is to head back to
the finder of fact. True, commercial disputes may not be natural jury-fodder.
But counsel will still want to provide as much credible evidence on risk
allocation as possible, and the judge can instruct the jury to determine how the
parties actually allocated the risk (perhaps taking the method outlined above as
a template). Furthermore, the factors that should be used to determine whether
the risk should be borne by the promisor are relevant as well to determine just
how much of it should be borne. We might properly despair of calculating the
allocation precisely, but so too might we despair of risk allocation in a host of
other contexts.399 Eppur si muove.
In sum, this Article's approach will not settle exactly where low-
probability, high-magnitude risks should fall, and to what extent. No more, of
course, does any other approach. The approach suggested here, though,
conforms with cognitive reality (and with default theory as well, appropriately
modified), and gives guidance where guidance was lacking. Perhaps, then, it
can make more predictable a capricious area, and bring a measure of
certainty- and thus a more rational amount of planning-to the uncertain world
of disproportionate consequential damages. 40 0
398 See, e.g., WLTAMSON, supra note 178.
399 For instance, in CERCLA contribution actions, actions against multiple tortfeasors,
and the like. Cf. Lewis A. Komhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Settlements Under Joint and
Several Liability, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 427 (1993).
400 And, of course, the revision of Article 2 could further roil the waters if it merely
adopts the language of the Restatement (Second); after all, though most jurisdictions have not
yet adopted disproportionality, all, save Louisiana, have adopted Article 2 of the U.C.C., and
might be expected to adopt the revision. Perhaps the comments will give further guidance to
courts not hitherto troubled with this question.
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